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Corporate governance has been the topic of intense research and policy debates 
over the past two decades. Clearly, the duties that directors owe to their company 
are a key component of corporate governance. These duties were introduced in 
an attempt to create a fair and balanced relationship between shareholders and 
directors. This balance is needed to regulate tensions between ownership and 
control of companies. Nonetheless, if directors’ duties are not enforced 




The key objective of the current thesis is to analyse and assess the enforcement 
actions under Saudi law that can be taken against directors in breach of their 
duties compare to their counterparts in UK. This is done in the hope of benefiting 
from other countries’ more advanced political, financial and legal institutions and 
avoiding any shortcomings identified in existing legal systems. The newly 
enacted Companies Law 2015 substantially reformed and modernised company 
law in the country, yet it has not made any significant inroads in regards to 
enforcing the duties of directors. It was found that the new legislation requires 
further amendment and revision.  
The study found that the text stipulating the duties of directors in Saudi law that 
directors' substantive responsibilities are observed, though certain aspects are 
clearly ignored or neglected. What is required henceforth is for directors under 
Saudi law to have a broader way of covering director actions and behaviour. Also, 
it was argued that if directors are in breach of their duty in Saudi Arabia then 
there is no effective legal course by which private actions can be initiated to 
punish or reprimand the wrongdoers. On the other hand, the author found that 
public enforcement actions are not only sufficient but more efficacious compared 
to private actions and enforcement.  Therefore, this study proposes to a number 
of changes to existing Saudi Law and argues that the legal system in Saudi Arabia 
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CHAPTER 1. Introductory 
 
1.1 Brief background   
 
The concept of corporate governance has acquired significant interest over the 
past two decades as both Western and less developed economies have suffered 
on account of financial crises, economic downturns and corporate scandals. For 
instance, the Enron and WorldCom scandals highlighted the need for corporate 
governance provisions to monitor and regulate the activity of multinational 
corporations on an international scale. As these companies, along with many 
others, reached bankruptcy on account of investor distrust and financial fraud, the 
need for a regimented corporate governance framework to ensure greater 
transparency and protection for the public has been acknowledged1. In addition, 
corporate governance contributes mainly towards protecting shareholders’ rights, 
which includes maximising their profits; participating in general meetings, and 
being informed when needed, thereby creating an appropriate atmosphere to 
attract transnational commerce as well as guarantee the economic stability 2. 
 
                                                             
1 Simon Ho and Kar Wong, “A Study of the Relationship Between Corporate Governance 
Structures and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosure”, Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation, 2001, 10, 139. 
2  See Ruth V. Aguilera, Luiz Ricardo Kabbach-Castro, Jun Ho Lee and Jihae You, 
“Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets” March 12, 2012, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1806525 , and also, see David Milman, National Corporate Law in 
A Globalized Market, Edward Elgar, 2009, p28. 
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Since the late 20th century, several bodies, such as the World Bank and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have 
realised the significant importance of corporate governance. Therefore, they have 
contributed effectively in this area by creating or developing programs3. The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has played 
the most significant role in improving the concept of corporate governance as it 
has established basic principles of corporate governance, which are: 
shareholders’ rights, equitable treatment of shareholders, stakeholders’ role, 
board responsibilities and disclosure and transparency4, before adding the sixth 
principles which is ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance 
framework5. In fact, all the above mentioned principles cannot be applied without 
the board of directors, so the directors’ responsibilities, or in other words the 
directors’ duties, are central to the aforesaid principles. 
In this respect, the role of government is to adopt effective principles through 
binding rules which are enforced by the firms in order to govern any wrongful 
behaviour, as well as playing a fundamental role whereby a sound framework is 
                                                             
3 See John D Sullivan, "Building Sound Corporate Governance for Global Competitiveness" 
Presentation to the Colombian Confederation of Chambers of Commerce, Cartagena, 
Colombia, 2000. 
4 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, by Organization of Economic Co-Operation & 
Development, 1999. 




set up for a market economy; otherwise, anarchy would be the result6. For 
example, in the UK, a complicated network of statutory law questions possible 
misconduct and stipulate director duties. These laws have been created in an 
effort to right the balance between directors and shareholders7.  
It is indisputable that directors’ duties to their company are an important element 
of corporate governance in particular, and company law on the whole8. However, 
although it is very often that the corporate law in each jurisdictions -including 
UK Saudi laws- provide an elegant set of rules on the duties owed by directors, 
this is only one side of the issue. It is essential to have an effective and adequate 
enforcement scheme, in case of a breach of their duties9, otherwise, these duties 
are unlikely to make any real difference to corporate management. 
This thesis will examine the ways in which enforcement actions with regard to 
the directors’ duties can be taken, which should lead to good corporate 
governance, better shareholders’ protection, and therefore a successful business 
for shareholders and the community at large. 
                                                             
6 See John D Sullivan, "Building Sound Corporate Governance for Global Competitiveness" 
Presentation to the Colombian Confederation of Chambers of Commerce, Cartagena, 
Colombia, 2000. 
7 Shuangge Wen, Shareholder primacy and corporate governance: legal aspects, practices 
and future directions, Routledge, 2013, p.74. 
8 Andrew Keay, “The Public Enforcement of Directors' Duties” January 16, 2013. Available 




1.2. The importance of the topic 
In terms of the significance of the topic, this stems mainly from the importance 
of corporate governance itself, as mentioned above. In other words, the 
importance of the enforcement of directors’ duties, based on the fact that this is 
considered a critical point in corporate governance topics. 
 However, one may ask: why are the directors’ duties so important? The answer 
to that question is due to the fact that a company is a separate legal entity10, but 
without a brain, so it cannot run or act save only through its directors, relying on 
their stewardship11. In other words, being an artificial legal person, the company 
needs a natural person to act on its behalf. There are two means in which the 
company can act which involve stockholders in general meetings and the 
directors. Having said that, the power to institute litigation on a company’s behalf, 
tends to be vested by the articles of association, according to the board of 
directors. Therefore, when litigation is triggered, since one or more members of 
the board of directors breach their duties, then the director(s) will encounter a 
major conflict of interest. This poses a major obstacles in the way of enforcing 
the directors’ duties which have been provided by the law12. Hence, it is necessary 
                                                             
10 The establishment that companies are separate legal entity refers to Salomon v Salomon & 
Co Ltd [1896] UKHL 1. 
11 See Philip Lawton and Yung, Boyce, “Corporate political connection as a determinant 
of corporate governance in Hong Kong” Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 2012, 63, 449. 
12 Hans C. Hirt, The enforcement of directors' duties in Britain and Germany: a comparative 
study with particular reference to large companies. Peter Lang, 2004, p.17. 
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to find a legal solution for the shareholders, in order to protect their rights and the 
company’s right not to be subject to wrongful practices by the directors.  
Also, the importance of the topic can be seen clearly in the way that it is an 
attempt to deal with the most important elements of corporate governance. Hence, 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has tended to develop its laws and regulations to 
cope with global market needs, especially since its accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2005.  
Notable efforts have been made by the government of Saudi Arabia to introduce 
a stable and strong legal system to structure governance and ensure that the 
function of human resource management is properly applied all through the 
country13. Moreover, to better safeguard the interests of shareholders, the Saudi 
Stock Market has introduced a range of policies and guidelines for best practice. 
Several essential characteristics of the institutional framework for corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia can be identified from the perspective of the Saudi 
Stock Market14. Since the start of the 21st century, the Saudi Stock Market has 
experienced significant development. During the period 2001-2005, there was a 
nine-fold increase in the market value of shares, from SR. 275 billion to SR. 2438 
billion15. However, this promising growth was cut short by the market crash in 
                                                             
13 See Kamel Mellahi,"The effect of regulations on HRM: private sector firms in Saudi 
Arabia" The International Journal of Human Resource Management 18.1, 2007, 85. 
14 Christopher Robertson, Sulaiman Al-AlSheikh and Ali Al-Kahtani "An Analysis of 
Perceptions of Western Corporate Governance Principles in Saudi Arabia" International 




early 2006. The Capital Market Authority (CMA) reacted to this critical situation 
by publishing a detailed corporate governance regulation mandate with the 
purpose of informing Saudi state-owned companies about best governance 
practices16. Al-Abbas conducted an empirical research addressing the impact of 
the absence of corporate governance on earnings management behaviour and 
questioning whether regulations should be multiplied or minimised if governance 
rules are to facilitate and promote Saudi commercial development. The findings 
of this research suggested that there is a necessity to regulate the governance 
practices used by Saudi companies through the introduction of a monitoring 
programme17. 
In this regards, a new bill proposing amendments to the Companies Law was 
passed by the Consultative Council of Saudi Arabia (Shura Council) in 2011 for 
ratification by the Ministers Council,18 which has just ratified the bill. Recently, 
a Royal Decree approving the long-awaited new Companies Law 1437H/2015G 
has been promulgated by the King.19. Section 227 of the new law states that it 
will come into force 150 days after its publication in the Official Gazette, which 
took place on 4 December 2015.20 This means the CL 2015 came into force on 3 
                                                             
16 See Mohammed Al-Abbas “Corporate governance and earnings management: An empirical 
study of the Saudi market” The Journal of American Academy of Business, 2009, 15, 301. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See Riyadh Newspaper, 21st February 2011, http://www.alriyadh.com/606824 . 
19 The Royal decree NO. 3 in 11/11/2015.  
20 Umm al-Qura Gazette, Companies Law, available at 
http://www.uqn.gov.sa/News/PDFVersion/UM-ALQURA.4595.pdf (Accessed on 27th 
December 2015).  
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May 2016. The Law represents a significant overhaul and modernisation of Saudi 
Company Law, aligning it closer with global trends and developments in 
corporate law and governance. For example, the concept of holding companies, 
the possibility of setting up single-shareholder companies, provision prevention 
the combination of the post of chairperson with executive positions (including 
that of CEO) and compulsory cumulative voting have been introduced. 
Nevertheless, as this thesis will address, the new law has made no major changes 
to minority shareholders’ right to sue directors. 
Although the CL 2015 substantially reformed and modernised company law in 
the country, it still needs to be revised and amended. It is possible to put forth 
recommendations to amend the CL 2015 according to fresh developments and 
requirements. The main aspects that demand attention are improvement of the 
structure of corporate governance, better enforcement of directors’ duties, and 
consolidation of shareholder protection based on the efficiency of enforcement 
actions.  
From this standpoint, the research will aim to contribute to this reform process by 
benefiting from the experiences of more developed countries in this field. 
1.3. Aims and objectives  
This thesis aims to analyse and provide a critique of the appropriate methods for 
the shareholders’ protection in light of the enforcement of the duties of the 
company's board in Saudi and the UK’s legal systems. This will contribute to the 
protection of the rights of shareholders, and enhance confidence and promote 
16 
 
greater integrity in the market. To this end, the study addresses three main issues. 
First, it will clarify the duties of the board in each legal system. Furthermore, it 
will illustrate misconduct according to actions which are considered to be a 
breach of the duties, when a director(s) commits them.  
Second, the study provides a critical analysis of each of the actions that can be 
taken, whether publicly or privately, to enforce the duties of the directors; taking 
into consideration any obstacles which could affect or prevent the establishment 
of such action.  
Finally, it attempts to provide appropriate solutions by learning from other 
countries’ regulations using methods that reveal proven success. This means that 
the study will try to identify the weaknesses in each legal system in an attempt to 
find possible solutions, taking into account the economic, political and social 
structures in each country. 
1.4. Methodology  
This study will use two research methods – one comparative and one critical – in 
performing this analysis. Firstly, the objectives of this research will be met using 
some aspects of comparative law approach. The study will be carried out between 
the Saudi and UK’s jurisdictions in terms of dealing with the enforcement of 
directors’ duties. This will help to clarify the similarities and differences between 
both laws. This will broaden the horizons for Saudi legislators and reformers 
which will contribute to improving the scope of laws. Secondly, as the study deals 
17 
 
with the situation in the UK and Saudi Arabia, a review of both primary and 
secondary sources of literature will enable the critical analysis of current practice 
in each jurisdictions. First, primary resources such as company law, stock market 
regulations, public agencies’ decisions, law cases and other relative laws and 
regulations will be important sources of information. Secondary resources, 
including books, journals and papers will be important too, to support the 
analytical approach of this study21. Also, due to the lack of research studies on 
the topic, this thesis will use some valuable PhD theses as sources where the work 
has not been published elsewhere. 
 The UK law has been chosen since it is considered among the most advanced 
jurisdictions in the area of corporate law, particularly in terms of how it deals 
with directors’ duties and their enforcement. Based on its long experience in this 
field, this thesis will consider a number of sources of UK law. Court cases and 
legislation, particularly the Companies Act 2006, have comprehensively covered 
a number of directors’ duties aspects. Even after the introduction of the new Saudi 
Companies Law 2015, there remain some essential points that have not yet been 
addressed. Hence, it will be useful to carefully consider relevant UK legislation, 
as it could significantly contribute to the development of the CL 2015. 
                                                             
21 The author has attended a workshop of "comparative research in commercial law- 
challenges and opportunities-" which took place in Durham University on 25th June 2013. 
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On this subject it is necessary to discuss the concept of legal transplantation. 
Legal transplantation has been defined as the transposition of a system of law or 
rule from one jurisdiction to another and is considered the most productive source 
of development of the law. Legal transplantation does not involve transplanting 
the essence of a legal system but rather borrowing substantive laws, legal 
structures, legal concepts and institutions. In other words, a legal rule originating 
in one jurisdiction can be transplanted to another verbatim, but will still not be 
the same legal rule22. Legrand maintained that although a rule is likely to 
understand in a certain manner, there must be certain sorts of epistemological 
assumptions behind the understanding of rule in particular aspects23. 
 Correspondingly, a specific enforcement action may be successful in one legal 
context but may fail when moved to a different legal environment. That is, the 
specific conditions in which a legal instrument operates must be considered when 
any attempt is made to transplant this instrument. If conditions differ the 
instrument may not function as expected. In addition, reformers of legislation 
need to confirm that the new law is needed and demanded in a domestic context 
                                                             
22 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants, Scottish Academic Press Ltd, Edinburgh, 1974, pp.19-21. 
23 Pierre Legrand, “The Impossibility of Legal Transplants”, Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 4, 1997, 111. 
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and can be delivered in a way that meets this need.24 Indeed, too much legal 
reform can create uncertainty for and can lead to an unstable system.25  
In particular, while the adoption of corporate notions and structures from other 
countries is commonplace, this does not mean that challenges do not arise26. Stout 
believes that the task of successfully transplanting the United States’ corporate 
law can vary from only being slightly challenging to extremely difficult. She 
argues that to enhance the possibilities of effective transmission, we should 
employ the help of anthropologists, sociologists, historians, and even political 
scientists27.  
Nonetheless, legal transplantation is a valuable element in the creation and 
implementation of a new legal strategy and related literature. In order for a legal 
transplantation to be successful it is necessary for legislators to identify the 
potential opportunities that the adoption of a legal element can offer. This can be 
achieved by describing the reasons why the legal transplant is needed.28 Put 
                                                             
24 Daniel Berkowitz Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard. "Economic development, 
legality, and the transplant effect" European Economic Review, 47.1, 2003, 165. 
25 See David, Milman, National Corporate Law in A Globalized Market, Edward Elgar, 2009, 
p.37. 
26 Ibid, p.24. 
27 Lynn A. Stout, “On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: 
Can a Transplant Take?” UCLA, School of Law Working Paper No. 02-11. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=313679 . [Accessed 5 October 2016]. It is submitted that 
corporate regulations are less complicated to transmit compared to family legislation as they 
are not as likely to be dismissed by the new country during the transmission process. See 
Mathias Siems and David Cabrelli, Comparative Company Law: A Case-based Approach, 
Hart Publishing, 2013, p.10. 
28 María Paula Reyes Gaitán, The challenges of legal transplants in a globalized context, 
Diss. University of Warwick, 2014, p.48. 
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simply, law-makers need to adopt a foreign legal element that has been shown to 
be effective in its original context to maximise the chances that it will work in a 
new context29. 
The situation with regard to Companies Law (now 2015; formerly 1965) in Saudi 
Arabia is complex, given that its general structure was originally promulgated 
through French and Egyptian Law30. Seeking to introduce laws common in 
Western countries into Saudi Arabia could be problematic, given the country's 
under-pinning reliance on Shari’ah law. Providing there is no compromise to the 
principles of Shari'ah, research suggests that appropriate laws and regulations 
from foreign legal frameworks can be adopted into Shari'ah law31.  The prevailing 
view that Islam, the demands of globalisation and the international markets, are 
mutually incompatible is incorrect, according to Miles and Goulding32. The 
authors concur that the mores attributed to Western capital markets do not 
necessarily compromise observant practice of the Islamic faith. Rather, the 
requirements of the international market and globalisation more generally are 
compatible with Islam.  
                                                             
29 Mathias Siems, Comparative Law, Cambridge University Press.2014, p.190. 
30 Maren Hanson, “The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia” 
Arab Law Quarterly, 1987, 272. 
31 For in depth see Ch 3, paras 3.1.1.2. 
32 Lilian Miles and Simon Goulding, “Corporate governance in Western (Anglo-American) 
and Islamic communities: prospects for convergence?” J.B.L. 2010, 2, 126. 
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1.5 Research question 
The research question has been carefully selected to suggest reform to the current 
Saudi practice of directors’ duties and the possible enforcement actions when 
these duties are breached. This thesis will mainly attempt to answer the following 
question: To what extent does UK legislation provide effective enforcement 
actions for directors’ duties in comparison to Saudi law?  
To this end, this question will be addressed and critically evaluated throughout 
chapters of the thesis.  
1.6 The scope and limitations of the study 
This research addresses a number of research questions and involves evaluating 
current practice in the area of the enforcement of directors’ duties in Saudi Arabia 
with reference to more developed jurisdictions.  This paper will discuss the 
enforcement of directors' duties to protect the rights of shareholders in Saudi 
Arabia and the UK, including directors' duties towards the company; directors' 
actions that are considered to be a breach of their duties; possible enforcement 
actions, and the difficulties that may be faced as regards enforcement. Hence, this 
study excludes the issue of the protection of non-shareholders, such as creditors 
and other stakeholders. Therefore, only enforcement actions against the directors 
of a solvent company with the purpose of safeguarding the rights of the 
shareholders are analysed here. 
22 
 
This research will primarily consider the situation according to UK and Saudi 
Arabian law. Nevertheless, it will make reference to other legal systems in 
developed countries such as Germany, Canada and Australia, when the researcher 
sees this as beneficial. 
1.7 Research Structure 
In order to answer the research questions in depth, this thesis is divided into six 
chapters. First of all, the introductory chapter will provide a brief background to 
the study, identifying the importance of the research, aims, methodology, 
questions, scope and limitations. 
Chapter 2 will both define what a ‘director’ is and will explain what is required 
for a person to become a director. As the structure of boards of directors varies, 
it will then be discussed which structure is most effective to ensure the best 
possible operation and performance of a company. As a final point, the statutory 
responsibilities placed on formally appointed directors will be reviewed. 
Furthermore, as courts have repeatedly applied statutory and common law duties 
to those directors who are not formally appointed, the different director types 
acknowledged by both the courts and statute will also be explored. 
Chapter 3 will examine UK law and Saudi Arabian and Shari’ah law as they relate 
to the responsibilities of directors. The responsibilities of directors have always 
been considered to be central to good corporative behaviour. Correspondingly, 
director misconduct has been blamed as the driving force behind explosive 
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corporate scandals, Enron, for example. In the UK, the duties of directors and 
what constitutes a breach of these duties is laid out in the CA 2006 while in Saudi 
Arabia it is laid out in Companies Law 2015. Saudi Arabian law has the additional 
component of Shari’ah principles and standards which provide suggestions on 
how to confront fraud and misconduct and improve the regulatory response. It 
will be seen that there are a number of similarities in the basic features of the 
duties of directors in both countries as well as some considerable differences. 
This chapter will present an evaluation of the responsibilities of directors in both 
legal systems and will compare and contrast them. 
In practice, directors’ duties are unlikely to make any real difference to corporate 
management in any legal system if they are not efficiently enforced. Depending 
on whether the action is taken by a private party or a state official, enforcement 
is categorised as either private or public. Private and public enforcement will be 
examined in Chapter 4 and 5 respectively. 
Chapter 4 will examine the efficiency of private enforcement actions. This 
chapter will be separated into five sections. The first section will address 
derivative claims under UK law, which can be taken up by minority shareholders 
on behalf of the company. It will also be discussed whether these actions are 
recognised by SCL 2015. The second section will concentrate on personal suits, 
while the third section will explore unfairly prejudicial conduct claims. The 
fourth section will discuss the additional measures that shareholders can resort to. 
24 
 
Finally, the fifth section will present the impediments to enforcement that arise 
from the pervasiveness of the principle of majority rule, as well as the drawbacks 
of an enforcement system underpinned by shareholder action. As regards the 
scope and limitations of this study, litigation against the directors of a solvent 
company as a means of safeguarding the rights of shareholders will be the only 
issue assessed. 
Chapter 5 will be divided into three main sections in order to fully address public 
enforcement. In the first part, public enforcers will be discussed. This section 
outlines the public decision-making bodies that are authorised to penalise 
directors who have violated their responsibilities in the UK and Saudi Arabia. 
The second part of the chapter examines the various measures that can be utilised 
by state officials in the UK and Saudi Arabia to penalise a director who has 
violated civil or criminal law. These measures could be outcomes such as director 
disqualification, financial sanction or even punishment under criminal law. The 
final section will highlight the obstacles to public enforcement actions. 
Finally, the concluding chapter will summarise the research findings. Also, it will 
provide some recommendations in the hope of contributing to Saudi Arabia’s 
legal reform programmes which are aimed at improving current practice as 
regards the enforcement of directors’ duties. In addition, future research will be 




CHAPTER 2. The nature of the Board of Directors 
The everyday influence of boards of directors is not immediately apparent: so 
people often doubt their importance. However, their significance is clear when 
disaster strikes, as illustrated by the corporate scandals of Parmalat, Worldcom, 
Enron33. A substantial amount of academic research and a great deal of political 
debate about governance reform has centred on boards as a result of such 
corporate scandals and continuing apprehension about corporate governance34. 
Chapter 2 will both define what a ‘director’ is and will explain what is required 
for a person to become a director. As the structure of boards of directors varies, 
it will then be discussed which structure is most effective to ensure the best 
possible operation of a company. Also, the statutory responsibilities placed on 
formally appointed directors will be reviewed. However, as courts have 
repeatedly applied statutory and common law duties to directors who are not 
formally appointed to that position35, the different director types acknowledged 
by both the courts and statute will also be explored. Finally, a summary will be 
provided. 
                                                             
33 See Lynn A Stout, The shareholder value myth: How putting shareholders first harms 
investors, corporations, and the public, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2012, p.22. 
34 See Renee Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin, and Michael S. Weisbach “The role of boards of 
directors in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey”, Working Paper 
14486, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008, available at: 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14486.pdf . 
35 See Paul Lyndon Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, p. 510. 
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2.1 The definition of a “Director” 
The CA 2006 states that a ‘director’ includes any person occupying the position 
of director, by whatever name called36. Thus, shadow directors, de jure directors 
and de facto directors are all covered by this definition found in s.250 of the 
statute37. Nonetheless a distinct definition of a shadow director is given in s.251. 
Section 251 states that a shadow director is someone in accordance with whose 
directions or instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act. 
Apparently, the law-makers evidently deemed it necessary to expand on the 
unique character of shadow directors. 
In Saudi Arabia, no piece of legislation currently includes an explicit definition 
of ‘director’. However, defining precisely what the directors are is vitally 
important and centres on the key concern of the question by whom the duties of 
directors are owed? In Saudi Arabian law, in order to be acknowledged as a 
director, an individual must be formally appointed to this role38 and thus de facto 
and shadow directors are not recognised. It is recommended that, when 
introducing new amendments into the CL 2015, law-makers include a clear 
definition of ‘director’ to prevent uncertainty when enforcing the law. 
 
                                                             
36 S.250 of the CA 2006. 
37 See Ch 2, para 2.4. 
38 S.66 of the CL 1965, s.68 of the CL 2015. 
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2.2 The requirements for directors 
A director must be formally appointed in order to act on a firm’s behalf. The CA 
2006 covers what is needed to formally appoint a director in the United 
Kingdom39. The statute states that no one under the age of sixteen can be 
appointed a company director, although the Secretary of State is empowered to 
create special regulatory provisions that will allow someone under the age of 
sixteen to be made a director. These provisions must clarify the specific situations 
in which such an appointment can be made and any conditions that may apply in 
such a case40. In Australia the law is slightly different and a director of a company 
must be at least eighteen years of age41.  
No clauses within the CL 2015 make reference to what age an individual must be 
in order to be recognised as a director. However, the Commercial Court Law 
(CCL) 1931, s.4, does specify that an individual has the right to engage in any 
form of trade profession once they achieve the age of majority. The age of 
majority in Saudi Arabian is eighteen, as decided by the Shura Council (or the 
Consultative Assembly of Saudi Arabia) 42. Therefore, to be recognised as a 
director in Saudi Arabia, one must be a minimum of eighteen-years-old43. Yet, it 
can be considered that the role of a director is not classed as a form of trade 
                                                             
39 Ss.157-161 of the CA 2006. 
40 Ss. 157(1), 158 (1) and (2) of the CA 2006. 
41 S.201B of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
42 Shura Council Decree No: 114 in 1955.  
43 See Sadiq Al-Jubran, The Joint Stock Company’s Board of Directors in Saudi Law, 
Alhalabi for legal publications, Lebanon, 2006, p. 132. 
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profession according to the CL 2015 and the CCL 1931. In addition, Saudi 
Arabian legislation relating to directors is completely silent in regards to how old 
an individual must be in order to be appointed to a board of directors. It has thus 
been argued that the CL 2015 should make specify a minimum age requirement 
for directors. 
 
In UK, the CA 2006 also demands that public companies have a minimum of two 
directors whereas private companies can have only one44. Nonetheless, a 
minimum of one board member for every company (public or private) must be a 
natural person45. 
In July 2013, a paper entitled ‘Transparency and trust - enhancing the 
transparency of UK company ownership and increasing trust in UK business’ was 
published by the United Kingdom’s Business, Innovation and Skills Department. 
Following consultation on the paper, in April 2014 the UK government made 
public what actions it intended to take. The ‘Transparency and trust’ paper 
suggests that all directors should be individuals rather than corporate directors, 
and that companies in the UK should not be allowed to appoint corporate 
directors. The reason for this is that it is believed that the appointment of 
individuals as directors would improve accountability in regards to who is in 
                                                             
44 S.154 of the CA 2006. 
45 S.155 of the CA 2006. 
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practical control of businesses in the United Kingdom46. The government, 
however, decided that a pragmatic approach in these matters was required. In 
certain sectors of the UK economy47, corporate governance and transparency are 
considered to be less important issues and corporate directors are seen as valuable 
assets. The government is endeavouring to improve the UK’s business 
environment, which includes not introducing onerous restrictions. A default 
prohibition is thus being implemented, with some exemptions to this prohibition 
being put in place. Thus, the majority of businesses will be prohibited from 
appointing corporate directors to their boards, but some businesses will still be 
able to do this. The goal here is to reduce the appointment of one company as a 
director of another except in cases where the appointment of corporate directors 
has less risk attached to it and greater potential value48.  Following this, the Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 was introduced. In this respect, 
after October 2016 when the S.87 of the Small Business, Enterprise and 
Employment Act 2015 comes into effect, it is possible that legal persons will no 
longer be eligible. This is based upon a change in the CA 2006 whereby only 
natural persons can be employed as a company director49. 
                                                             
46 See “Transparency and Trust - Enhancing the transparency of UK company ownership and 
increasing trust in UK business –Government response-“published by the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, April 2014, para.161. 
47 Ibid, para.168. The government response does not specify which sectors of the UK 
economy consider directors’ duties more important. 
48 Ibid, paras.167-169. 
49 S.87 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, and the new s.156A (1) 
of CA 2006. 
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In Saudi Arabia, a few decades ago a number of practical problems had arisen in 
relation to legal persons being appointed to the boards of directors of joint stock 
companies.  
As a response to this situation, in 1989 the then-Trade Minister announced what 
is referred to as Decision No. 432. This decision introduced a set of rules designed 
to control the appointment of legal persons to joint stock company boards. A 
number of limitations to such appointments were implemented. Firstly, a natural 
person must be appointed by a legal person to act on the legal person’s behalf for 
an unlimited amount of time; secondly, no legal person can be on the boards of 
three joint stock companies simultaneously; thirdly, s.78 of the CL 2015 applies 
to the legal person (and the legal person’s representative) making it possible for 
them to be held liable for a violation of a director’s duty; and lastly, the legal 
person’s representative can face criminal sanctions50 if convicted of a crime under 
the CL 2015 specifically or Saudi Arabian law generally. These crimes include 
fraud, misuse of funds, distributing false dividends51 and mismanagement52. 
                                                             
50 See Ch 5, para 5.2. 
51 When there is no profit, no dividends may be distributed to shareholders; when dividends 
are paid without the existence of profits, they are deemed fictitious. 
52 Ss. 229,230 of the CL 1965, ss.212, 213 of the CL 2015. 
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2.3 Board structures 
2.3.1 A unitary or a supervisory board structure? 
Inherent in corporate governance is the problematic issue of collective action. A 
board is one apparatus intended to help settle this issue. A board is responsible 
for the oversight of a company’s actions and the appointment of managers. It also 
operates on shareholders’ behalf in a monitoring capacity. There are two chief 
forms of board structure found in developed nations. The unitary (single) 
structure is made up of independent directors and managers and blends the 
monitoring and advisory responsibilities of the board together. In the two-tier 
(dual) structure the board’s monitoring and advisory responsibilities are divided 
up. A management board oversees the company’s operations and a distinct 
supervisory board, on which managers cannot sit, oversees a company’s 
activities. In particular, a supervisory board oversees the appointment of 
managers and how they are monitored53. 
In Europe, the US and the UK, the majority of boards have a unitary structure. 
However, in some European nations, such as Finland and France, two-tier boards 
are often adopted and in some countries, Austria and Germany for example, a 
dual board structure is compulsory. A two-tier board will typically comprise a 
supervisory board and a managing board made up of the company’s executives. 
                                                             
53 See Francois Belot, Edith Ginglinger, Myron B. Slovin and Marie E. Sushka,“Freedom of 
Choice between Unitary and Two-Tier Boards: An Empirical Analysis” October 1, 2013, 
Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), 112(3), 364. 
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Co-determination, that is, the representation of employees on a supervisory board, 
is also compulsory in Germany54. The internal organisation of European 
Companies, or SEs, is significantly benefitted by the Council Regulation on the 
Statute for a European Company (SE) 2157/2001 as this Regulation gives 
European Companies the freedom to determine their own management structure. 
As per Art.38 (b) of the SE Regulation, founding members of a European 
Company face no limitations when choosing whether to practice a unitary or two-
tier board structure55. 
 
 A unitary board is simpler than a two-tier structure and offers a more efficient 
decision-making process, quicker reaction times to key events and facilitates 
better communication between directors and managers. Empirical research has 
identified that when a CEO is part of the control group a unitary system is 
favoured. This indicates that control in such organisations is centralised56. Also, 
single board systems that are capital market oriented offer greater flexibility, 
                                                             
54 See Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson and Michael Wright, Corporate governance: 
accountability, enterprise and international comparisons, John Wiley & Sons, 2005, p.256, 
and also see Francois Belot, Edith Ginglinger, Myron B. Slovin and Marie E. Sushka, 
“Freedom of Choice between Unitary and Two-Tier Boards: An Empirical Analysis” October 
1, 2013, Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), 112(3), 364. 
55 See Jessica Schmidt “SE and SCE: two new European company forms - and more to 
come!” Comp. Law. 2006, 27(4), 99. For in depth see John Quinn “German codetermination 
and Ireland's convergence” Comp. Law. 2016, 37(11), 331. 
56 See Francois Belot, Edith Ginglinger, Myron B. Slovin and Marie E. Sushka,“Freedom of 
Choice between Unitary and Two-Tier Boards: An Empirical Analysis” October 1, 2013, 
Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), 112(3), 364. 
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slimmed down management structures and improved flow of information57. 
Subsidiaries and smaller companies (that do not have to abide by co-
determination) are thus more likely to benefit from a unitary structure58. 
 
A unitary board of directors in a British company has two key functions which 
appear to be irreconcilable with each other. The board is the company’s ultimate 
executive organ and is legally obliged to make sure that the actions of the business 
comply with company law and other relevant legal provisions and to produce and 
implement business tactics on the shareholders’ behalf. The board’s second role 
is to act as the key institutional apparatus through which shareholders are 
supposed to be able to hold the managers of their assets accountable for their 
actions as stewards59. In conventional single board structures, management and 
supervision are carried out by the one administrative organ. Yet, a unitary board 
will generally have wide-ranging discretionary powers to delegate authority as 
the needs of companies differ. A board may give non-board member managers 
considerable authority and thus only be responsible for overseeing the 
management of this authority. In the most permissive systems, the board is given 
complete control over delegating authority, except in the case of hiring and firing 
                                                             
57 See Paul Davies, "Board structure in the UK and Germany: convergence or continuing 
divergence?" 2001, Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=262959. 
58 See Jessica Schmidt “SE and SCE: two new European company forms - and more to 
come!” Comp. Law. 2006, 27(4), 99. 
59 See Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson and Michael Wright, Corporate governance: 
accountability, enterprise and international comparisons, John Wiley & Sons, 2005, p.104. 
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rights. This approach is prevalent in the UK where boards generally enjoy all the 
firm’s powers but are able to distribute these to non-board member managers60. 
 
In the 1990s, the unitary board structure of the UK came under fire when a 
number of businesses collapsed and instances of mismanagement were revealed. 
Analysts looked into the make-up and responsibilities of boards of directors 
concentrating on the part that non-executive directors played in both monitoring 
and reprimanding senior executives. It was established that hiring decisions 
regarding non-executive directors (NEDs) were taken in large part by CEOs. It 
was also found that boards that consisted of a number of independent members 
had greater freedom and more authority over CEOs. Companies with these boards 
performed better but it was postulated that managers may have lacked the 
motivation to make choices that carried higher risks and returns. Furthermore, it 
was also found that NEDs can have an effect on strategic decision-making and 
control but, as compared with CEOs, they may lack adequate information and 
proficiency. Lastly, it was highlighted by Ezzamel and Watson that requiring 
NEDs to both monitor executives and act as their equals on boards as managers 
of a firm did sometimes result in conflict61. 
                                                             
60 See Paul Davies and Klaus Hopt "Boards in Europe–Accountability and 
convergence."Ecgi, Law Working Paper 205, 2013, 25. 
61 See Mahmoud Ezzamel and Robert Watson, Wearing two hats: the conflicting control and 
management roles of non-executive directors, Corporate governance, 1997, 54-79, and also 
see Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson and Michael Wright, eds. Corporate governance: 




Certain analysts examined closely held companies62 and established that a two-
tier board structure is a helpful mechanism for delegating investment project 
decisions to qualified managers. Another benefit of the dual system is that 
creativity is left to the management organ. Qualified managers can do what they 
need to collect project data without running the risk that key shareholders’ (who 
form part of the supervisory board) incentives in relation to monitoring will be 
impacted upon63. Moreover, it is more feasible that a meaningful division of 
management and supervisory activities can be achieved in a two-tier system. This 
division offers an improved balance of authority, more transparency, enhanced 
responsiveness to stakeholders and better relationships between managers. There 
are also a number of examples which, in reviewing the type of information passed 
on to stakeholders, are seen to illustrate that a two-tier system is a more modern 
business system compared with the unitary system. It was the position of the 
majority of companies that the chain of command remains the same but that a 
much-needed gap between directors and managers is created by transferring their 
existing independent directors to supervisory boards64. It has been claimed that, 
irrespective of the role given to a supervisory board, in Germany large 
                                                             
62 A closely held corporation is any company that has only a limited number of shareholders; 
its share is publicly traded on occasion, not on a regular basis. 
63 See Clara Graziano and Annalisa Luporini, "Ownership concentration, monitoring, and 
optimal board structure." Economics Bulletin 32.4, 2012, 3333. 
64 See Francois Belot, Edith Ginglinger, Myron B. Slovin and Marie E. Sushka,“Freedom of 
Choice between Unitary and Two-Tier Boards: An Empirical Analysis” October 1, 2013, 
Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), 112(3), 364. 
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shareholders can adequately monitor management, monitoring that also 
advantages minority shareholders. Moreover, a lesser focus on a supervisory 
board’s role as monitor gives them the freedom to engage with the company’s 
stakeholders and to network. The effectiveness of the German two-tier system 
explains why there has been little public debate in the country concerning the 
possibility of employing a unitary board structure65.  
 
In theory, a dual board of directors’ structure avoids conflicts of interest in regards 
to lawsuits. Germany’s two-tier system includes the Aufsichtsrat (supervisory 
board) and the Vorstand (management board). The Aufsichtsrat represents the 
business’s claims against the Vorstand while the Vorstand can bring a claim 
against Aufsichtsrat members. This arrangement naturally requires that one must 
be a member of either the Vorstand or the Aufsichtsrat and definitely not both66. 
This kind of set-up has a lot to recommend it on a theoretical basis, however, it is 
claimed that it does not prove effective in reality67.   
A dual board structure also provides the potential for litigation to be brought by 
shareholders and the supervisory board (as a collective or separately) against 
management. Yet, the supervisory board has strong motivation to avoid bringing 
                                                             
65 See Paul Davies, "Board structure in the UK and Germany: convergence or continuing 
divergence? 2001, Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=262959. 
66 S.90 of the German Stock Corporation Act 2010. 
67 See Hans C. Hirt, “The enforcement of directors' duties in Britain and Germany : a 
comparative study with particular reference to large companies”Peter Lang AG, Euroean 
Academic Publisher, 2004, p.262. 
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claims against management as such a claim can appear to indicate that the 
supervisory organ itself has not carried out its duties effectively. The 
Bundesgerichtshof’s decision in the ARAG/Garmenbeck68 case is of note here. 
The decision in this case reflected that the supervisory board, who had decided 
not to sue, could not rely on the protection of the business judgement rule and 
thus a higher level of judicial inspection was applied to the supervisory board. 
Nonetheless, a supervisory board can still exercise a certain level of discretion 
when it comes to considering the business interests of a company when assessing 
whether to bring a claim. Unsurprisingly, after the ARAG/Garmenbeck decision, 
the amount of claims brought against management by supervisory boards went 
up, especially in the wake of the 2008/9 financial crisis. However, it is still 
difficult to obtain the necessary empirical data to prove a claim as typically only 
anecdotal evidence and financial statements are available. Thus, the rate of 
litigation brought by supervisory boards concerning the liability of directors 
remains low69. 
Dual and single board structures have one essential difference. In a unitary system 
monitoring of senior executives is carried out by the board itself whereas in a 
two-tier system a distinct supervisory board is created to fulfil this function. This 
essential variation has given rise to a continuing discussion about appropriate 
                                                             
68 Judgement dated 21 April 2007 – II ZR 175/95. 
69 See Paul Davies and Klaus Hopt, "Boards in Europe–Accountability and 
convergence."Ecgi, Law Working Paper 205, 2013, 25. 
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director compensation in a two-tier board structure context70. It is claimed by 
some analysts that directors in a two-tier system are more effective administrators 
of a company’s assets than other agents and have greater disciplinary powers71. 
From this perspective incentive schemes for directors are only of marginal value. 
However, a contrasting viewpoint holds that information asymmetry is likely to 
be greater in a two-tier system72. This makes monitoring more challenging and 
thus incentive regimes for directors take on greater importance73. 
Company directors are under a legal duty (s.173 of the CA 2006) to independently 
evaluate situations. In an attempt to ensure this occurs, the Cadbury Report 
presented a number of recommendations. The Cadbury Report stated that all 
boards of directors should include a minimum of three NEDs, one of which can 
be a chairman of the firm and the minority of which should be from within the 
firm. Most NEDs should thus be outsiders74. The United Kingdom Governance 
Combined Code has backed this suggestion and argues that boards of directors 
should have a healthy mix of executive director and NEDs. It is hoped that this 
                                                             
70 See Jörn M. Andreas, Marc Steffen Rapp and Michael Wolff, "Determinants of director 
compensation in two-tier systems: evidence from German panel data", Review of managerial 
science 6.1, 2012, 33. 
71 See Pieter W. Moerland "Alternative disciplinary mechanisms in different corporate 
systems." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 26.1, 1995, 17. 
72 See Martin J. Conyon and Joachim Schwalbach, "Executive compensation: evidence from 
the UK and Germany." Long Range Planning 33.4, 2000, 504. 
73 See Jörn M. Andreas, Marc Steffen Rapp and Michael Wolff, "Determinants of director 
compensation in two-tier systems: evidence from German panel data."Review of managerial 
science 6.1, 2012, 33. 
74 See Adrian Cadbury, et al. Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance, Gee, London, 1992. 
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will prevent any one group from taking control of the decision-making process. 
The Code asserts that independent NEDs should make up a minimum of 50% of 
a board. So, in a board of nine, four independent NEDs are needed to match the 
four executive directors (the final board member being the company’s chairman)  
75.  It can be argued, however, that the Cadbury Report did not go far enough. 
Safeguarding the independence of NEDs requires more significant efforts such as 
amending UK company law. If the law were changed so that NEDs had no 
executive duties but were limited to sitting on supervisory boards and to fulfilling 
a monitoring function, or the function of introducing a dual system to a company, 
they could finally be said to be genuinely independent76.  
It is believed that a dual board structure can offer more accountability than a 
single system can. Additionally, it is not believed that enhanced accountability 
will compromise a business’s performance. If performance was found to suffer 
this would signify that greater accountability enforces certain costs on at least one 
of the elements of the business but would not have an impact on the accountability 
features of the board structure. While relevant features of Germany’s two-tier 
system, it is regularly claimed that delayed reaction to external changes, poor 
information flow to the supervisory board and ineffective meetings of the 
supervisory board and overly entrenched staff can all be blamed on a dual board 
                                                             
75 S.B1 of the GCC 2010. 
76 See Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson and Michael Wright, Corporate governance: 
accountability, enterprise and international comparisons, John Wiley & Sons, 2005, p105. 
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structure. However, these features are not inherent characteristics of the two-tier 
system77. It is acceptable to question who the supervisory board is responsible to, 
as opinions vary. It was suggested by Keay that because the employees and 
shareholders elect the board, people may suspect these are the primary groups the 
board is accountable to. This may be accurate as these groups are also able to 
prevent members re-joining the board78. 
 
Of note are the distinct structures of Japanese boards of directors. The first 
Japanese governance structure includes a board of directors and a supervisory 
organ (like the dual system). Boards of directors are primarily made up of internal 
directors and supervisory boards primarily comprise auditors. Japan’s second 
governance system is the American structure which includes just the one board 
of directors but within which are a number of committees. Article 400 of the 
Japanese Corporations Act 2006 defines this board structure as a committee 
governance structure. Such a system requires the presence of audit divisions and 
all directors must be nominated and duly compensated. A company cannot adopt 
both board structure types. If a firm opts for the first type of Japanese governance 
system there is no obligation on the firm to include directors from outside the 
company79. Generally, the most up-to-date government policies on the structure 
                                                             
77 Ibid, p113. 
78 Andrew Keay, Board Accountability in Corporate Governance, Routledge, 2015, p.155. 
79 See K.T. Fung, Z.Y. Gao, J. Gonzalez and K.L. Alex Lau “A study on the ineffectiveness 
of corporate governance in Japan” Comp. Law. 2014, 35(3), 83. 
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of boards of directors does promote the use of directors from outside the firm but 
does also give companies the freedom to determine whether they will adopt an 
American committee structure or the more conventional Japanese structure 
including a board of directors and a supervisory board80. 
A number of researchers have argued that as Saudi Arabian legislation does not 
promote, or even make reference to, the adoption of any particular structure for a 
board of directors, a unitary model is used by businesses in the country. There are 
no clauses in the CL 1965 –now CL 2015- restricting the adoption of any 
particular board structure type, whether it is for a small or large enterprise. 
Despite companies being given this freedom to choose, as yet no business on the 
Saudi Arabian stock market has opted for a non-unitary board structure81. 
What the CL 1965 –now CL 2015- does provide, however, is the right for 
shareholders of a limited liability company (LLC) to keep tabs on the activities 
of a board or directors and monitor them. If a group of shareholders numbers 
twenty or fewer people, each shareholder can advise the board directly and has 
access to relevant documents and accounts. Any agreement or practice that 
contravenes these rights is considered invalid82. If a group of shareholders of an 
                                                             
80 Masao Nakamura, "Adoption and policy implications of Japan’s new corporate governance 
practices after the reform”, Asia Pacific Journal of Management28.1, 2011, 187 
81 See Fahad M. Al-Majed, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate 
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LLC numbers more than twenty, then a business’s activities may be disrupted by 
their direct involvement83. As a result, the CL 1965 - now CL 2015- requires that 
a supervisory board be created. This board is made up of a minimum of three 
shareholders84. A supervisory board is entitled to oversee the business’s actions. 
It can also make judgements in relation to issues that come before the board of 
directors and it must grant permission for certain actions to be carried out. 
Additionally, a supervisory board can call for a general assembly of the 
shareholders regarding the violation of a director’s duty. At the close of each 
fiscal year, the board submits a paper on the outcomes of its oversight of the 
business’s conduct to the general assembly. If a supervisory board does not call 
a general assembly despite knowing that directorial transgressions have occurred, 
then the supervisory board members may be found guilty of negligence85. A two-
tier board structure, as previously discussed, is useful in regards to utilising 
qualified managers in closely held companies to make investment choices. The 
concentrated ownership found in the majority of Saudi Arabian businesses is 
consistent with the creation of supervisory boards86. 
A defining feature of Saudi banks is the Shari’ah supervisory board (SSB). In 
2005, Al-Aljlan completed an empirical study which revealed that two thirds of 
                                                             
83 Mohammed Al-Jeber, The Saudi Commercial Law, King Fahad National Library, Riyadh, 
2000, p.400. 
84 S. 170 of the CL 1965, s.172 of the CL 2015. 
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the Saudi Arabian banks examined (nine in total) had an SSB made up of between 
two and five Shari’ah scholars, all of which were non-executive SSB members. 
The remaining third had one sole advisor on Shari’ah. The Al-Aljlan (2005) study 
examined the part played by SSBs in connection with the business strategies 
adopted by banks. The majority of directors involved in this research stated that 
their SSB played no part in deciding or creating their firm’s business strategy. 
The primary function of SSBs is thus to provide opinions on the matters they are 
presented with87. As a result, an SSB is not, in fact, a true supervisory board as it 
does not oversee the actions of the board of directors nor does it have any direct 
effect on determining a company’s actions. An SSB member is better described 
not as an overseer but simply as an advisor. 
2.3.2. The CEO and the Chairman 
Numerous corporate financial scandals have led to harsh criticism of certain 
board leadership structures, in particular the combining of the chairman and CEO 
positions. The amalgamation of these two positions in a corporate environment 
results in a power monopoly that can corrupt the goals of a business to ensure 
personal prosperity over the prosperity of the company. If the inaction of 
stakeholders and the board of directors allows personal benefit to be pursued 
unimpeded, stakeholder value will be misappropriated and legal problems will be 
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created for the company. Ultimately, the value of the business will be 
compromised. This type of behaviour breeds a climate of corruption and self-
interest that results stock viability being called into question and valuable 
employees, who could have assisted in the resurgence of the business, being 
lost88. 
 However, some academics argue that these opinions concerning the dual 
CEO/chairman position are not supported or borne out in the literature. The 
contrasting argument is that companies decide on their board leadership structure 
based on an evaluation of the advantages and costs of various structures in their 
particular economic and business climate. To determine the impact of splitting or 
not splitting the chairman and CEO roles, negative performance outcomes in 
companies who adopt a dual role approach because of external factors has been 
recorded89. It has been found that for the majority of large companies there are 
more costs associated with splitting than there are advantages, some of which 
have been ignored by the supporters of dual leadership structures. Among these 
costs are: the expense of altering succession procedures, information costs, the 
cost of unpredictable decision-making and the agency costs associated with 
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managing a chairman’s conduct. Certainly, the best board leadership structure for 
a business will be likely to change depending on the economic environment90. 
The vast majority of reports and guidelines on corporate governance released in 
the United Kingdom suggest that the role of CEO and chairman should be split91. 
The Corporate Governance Code (CGC) 2010 stipulates that the position of chief 
executive and chairman should not be held by the same person and that the 
separation of the duties of chairman and chief executive should be clearly defined 
in writing and with the board of directors’ agreement92. Importantly, certain 
jurisdictions, for example Iraq (in 2004 amendments to the country’s Companies 
Law 1997), prohibit members of a board of directors from holding both the 
position of chairman and CEO93. 
S.79 of the CL 1965 in Saudi Arabia provides that it is acceptable for a member 
of a board of directors to hold the position of chairman and CEO. Furthermore, 
the CL 1965 enables a board of directors to choose the chairman and CEO from 
among its members94. Yet, the Corporate Governance Code 2006 indicates that 
the merging of the position of chairman with another executive role, most notably 
that of CEO but also general manager or managing director, is not permitted. 
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However, the CGC 2006 applies only to firms listed on the Saudi Arabian Stock 
Exchange and is guidance, not law. Nevertheless, s.81 of the new CL 2015 makes 
it illegal for a director to combine the post of chairperson with executive positions 
(including that of CEO). 
An interesting feature of the configuration of Saudi Arabian boards of directors 
has been identified by scholars. This feature may be unique to the country. The 
CEOs of a significant number of firms listed on the stock market, for example, 
SADAFCO, SAMBA Bank, STC and the Saudi Electricity Company, are not 
members of their company’s board of directors. While no Saudi Arabian 
legislation actually demands that a CEO of a company also be a member of its 
board of directors, if this is not the case it may call into question a board’s 
effectiveness. A primary function of a board of directors is to keep track of the 
actions of the CEO and it is empowered as a supervisory mechanism to discipline 
senior members of staff. If a CEO is not present on a board it can be argued that 
the board is not able to effectively monitor an individual who forms the core of 
the firm’s everyday activities95. 
2.3.3. Women directors 
A review of the gender mix on boards is a necessary part of any thorough analysis 
of corporate board systems. In numerous countries, the small amount of women 
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who act as directors on boards of directors has been the cause of much 
consternation. Some nations, such as France, Sweden and Norway and soon Italy, 
have utilised legally binding quotas to ensure that the gender balance in 
boardrooms is more equitable. In the recent past, boardrooms in the UK have 
shown a trend towards there being higher numbers of NEDs than executive 
directors and thus concern about gender inequality focuses on women securing 
NED positions96. A recent FTSE report reveals that in FTSE 100 firms, there were 
over 800 women acting as NEDs while less than 300 held executive director 
roles97. The Davies Review Annual Report 2014 reveals that the number of 
women on the board of directors of FTSE 100 companies has risen from 12.5% 
in 2011 to 20.7% in 2014 with two FTSE 100 firms still to welcome a woman 
onto their boards98. It was Lord Davies’ recommendation in 2011 that by 2015 at 
least one quarter of the board members of FTSE 100 companies should be 
women99. The government endorsed the recommendations and the target has been 
achieved. In 2015 a report was published in which Lord Davies states that over a 
quarter of positions on FTSE100 boards are filled by women. The 
                                                             
96 See Mark McCann and Sally Wheeler, "Gender diversity in the FTSE 100: The business 
case claim explored", Journal of Law and Society 38.4, 2011, 542. 
97 According to FTSE, the FTSE 100 companies are those who have a bard with an average 
size of 11 member, see Susan Vinnicombe, Elena Doldor and Caroline Turner,"The Female 
FTSE Board Report 2014” Cranfield University, 2014. 
98 See Lord Davies, “Women on boards” in Davies Review Annual Report 2014, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/297519/bis-
women-on-boards-2014.pdf. 





recommendation made in the report is for a new voluntary target: women should 
hold a third of positions on the boards of FTSE350 companies within five 
years100. 
Former UK Business Secretary Vince Cable praised the EC’s decision to abandon 
compulsory quotas. He argued that the United Kingdom is dedicated to including 
more women on boards of directors in UK companies but states that any 
legislative measures are always best dealt with on a national rather than European 
level. Cable affirmed that the approach outlined in the Davies Review, that is, an 
approach led by businesses and subject to self-regulation, is the optimal method 
for the UK to adopt but reassures the EC that the UK will work alongside other 
Member States to review the EC’s proposal and establish a Directive that 
enhances national initiatives to create more gender equality on boards101. 
The reviewed UK CGC was published in mid-2010. This amended CGC 
introduced Supporting Principle B.2 which acknowledges the benefits of 
boardroom diversity. This principle specifies that, when seeking candidates for a 
board, all interviews and appointments should be based on merit and guided by 
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objective requirements taking into account the value of having a board that is 
diverse, including gender diversity. 
An alternative account of how gender categories inflect upon governing boards, 
relating to the enlightened shareholder value (ESV) principle102, was offered by 
Valsan. He suggested that leading or authoritative traits are linked to more male 
characteristics, while conciliatory or collective ones are considered more female. 
Additionally, he states that ESV principles have affected attitudes towards the 
prevalence of interpersonal board relationships. Valsan notes that studies of the 
correlation between authority and gender has revealed women are better at 
interpersonal relationships than men. Consequently, when a board incorporates 
both authoritative and collective aspects, Valsan believes the board will be more 
successful in achieving overall managerial objectives103. 
Although at first women may be appointed to boards as a token gesture, they will 
nonetheless have the opportunity to participate in all of the activities of a board 
of directors. Industry type has a significant impact on whether women are 
appointed to boards. Physical and technical businesses have significantly less 
women on their boards than do firms from the consumer and economic 
industries104. The appointment of women to boards should not be done because it 
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could be ‘good for business’. Women deserve a place on boards due to their 
economic participation and their justified calls for equality105. However, 
European nations such as Spain face a serious challenge in encouraging the 
appointment of women onto boards as their history and culture is steeped in the 
concept of male dominance, a concept that is so ingrained that it manages to 
continue without attracting any real censure in the country. Removing this 
entrenched cultural attitude will be hugely challenging106. 
According to statistics concerning the number of women on boards in the GCC, 
including Saudi Arabia, only 5% percent of directors on the boards of family 
companies are women107. The rights of women in Saudi Arabia have long been a 
highly contentious issue. However, substantial attitudinal shifts concerning 
women’s rights have occurred recently. For example, women can now be 
appointed to the Majlis al-Shura, or consultative council, and have been allowed 
to vote since 2015 municipal council elections108. These developments indicate 
that Saudi Arabian law-makers have become more mindful of women’s social, 
political and economic rights. As a natural progression of the rights of women in 
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the country, new legal provisions should be introduced compelling firms to 
appoint female board members. 
Given its status as a Gulf country, it is interesting to note that the United Arab 
Emirates has recently implemented quotas associated with gender. As one of the 
initiatives of this scheme, legislation has been brought forward to motivate 
organisations to approach gender parity regarding directorial company boards, 
and, as stipulated by the Ministerial Resolution 225 of 2012, it is necessary for 
the board of directors in joint stock companies to have a minimum of one female 
member109. The underlying rationale for such a ruling is that having at least one 
female member on boards of this kind will serve to represent women equitably at 
the leadership level, thereby meaning that female interests will have some level 
of representation in the decision-making sphere110. 
As previously noted, female representation on directorial company boards in the 
United Kingdom rose above one quarter of all the positions held in FTSE 100 
boards, and this took place even in the absence of pertinent legislation. In this 
way, in contrast to the United Arab Emirates, the method adopted in the UK is 
characteristic of the free market ethos of allowing companies themselves to 
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determine the most viable course of action111. Many commentators suggest that 
this is a favourable avenue to take, primarily because legislating for the 
representation of women on directorial company boards could have the impact of 
leading to positive discrimination112. Furthermore, given that the degree to which 
boards are diverse in terms of gender constitutes a socially-informed 
responsibility, as determined by responsive theory113, businesspeople who are 
motivated by social responsible conduct are likely to have their actions informed 
and directed by a self-regulatory framework114. 
Recently, the Growth and Emerging Markets Committee of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSC)115 indicated that board diversity, 
including gender, ethnic, age and level of expertise, should be encouraged 
through recommendations and guidelines. To incorporate these diverse elements 
into a homogenous whole, the IOSC proposes that a balance of appropriate skill-
sets, experience and capability should be achieved116. 
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2.4 Types of directors 
Formally appointed directors are subject to general statutory obligations. 
However, it has historically been the case that the courts apply common law as 
well as statutory duties to people who are not formally appointed as directors but 
appear to fulfil that role117. As previously stated, the definition of a director given 
in the CA 2006 includes anyone acting as a director regardless of the actual name 
their position carries118. A ‘de jure director’ is a director who has been formally 
appointed to that position. However, in certain cases natural or legal entities carry 
out the same tasks as formally appointed directors despite not being properly 
appointed to this role themselves. This type of director is legally treated as a de 
jure director but is known as a ‘de facto director’119. In Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry v Hall and Nuttall120, it was held by Evans-Lombe J. that the 
definition of a de facto director as given in Re Hydrodam Ltd121 by Millett J. 
demands that an individual takes some sort of positive action in order for it to be 
concluded that s/he was in reality behaving like a director of a company122. 
However, as will be explained below, in Re Paycheck Services 3 
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Ltd (HM Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Holland)123, it was affirmed that 
this is not sufficient to make a one a de factor director of a company. 
 ‘Shadow director’ was first defined in the Companies Act 1980 and then again 
in the Directors Disqualification Act (CDDA) 1986 and the CA 2006. According 
to these definitions a shadow director is someone whose instructions company 
directors habitually follow. Other advisers, such as solicitors, who offer directors 
guidance, which they may follow, in their capacity as a professional are not 
considered to be shadow directors124. However, if such an adviser steps outside 
the purview of her/his role as a professional then s/he may be deemed to have 
acted as a shadow director. It is argued by Morritt L.J. that a shadow director does 
not literally have to be relegated to the shadows. Even when an individual comes 
from inside a firm they can behave in such a way as to make them a shadow 
director125. 
For someone to be deemed a shadow director the majority of directors of a board 
must follow their instructions almost instinctively and without entering into any 
decision-making process, and this must become the habitual response to 
directions given by this person126. Millett J127. clarified that if directors use their 
own judgement in deciding whether to follow someone’s instructions this 
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‘someone’ will not be considered to be acting as a shadow director128. To become 
a shadow director an individual may engage in widespread monitoring of a firm’s 
actions, which can occur in a variety of ways, or may be actively involved in 
appointing staff and directors. It is typically stakeholders and blockholders (large 
shareholders) who bring about high levels of monitoring as they are eager to 
prevent directors from acting according to their own self-interests as much as 
possible129. 
According to English law a company may be a legal person (a corporate director) 
or a natural one. Before the CA 2006, it was allowed for a corporate director to 
be the sole director of any other business. A firm itself can behave as a de facto 
or shadow director of any other firm or can formally be appointed a de jure 
director of another firm130. It is possible that, in the scope of the internal 
management systems of a firm acting as a corporate director of a different firm, 
a director of the primary firm can be found to also act as a director of the 
secondary firm despite having never been properly appointed to this position 
within the secondary firm. This form of directorship would be a shadow or de 
facto directorship131. 
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 It has been held by Millett J. that, in this context, the director of the primary 
company will not be seen as a shadow director for the secondary company if it 
can be illustrated that all the director did was to engage in and possibly affect the 
activities of the secondary company. Millett J. clarified that personal liability to 
the company in which an individual is a director (or that company’s creditors) 
may, in some rare cases, exist if a director of one company attends board meetings 
and votes with the board members of a secondary company. However, this fact 
alone will not make this individual a director of the secondary company132. It is 
Millett J.’s view that if the activities of a director consist simply of acting as a 
director for the final holding company then it is not the individual who is the 
shadow director but the holding company itself133. 
Consider a situation involving a director who is a director of the only corporate 
director of a different, second company. Can, and if so to what degree, this 
director be held liable for the mismanagement of the assets of the other company? 
This question was recently posed in HM Revenue and Customs Commissioners v 
Holland134. In the court of appeal, it was held by Rimer L.J. that, to be held liable, 
the questionable action/s concerning the affairs of the second company must be 
directed by the corporate director rather than the second company’s own board of 
directors. It can be argued that this is quite a specialised distinction but it is still 
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an important one in the context of company law where a separation between 
directors and the company itself is acknowledged135.  
Finally, in Re Paycheck Services 3 Ltd (HM Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners v Holland)136 , by a majority of three to two, with Lord Walker 
and Lord Clarke dissenting, the Supreme Court upheld the previous decision of 
the Court of Appeal which had held that Mr Holland was not a de facto director 
of forty-two different firms. It was argued by Lord Hope in the Supreme Court 
that what Mr Holland had done was simply to carry out his duties as a director of 
the corporate director of the forty-two organisations. Lord Hope affirmed that 
these actions were not sufficient to make Mr Holland a de factor director of the 
firms137. 
In the context of the introduction of s.155 of the CA 2006, which requires that all 
firms have a minimum of one natural person as a director on their boards, it is 
suggested that the impact of the decision in this case is quite narrow138. However, 
of significance is the fact that it was not until Re Paycheck Services 3 Ltd (HM 
Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Holland) that the Supreme Court was 
faced with and debated the issue of shadow and de facto directors139. 
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However, S.251(3) of the CA 2006 states that in particular circumstances, 
corporate bodies can be excluded from being treated as shadow directors. This 
section states that, especially in regards to the general responsibilities of directors 
but also in relation to transactions that board members must approve and contracts 
with the sole member who is additionally a director, a corporate body will not be 
considered a shadow director of its subsidiaries because these secondary 
businesses are used to acting in a way that accords with the directions of the 
corporate body. However, after October 2016 when the S.87 of the Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 comes into effect, it is possible 
that legal persons will no longer be eligible. This is based upon a change in the 
CA 2006 whereby only natural persons can be employed as a company director140. 
It is important here to question whether there is any meaningful difference 
between a de facto director and a shadow director. The courts have continually 
blurred the lines between these two types of directors in their unsuccessful hunt 
for those bodies or individuals with genuine influence over the affairs of a 
particular firm141. In Re Paycheck Services 3 Ltd (HM Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners v Holland)142 it was confirmed that no one definition of a de facto 
director exists and there is no solid test for establishing that someone is a de facto 
director. The findings in this case established that it is in fact unnecessary for only 
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one definition to exist and the term ‘de facto director’ can be applied to a range 
of situations143. Therefore, it is possible for someone to be a shadow director and 
then a de facto director (or vice versa) or even to be a shadow director and a de 
facto director at the same time. For example, an individual would be both types 
of director simultaneously if they assumed the tasks of a director in relation to 
one aspect of a firm’s business (de facto), e.g. marketing, and then instructed the 
board of directors in relation to another aspect (shadow), such as financial 
affairs144.  
Although the term ‘shadow director’ does not exist in Australian law, the idea of 
a shadow director does form part of the definition of a director given in s.9 of the 
Corporations Act 2011. This section provides that if an organisation habitually 
acts on the instructions of a particular individual then this individual will be 
deemed to be a director regardless of whether they have been properly appointed 
to this position145. In UK law, a separate definition for shadow director is 
provided, separating this form of directorship from the others, a separation that is 
not made in Australian law. In the UK shadow directors are referred to 
specifically and thus not all of the statutory regulations placed on directors apply 
to them. By contrast, in Australian law shadow directors come under same 
                                                             
143 See Len Sealy, David Milman and Peter Bailey “Sealy and Milman Annotated Guide to 
the Insolvency Legislation” Sweet & Maxwell, (19th ed) 2016, vol.2, p.68. Brenda Hannigan, 
Company law, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp.161,162. 
144 Re Mea Corporation Ltd; Secretary of State for Trade & Industry v Aviss [2007] 1 
B.C.L.C. 618. 
145 S.9 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
60 
 
umbrella as any other director type and are therefore subject to all of the rules 
applied to the directors of a company146. 
In this respect, in order to distinguish a fiduciary within English legislation, the 
typical definition relies on whether or not a prior form of status or relationship-
based fiduciary already exists. Additionally, and in contrast to de jure and de facto 
executives, the nature of the association between organisation and shadow 
executive is not pre-decided147. 
Beyond the accepted categories of fiduciary relationships, a ﬁduciary relationship 
will also arise when an individual makes an express or implied undertaking to act 
on behalf of another person (fact-based ﬁduciaries). This is the so-called 
“undertaking test”. Although this form of assessment may be utilised to confirm 
the relationship of shadow executives in a fiduciary association with the 
organisation, it cannot be considered exhaustive148. The Canadian Frame v 
Smith149 case, provided another precedent for this with the ‘power and discretion’ 
assessment, which has three primary features. These consist of whether or not the 
fiduciary can potentially perform an authoritative role or function (i.e. power), 
whether the fiduciary may actually perform that action in order to impact upon 
the lawful or concrete benefit of the recipient, or if the recipient will be dependent 
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upon the discretion or power of the fiduciary. Overall, the case discovered that 
when the power and discretion mode was applied, more precise findings may be 
gleaned from the investigation of specific relationships. Although the above 
method may be used to validate specific fiduciary relationships on a case-by-case 
basis, it may be considered objectionable as discrepancies will likely result. As 
an alternative, Moore suggested that in addition to the status-based fiduciary 
relationships, additional validation should occur through a combination of the 
power and discretion examination, and the undertaking assessment150. 
Over the past twenty years Saudi Arabia has been following the lead of Western 
nations in regards to its legislation, especially in relation to company law. 
However, as yet the Saudi Arabian legal system does not recognise ‘shadow’ or 
‘de facto’ directors. If Saudi Arabian law-makers were to recognise these two 
forms of director, this would make firms and their directors more accountable for 
their conduct. It is thus recommended that new laws be introduced to ensure that 
the perpetrators of bad corporate conduct be held responsible for their actions. 
The UK Governance Combined Code makes specific mention of non-executive 
directors151 but no clear definition of NEDs is given. In fact, no legislation in the 
United Kingdom offers a definition of either an ‘executive’ or a ‘non-executive’ 
director. Typically, an executive director works full-time in this role and is given 
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particular functions to carry out that are connected with the everyday business 
affairs of the firm. The CEO (chief executive officer) is one such executive 
director and is ultimately responsible for the management of the firm’s business 
activities. A non-executive director, however, is employed by the company to 
work part-time, rather than full-time, as a director and is not allocated the job of 
supervising the firm’s day-to-day activities152. However, a directorship is not a 
job, it is an office. Thus, a director is in fact continually on-duty throughout their 
directorship and is bound by their fiduciary responsibilities at all times153.  
The Saudi Arabian CGC recognises three types of director: executive, non-
executive and independent. An executive directorship is defined in the CGC as a 
full-time corporate role that is remunerated by a monthly salary and involves 
administrative work154. A non-executive directorship is defined in the CGC as a 
part-time role for which the director does not receive a monthly salary and which 
does not concern administrative work155. As previously stated, the CGC is largely 
only guidance but as such it provides the framework for practice and certain of 
the provisions issued by the CMA Board, namely art.2.b, do create legally 
binding rules and regulations. In 2008, the CMA Board released the legally 
binding Decision No. 1-36-2008 which requires that all firms listed on the Saudi 
Arabian Stock Exchange act in compliance with art.12(c) of the CGC. This article 
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states that the majority of directors sitting on a board of directors should be non-
executive directors156. 
 
An independent director is completely independent from the company on whose 
board they sit. Official rules stipulate when a director cannot be considered 
independent. Firstly, a director is not independent if they own a controlling 
interest in the firm or a subsidiary or have been senior executive for the 
firm/subsidiary for a period of two years. Secondly, a director is not independent 
if they own 5% or more of the firm or its group or is a representative of a legal 
person who owns such a stake. Thirdly, a director will not be considered 
independent if they are a director of a firm that falls within the body of the original 
company. Fourthly, a director is not independent if they have, for a period of two 
years, been an employee and partner of the firm or any other related firm 
(inclusive of senior suppliers and external auditors). Finally, a director will not 
be considered to be independent if they are a relative of a senior executive or 
other board member of the firm or any of the firm’s subsidiary businesses157. 
 
Despite the CGC’s role as a guiding instrument rather than a legal one, the CMA 
Board’s issuance of Decision No. 1-36-2008 makes certain provisions legally 
binding. This decision demands that all firms listed on the Saudi Arabian Stock 
                                                             




Exchange act in accordance with art.12(E) of the CGC. This article states that at 
least two seats on every board (or a third of seats, whichever is more) be held by 
independent directors158. 
 
A further type of director is the ‘nominee director’. Nominee directors are 
appointed to be either executive directors or NEDs by outside stakeholders who 
have an interest in how the company is run. As such, nominee directors generally 
represent a key shareholder or group of shareholders on a board of directors or 
are a representative of the company’s employees, an investor or a lender. In body 
corporates a holding company will typically have nominee directors sitting on the 
boards of its subsidiary companies159. The CA 2006, and indeed all other relevant 
UK legislation, provides no explicit legal provisions for nominee directors160. The 
term ‘multiple director’ refers to someone who acts as a director for a number of 
different firms161. This is entirely legal162 and in Gwembe Valley Development 
Co. Ltd v Koshy163 was referred to by Harman J. as being appropriate and even 
common164. Despite this, and a point that will be developed further on, it has been 
argued that the existence of multiple directors or nominee directors in competing 
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firms can result in conflicts of interest when the director’s responsibility towards 
the parent firm or other firm is at odds with that owed to the firm165. 
There are no provisions in the CL 2015 that stipulate how many boards a director 
may be a member of at any one time. This oversight has been condemned by 
numerous different jurists as it allows the authority over several firms to reside in 
only a small number of investors. In turn, these investors may not have the 
capacity to encourage the profitability of the firms under their directorship166. 
Yet, s.66 of the CL 1965 does give the Council of Ministers the power to decide 
how many boards of directors a single person may be appointed to. In an attempt 
to reform this law, the Council of Ministers issued a decree stating that only state 
representatives or persons appointed by the government or stock companies are 
able to act as a director on two or more boards167. A further decree released by 
the Council of Ministers then allowed a person to participate in a number of 
boards of directors in various stock companies provided that these companies are 
not government-subsidised168. The amount of joint stock company boards of 
directors a single person can sit on has been set at a maximum of five by the CGC 
2006, although, again, the CGC is only guidance169. The CL 2015 –again- does 
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not specify how many boards a director may be a member of at any one time. 
Nevertheless, unlike the old CL 1965, the new statutory does not grant the 
Council of Ministers the power to regulate this area. Hence, there is a question 
whether the aforesaid Council of Ministers’ decrees have been repealed. 
Additionally, the articles of a firm can empower individual directors to appoint 
an ‘alternate’ to act as their representative if they cannot be present at meetings 
or are unable to fulfil any other of their directorial responsibilities170. However, 
the CA 1985 stated in s.308 that if an agreement between the people in a company 
is made to appoint an alternate or if a company’s articles do allow for a manager 
or director to allocate their functions to someone else, then this agreement or 
article provision must be approved by a special resolution of the firm if it is to be 
legitimate. The use of alternate directors constitutes one of only a few exemptions 
to the common rule that the office of a director cannot be delegated or allocated 
to another. 
There is no mention of alternate directors in the CA 2006, so it is believed that 
directors are not able to assign their office unless this is provided for in a firm’s 
own articles171. If a firm’s articles do allow alternates these alternates can attend 
meetings on behalf of a director or manager and generally fill their role. Section 
                                                             
170 See John Davis, “A guide to directors’ responsibilities  under the Companies Act 2006” 






250 of the CA 2006 provides a very broad description of the term ‘director’ and 
defines it as including anyone acting as a director regardless of what their title 
actually is. Overall, it is recognised that an alternate director is covered by this 
definition and thus all of the provisions applied to directors in general apply to 
alternates as well. The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008172 have 
dealt with the assigning of directorial powers to others, in both private and public 
firms173. Of particular note is the rule that certain documents must be signed by 
all directors. These documents include a solvency statement in the case of a 
private company reducing its share capital (as per art.2(c) of the Reduction of 
Share Capital Order (SI 2008/1915)) and the responsibility statement for a 
prospectus. As an alternate director is legally defined a director, as per s.205 of 
the CA 2006, both the assigning director and her/his alternate will thus need to 
sign the relevant documents. 
 
The legislation of certain other jurisdictions has dealt more thoroughly with the 
activities of alternate directors, their appointment and the extent of their authority. 
Section 201K(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 provides that a director 
can appoint an alternate if they obtain the approval of the other directors174, and 
s.201D of the CA 2001 demands that the approval of the alternate her/himself 
                                                             
172  The Secretary of State makes these Regulations in exercise of the powers conferred by 
section 19 of the CA 2006. 
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must also be obtained in writing175. Section 205B(2) of the CA 2001 requires that 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) be notified of the 
appointment within four weeks of the appointment taking place176. Specifically, 
ASIC must be given the personal details of the alternate director and the terms of 
their appointment, in particular, what functions the alternate is not allowed to 
undertake. It is stated in s.201K(3) of the  Australian CA 2001 that an alternate 
has the same authority as a director when fulfilling the director’s role. Precisely 
what alternates have the power to do should be plainly spelt out in the terms of 
the appointment177. For example, an alternate director may be empowered to 
attend meetings of the board of directors, vote, take receipt of documents and sign 
papers on the firm’s behalf. Any limitations placed on the powers of the alternate 
should also be included in their appointment terms. However, it is not required 
that the timescale of the appointment be stated. Indeed, s.201K(4) of the 
Australian CA 2001 empowers the assigning director to cancel an alternate 
director’s appointment whenever they see fit178. 
Applying the principle “Delegatus non potest delegare” the CL 2015 in Saudi 
Arabia makes it illegal for directors to assign their office to another director 
except in cases where the company’s own articles allow this179. If the articles do 
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allow the use of alternate directors then these directors can participate in meetings 
on their nominator’s behalf. However, four key limitations apply. Firstly, the 
alternate director, also a regular director of the board, is prohibited from acting 
as an alternate on more than one director’s behalf at the one meeting. Secondly, 
there must be a written record of the assignment. Thirdly, the alternate director 
can only be assigned for a particular meeting. Finally, an alternate director can 
only vote for resolutions that the director on whose behalf they are acting is 
entitled to vote for180. 
2.5 Summary  
 
In order to answer the research question regarding the nature of the board of 
directors, Chapter 2 has discussed this matter in a more wide-ranging way. It has 
dealt with foundational issues relating to the structure and composition of the 
board of directors. To be more precise, it examined the issue of how a ‘director’ 
can be defined and it explained what is required for an individual to become a 
director. In addition to this, it discussed which board structure is most effective 
to ensure optimal company operation. Finally, different director types 
acknowledged by both the courts and statute in a number of jurisdictions were 
explored. The evaluation of these subjects is vital as it contributes significantly 
to enhancing the efficiency of directorial boards, assisting directors in the 
fulfilment of their duties, and making directors more accountable. In so doing, 
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this will improve the current practice of the enforcement of directors’ duties. For 
example, determining by whom “directors” duties are owed is very important to 
clearly identify the person that can be held accountable for damages done to the 
company. As explored in this chapter, within the context of Saudi law, the role of 
shadow director is not officially recognized. Hence, the individual that has the 
capacity to influence a board to a considerable extent is not deemed to be a 
director. Therefore, this chapter sets out a series of suggested amendments to 
Saudi law that could serve to ensure that all directorial responsibilities are 
applicable to shadow directors and de facto directors. As a result of this, such 
individuals will assume greater liability for misconduct or bad decisions, thereby 
meaning that several enforcement procedures and mechanisms are attainable in 










CHAPTER 3. Directors' Duties and Breaches of these Duties 
The responsibilities of directors have always been considered to be central to 
good corporate behaviour and director misconduct has been blamed as the driving 
force behind explosive corporate disgraces, Enron, for example181. The duties of 
directors and what constitutes a breach of these duties is laid out in the CA 2006 
in the UK, and Companies Law 2015 in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabian law has the 
additional component of Shari’ah principles and standards which give 
suggestions on how to confront fraud and misconduct and improve the regulatory 
response182. 
This chapter will examine UK, Saudi Arabian and Shari’ah law as they relate to 
the responsibilities of directors. It will be seen that there are a number of 
likenesses in the basic features of the duties of directors in both countries as well 
as some considerable differences. This chapter will present an evaluation of the 
responsibilities of directors according to each of these legal systems and will 
compare and contrast them. For the purposes of this chapter, directors’ duties 
towards the rights of shareholders will be assessed. Finally, a summary will be 
given at the end of the chapter. 
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3.1. Shari’ah Law and the Duties of Directors 
Since the establishment of Saudi Arabia, Shari’ah law has been considered to be 
the foundation of the state. The government of Saudi Arabia explicitly introduced 
the Saudi Basic Law in 1992. This clarified the constitution of the country within 
the first chapter of the constitution. Chapter I, section 1 provides that Saudi 
Arabia's only "constitutions" are the Qur'an and the Sunnah, which are the deeds 
and teachings of the Prophet Mohammad - peace be upon him.  
However, in order to know the position of Saudi law in terms of dealing with this 
topic, the Shari’ah perspective of directors’ duties needs to be identified.  
In addition, the wrongful actions of directors have been considered as the major 
reasons behind the massive corporations’ scandals such as Enron. Therefore, 
Islamic scholars have discussed directors’ duties in the light of Shari’ah principles 
and values to provide recommendations which can enhance the regulations’ 
efficiency for tackling fraud and corruption183. 
This section aims to explain the nature of Shari’ah law within legislation and its 
position in dealing with the duties of directors.  
 
 




3.1.1 The nature of Shari’ah 
This section provides an overall view about the nature of Shari’ah law. It will 
explore briefly the sources of Shari’ah law, its validity, as well as Shari’ah 
codification. Finally, a summary is provided. 
3.1.1.1 Shari’ah law sources 
Two major types of sources, primary and secondary, form the two main types 
that constitute the basis of Shari‘ah law. The primary source consists of the 
Qur‘an and the Sunnah. The Qur‘an is the holy word, according to the Islamic 
faith, the scripture of God (Allah), which was revealed to the Prophet 
Muhammad, peace be upon him, who was to deliver it unchanged to people. 
Muslims believe that the Qur’an continues to be a protected primary source of 
Islamic law, which was revealed to regulate the people’s lives, no matter when or 
where they live. Islamic doctrines are applicable at all times and in all places, and 
as established in Islamic literature184. 
 
The Sunnah is the second primary source of Shari’ah law, and its significance in 
Islamic law is based upon the belief that the Sunnah is intended to interpret the 
Qur‘an and to elaborate upon its principles. The Sunnah plays an essential part in 
Islamic jurisdiction and regarded as a source of authority, second only to the 
Qur‘an.185 
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There are two main sources within Shari’ah, which are Ijma and Qiyas. Ijma 
means the unanimous consensus of the Islamic jurists in a particular period, whilst 
Qiyas refers to the application in a new scenario of a divine law relating to a 
particular situation sharing features that are common186. A further source is 
Maslaha (public interest) and Urf (custom). Shari’ah secondary sources are tools 
that are used by Mujtahid (Islamic jurists) in order to interpret the primary 
sources, as well as giving an opinion about new contexts and the compatibility of 
Shari’ah principles187.  
 
 
3.1.1.2. Validity of Shari’ah law 
 
Shari’ah is not only concerned with spiritual practices, but it exists to govern 
human affairs. The Islamic religion consists of two main parts: Firstly, worship 
provisions, such as Salat (prayers) and Haj (pilgrimage), which regulate Muslim’s 
relations to Allah (God), which are unchangeable. Secondly, legal transactions 
that include inheritance, marriage, and commercial transactions, together with 
and all legal matters in both private and public law. Flexibility means that these 
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provisions are likely to be modified. Shari’ah law is a legal system operated by 
the courts, where punishments are given and not solely as a religion188. Unlike 
some societies where there is a separation between state and religion, where 
religion is considered to be a private matter, in Islamic society, Islam has an 
impact upon the decision making of its followers in all contexts, including 
business189. In Islamic law, the Shari’ah maintains sovereignty over all aspects of 
life, including social and ethical issues, encompassing criminal as well as civil 
jurisdiction190.  
 
The Shari'ah heritage highlights the differences in practice between Western and 
Islamic business. It is based upon man's contract with Allah, which is to adhere 
to the Shari'ah.  Business activities are restricted to only those that are halal 
(permissible) and involvement in any haram (forbidden) activities is regarded as 
a sin. The reasons behind certain business activities being forbidden are that they 
are undesirable or harmful for human beings, as well as the ecosystem. Avoiding 
forbidden activities assists in fulfilling the contract with Allah and society, by 
channelling resources into activities that would be of benefit to society. The 
selection of business activities must meet the requirements of Shari'ah as well as 
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influenced by Maslaha (greatest benefit to society or public welfare)191. Both 
welfare and success are tempered with ethical, moral and spiritual obligations 
with belief in accountability with Allah, who is the ultimate authority192. 
 
Shari’ah law has been criticised as being too immutable and too rigid a system of 
law, because any legislative authority cannot modify it. This is because changes 
in Shari’ah law ceased upon the death of the Prophet Mohammed - peace be upon 
him - 193 and because changes in Islamic law cannot be made, Islamic scholars 
fail to recognise the needs of current society194.  
 
It is claimed that this criticism is based upon misunderstandings of Shari’ah law. 
The belief that Shari’ah is immutable and rigid is based upon an incorrect 
understanding that Shari’ah law is only what is in the Qur‘an and Sunnah, which 
are the primary sources. The law is not given ‘ready-made’ to people, to be 
passively received and applied. Instead, it is to be actively based upon the sacred 
texts that are its acknowledged sources195. Procedural details were not set out in 
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either the Qur’an or the Prophet Mohammed - peace be upon him - for every 
single detail in people affairs. Islam only provides for the principle and the 
concept whilst details of procedure remain with Muslims to formulate and 
develop according to the circumstances and requirements of each generation196. 
Ibn Al-Qayyim197 stated that Shari’ah law is based upon wisdom, justice and 
benefit198, so it follows that Shari’ah law may be found wherever there is fairness 
and justice199.   
 
Shari’ah law is not only based upon what is specifically referred to in the Quran 
and Sunnah, but also upon areas where there is no conflict in ideas of wisdom and 
justice. Shari’ah law also includes regulations and laws from other legal systems, 
as long as they are not against the principles of Shari’ah. For example, in Saudi 
Arabia the Commercial Court Law 1931, the Commercial Register Law 1956 and 
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Law 1980 have been transplanted from 
other legal systems such as those in France, which were not against the Shari’ah 
law principles200. The laws were often introduced after being revised by members 
of the senior Saudi scholars, in order to check their compatibility with Shari’ah 
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law provisions201. The texts of Islamic law offer sufficient flexibility, which make 
Shari’ah rules relevant to society, able to satisfy their needs, to be closer to nature, 
as well as ensuring the security and contentment of the population.202  
Miles’ and Goulding’s empirical research203 disputes the traditional interpretation 
of the link between Islam and capitalism. While there is a commonly held belief 
that it is impossible for a Muslim to work within the conventions of the Western 
capital market without compromising aspects of their faith, the study argues that 
this is not actually the case. Rather, the requirements of the international market 
and globalisation more generally are compatible with Islam.  
3.1.1.3 Codification of Shari’ah 
The Prophet Mohammad - peace be upon him - established the Islamic state in 
the city of Almadenah in 619. Following the death of the Prophet Mohammad in 
632 - peace be upon him - and the succession of the four Caliphs, the last of which 
was in 661, the Arab world was governed mainly by three dynasties: the Umayyad 
Caliphate 662-751, the Abbasid Caliphate 751-1517, and the Ottoman Caliphate 
1517-1924. The Arab world was governed by 73 heads of state (Caliphs), which 
were all Arabs, from the seventh century until 1517204. 
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Shari’ah law governed the Islamic state during this period. However, there is a 
question whether Shari’ah law was codified during this period. It has usually been 
thought that the codification of the provisions of Shari’ah was carried out by the 
Ottomans, who were commonly known as Majallah, in 1876205. Sixteen books 
deal with some of the legal transactions, such as commerce, leases, transfer, 
companies, deposit, mortgage, agency, and the judiciary formed the 
Majallah206.207. It may also be argued that in earlier periods there were a number 
of attempts to codify Shari’ah principles and provisions. The author considers 
that the first codification Shari’ah law were ‘legal maxims, the ‘Alqwa’id 
Alfiqhiyyah’.   
 
‘Alqwa’id Alfiqhiyyah’ is a used to describe general rules that apply to several 
provisions, and gathered as rules books held by Islamic jurists’208. Islamic jurists 
have classified the history of ‘Alqwa’id Alfiqhiyyah’ into three main stages, with 
the occurrence of the stages dependent upon the necessity for legal maxims.  
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The first stage is the establishment that began in the era of Prophet Mohammed - 
peace be upon him - and his companions. There were few maxims during this 
period because the primary sources of Islamic law were still in existence. One 
example of these maxims is that the Prophet - peace be upon him - says: “There 
should be neither harming (darar) nor reciprocating harm (diraar)”, which is a 
main principle for many of the Islamic provisions.  
 
The second stage is the collection and writing of views and ideas that reflected 
the expansion of the Islamic state, together with a noticeable variation in the 
attitudes of Islamic jurists towards a number of provisions that were formulate 
into legal maxims. Imam Abu Zeid Aldbusi, who was followed by a number of 
Islamic jurists who began collecting provisions from the books of jurists. These 
provisions formed the basis of general rules ‘Alqwa’id Alfiqhiyyah’, such as one 
legal maxim, Al dharourat Tobeh Al Mahdhorat, which means illegal transactions 
that can be allowed in certain circumstances.  
 
The third stage of ‘Alqwa’id Alfiqhiyyah’ relates to fixedness and organisation. 
Fixedness and organisation at this stage means that ‘Alqwa’id Alfiqhiyyah’ were 
in the early stages, scattered in different books of Islamic legal scholars and mixed 
with other Islamic sciences such as “the differences” and ‘Alqwa’id 
Alo’suliyyah’. Therefore, at this stage ‘Alqwa’id Alfiqhiyyah’ appeared in its 
final shape, which facilitated the access of Shari’ah law to judges and 
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practitioners. ‘Alqwa’id Alfiqhiyyah’ is explained and clarified, with one 
example of Majallah by Ottomans 1876, which was mentioned earlier209. This 
resulted in ‘Alqwa’id Alfiqhiyyah’, which represented the first attempt at 
formulating Islamic jurisprudence into codified laws. 
 
Following the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, efforts 
were made to codify the Shari’ah rules. However, these attempts were 
unsuccessful due to the resistance from senior Saudi religious scholars, which 
were so vociferous that policymakers were unable to challenge them210.  
 
It may be argued that there was little resistance to the introduction of any code. 
In 1927, the Saudi Judicial Authority211, which consisted of a number of Islamic 
scholars, announced that Judgments should be based upon Ahmed Ibn Handbill 
schools, books, and legal maxims, unless judges saw benefits in other provisions 
that were greater212. One of the first laws in Saudi Arabia was the Commercial 
Court Law 1931213that regulates many aspects of commercial law in the country. 
This law did not face rejection from senior Saudi scholars, because it did not 
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conflict with the principles of Shari’ah. Saudi Arabia has regulated all legal areas, 
with the exception of the civil law and parts of criminal law. 
 
Useful insights into reasons for not codifying all legal provisions in the Kingdom 
are given by Alhusayen214. For instance, Alhusayen commented that laws are a 
principle necessity for all societies everywhere, and that laws should be treated 
like antibiotics, and only used when essential. Failure to observe this will result 
in it becoming the basis of corruption and corruptors, and especially without 
effective mechanisms for enforcement215.  
 
3.1.1.4 Summary 
This section has provided a clear understanding regarding the background of 
Shari’ah law. It has clarified, albeit briefly, the two major sources of Shari’ah 
law, namely, primary and secondary. It has explained that Shari’ah secondary 
sources are tools that are used by Islamic jurists in order to interpret the primary 
sources. Also, it has examined the validity of Shari’ah law and its applicability 
and flexibility at all times and in all places. Finally, it has answered the question 
whether Shari’ah law was codified in Islamic history. 
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This will go towards identifying the Shari’ah position in terms of dealing with 
directors’ duties. 
 
3.1.2. The duties of directors in Shari’ah law 
Several authors have highlighted the duties of directors in Shari’ah law, in order 
to develop Islamic corporate governance. Islamic corporate governance should 
be based upon the spirit of Islam and its teaching, with established corporate 
governance being considered in relation to contemporary corporate governance. 
These should then be tested against Islamic Shari'ah, with those that are consistent 
with Shari'ah law being accepted, whilst rejecting those that are not216. 
This section aims to explain the nature of directors’ liability, general duties of 
directors, and finally the relief from liability from Shari’ah perspective. 
3.1.2.1 Directors’ liability 
In the context of Shari’ah, contractual liability can be divided into two main parts 
that depend upon the type of legal transaction. Dhaman contracts are the first type 
that represent certain transactions, such as being in recipient of money or a 
commodity, and is held accountable under any circumstances, even with 
sufficient care, and which are usually commutative. Examples of this type of 
contract are loans and contracts of sales. 
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The second type of contract is an Amanah contract, by which a recipient of money 
or a commodity is considered to be a trustee; for example, agencies and all kinds 
of companies217. This section refers to this type of contract. 
 There is an Islamic recognition of the principle of the fiduciary relationship/trust, 
which can be shown through different aspects. First of all, it is thought that the 
institution of Waqf218 in Islamic law is the root of fiduciary duty, and that the 
former was imported to the UK in the 13th century219 by returning crusaders who 
had witnessed the operation of the Waqf institution under Shari’ah law in the 
Middle East. It is thought that Walter de Merton, who was a government servant 
and clergyman, was in touch with crusaders and visitors to the Arabic states, in 
order to conduct some transactions with the Islamic world on behalf of the New 
Temple. As a result, it is thought that he would have been familiar with religious 
and charitable institutions, particularly, the institution of Waqf due to its 
significance in the Islamic world220. 
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 In 1264, after being appointed as “practically Regent of the Kingdom”, Walter 
de Merton issued the 1264 Statutes of Merton College. These statutes were 
reissued in order to confirm the establishment of the institution of trust. After 
analysing the elements of trust in these statutes, it is clear that they are similar to 
the elements of Waqf in Shari’ah law. Therefore, it is thought that Merton 
imported the concept of Waqf into the UK221. Finally, this can justify why the 
institutions of Waqf and the English trust are almost identical222.  
Secondly, Shari’ah law insists that a trustee must avoid conflict of interest223, and 
also it prohibits insider trading224. The duty of loyalty - the core of fiduciary duty 
- is defined as the prevention of insider dealing and conflicts of interest225. As a 
consequence, Shari’ah law has recognised fiduciary duty.  
Liability can fall on trustees for two main reasons, such as cases of aggression 
or negligence. The concept of negligence from the Shari’ah point of view means 
a lack of care in maintaining and protecting money or commodities placed in the 
                                                             
221 See Monica M Gaudiosi, "The Influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on the Development 
of the Trust in England: The Case of Merton College", University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 136.4, 1988, 1231. 
222 See Avisheh Avini, “Origins of the Modern English Trust Revisited”, Tulane Law Review 
Association, 1995, vol 70, 1139. Also see James Hawley, Keith Johnson and Ed Waitzer. 
"Reclaiming fiduciary duty balance." Rotman International Journal of Pension Management 
4.2, 2011, 4. 
223 This will be discussed that on the coming sub-section on “General duties’. 
224 See Siti Faridah Abdul Jabbar, "Financial crimes: Prohibition in Islam and prevention by 
the Shari’ a Supervisory Board of Islamic financial institutions", Journal of Financial Crime, 
17.3, 2010, 287. 
225 See Norwood Beveridge, The Corporate Directors’ Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: 
Understanding the Self-Interested Director Transaction, DePaul Law Review, 1991, 41, 
p.688.   
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care of a trustee226. The term ‘negligence’ also relates to breach of duties by a 
trustee(s). Islamic jurists have answered the question of what is sufficient care 
that is clarified as the normal diligence that experts consider is adequate under 
normal circumstances227.  
Aggression relates to direct or indirect damage to commodities or money228. 
Acting beyond powers229, is also included within aggression in Shari’ah law, and 
is also known as ultra vires in common law230. 
The Prophet Mohammed - peace be upon him - also stated that whoever practices 
on people as a doctor, when he is not a doctor, will be held liable. The pretence 
of being skilled when he is not can be considered as aggression231. For instance, 
if an employee, who is unskilled, works in employment that requires certain 
skills, he will be held liable for damages created by his or her actions232. From 
the Shari’ah’ viewpoint, not only does duty of care concern loyalty and honesty, 
but it also includes competence.  
                                                             
226 See Wahbah Zuhayli, Islamic Jurisprudence in its new style, Dar Alkitab, Damascus, 
1967, p.488. 
227 See Mohammed Siraj, liability of aggression in Islamic jurisprudence compare to tort 
liability in Law, Dar Alddirasat Aljame’eiah, Beirut, 1993, pp.251-257. 
228 See Wahbah, Zuhayli, Islamic Jurisprudence in its new style, Dar Alkitab, Damascus, 
1967, p.488. 
229 See Abdullah, Ibn Qudamah, Alkafi, Dar Hajar, Egypt, 1997, vol 3, p.350, and also see Ali 
Abdul Hakim Net, Liability in Islamic jurisprudence, Najaf Press, Baghdad University Press, 
1974, p.216. 
230 More in depth, see Ben Pettet, Company Law, Pearson Education, England, 2005, p.114. 
231 See Wael Asaf, Civil Accountability for Doctors, Hard copy, A Master’s dissertation in 
Alnajah University, Nablus, 2008, p.26. The author cite a MA as it is the only source to 
examine this topic. 
232 See Ibn Al-Qayyim, Jawziyah, Altteb Alnabawy, Dar Ehyaa Alkutob, Egypt, 1957, p.105. 
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It is necessary to understand the position of company directors in the context of 
Shari’ah in order to determine the liability of directors in Islamic literature. 
Mudharabah is one form of company within the Shari’ah context, which is an 
arrangement whereby an investor or group of investors entrusts capital to an 
entrepreneur (Mudharib). The entrepreneur commences production or trade with 
this capital, and then gives investors a pre-agreed share of the resulting returns, 
together with their principal investment. The entrepreneur gains the remaining 
shares as a reward for his time and effort. The capital loss is borne entirely by the 
investors if the business fails, with the entrepreneur’s loss being his labour and 
effort233. Muslim jurists are unanimous that profits are to be shared in previously 
mutually agreed proportions, with losses being shared in the same proportion as 
invested capital234. 
The board of directors are represented by Mudharib, and capital owners represent 
the shareholders235, with Islamic jurists assuming that the directors (Mudharib) 
must act in accordance with the agreement between them and shareholders, and 
                                                             
233 See Walid Ghannouchi. Banking productivity and economic growth in emerging 
countries, PhD thesis at University of Rome Tor Vergata, 2010, p.44, available at 
https://art.torvergata.it/retrieve/handle/2108/1311/6442/Walid%20Ghannouchi%20-
%20Doctorate%20Thesis.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2016] . Also see Abdul Rahim Abdul 
Rahman, "Issues in corporate accountability and governance: an Islamic perspective", 
American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 1998, 15.1, 55. 
234 See Abdullah Ibn Qudamah, Almugni, Dar Hajar, Egypt, 1989, vol 7, p.145. 
235 See Ali Alkhafif, Companies in Islamic jurisprudence, Dar Alnahdhah Alarabiyyah, 
Egypt, 1978, p.62. 
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as decided by the board of directors236. The reason is that in Islamic literature, the 
Mudharib is regarded merely as a type of agent.  
There are a number of similarities and differences between normal agents and 
Mudharib. Usually, Mudharib has enhanced powers whilst normal agents must 
work in a particular manner. Although normal agents and Mudharib must act 
within certain powers, they are not held liable unless losses are the result of 
neglect or aggression237. In addition, they are not allowed to undertake actions or 
risks that are harmful to the people who trust them, and they must act in their 
interests238. In Shari’ah law, liability is mostly unlimited. Mudharibs are jointly 
responsible for any damages resulting from their aggression or negligence239. 
The concept of limited liability within modern commercial practice is a new 
concept, and there is no mention of it in original Islamic Fiqh sources, but limited 
liability can be found within the principles of Shari’ah240. The strong links 
between the existence of a separate legal entity and the concept of limited 
liability, Islamic authors have made considerable efforts to find precedents that 
                                                             
236 See Abdullah Ibn Qudamah, Alkafi, Dar Hajar, Egypt, 1997, vol 3, p350 
237 See Sultan Alhashimy, provisions of the agent’s actions, Dar Albuhooth Alislamiah, 
Dubai, 2002, pp.440-444, and also see Wahbah Zuhayli, Islamic Jurisprudence in its new 
style, Dar Alkitab, Damascus, 1967, p.580.   
238 See Mohammed Aldesoki, Hashiat Aldesoki, Dar Alfekir, Beirut, 1978, vol 3, p.380. 
239 See the related decision of Islamic Fiqh Council, the Muslim World League, in its 
fourteenth session, 1995. 




can prove whether the concept of a separate legal entity is recognised within 
Shari’ah sources, with the most obvious precedent being the Waqf241. 
The Waqf is a legal and religious institution, whereby a person dedicates some of 
his property for charitable or religious purposes. Once the property has been 
declared as Waqf, it no longer remains in the donor’s ownership. Whilst Waqf 
beneficiaries can benefit from the proceeds of the dedicated property, they are not 
its owners, as ownership has been given to Allah Almighty alone. If a property is 
purchased from the income of a Waqf, the purchased property cannot 
automatically become part of the Waqf. According to jurists, such property is to 
be treated as a property owned by the Waqf242. 
Muslim jurists consider Waqf as a separate legal entity, and have given it 
characteristics that are similar to those of a person relating to matters of 
ownership. Once ownership is established, it follows that it has its own budget, it 
can sell, purchase and own properties. It may become a debtor and a creditor and 
can sue and be sued. Accordingly, all the characteristics of a ‘juridical person’ 
can be given to it243. 
This view has been criticised for being not accurate. It is argued that assets 
purchased with the income of a Waqf do not become part of the original Waqf 
property, because in order to become Waqf, there has to be a human being who 
                                                             
241 Ibid. 




dedicates the asset to Allah (God) as Waqf (a Waaqif). The Waaqif of the Waqf 
property specifically made the property Waqf in order to provide an income for 
the intended charitable cause. If the income of the Waqf automatically also 
becomes Waqf, the purpose of the Waqf will be destroyed; this is a dissenting 
view244. 
Whilst Waqf is only dedicated for religious or charitable purposes, Islamic 
scholars are unanimous that a property can be also be allocated as Waqf for 
private purposes. A property can be dedicated for a person’s descendants or for 
posterity, as a posterity or family Waqf245. The institution of Waqf is not owned 
by the donor, or by the beneficiaries; it has its own independent financial 
statements and budget. Waqf is a separate legal entity, with a notion of limited 
liability.  
If a company is formed as a Waqf, from the perspective of Shari’ah law, it follows 
that it has its own legal entity and the directors have limited liability. However, 
due to the flexibility and compatibility of Islam that is based upon the principles 
of ‘urf’ (custom) to suit the changing nature of trade and business in the modern 
                                                             
244 See Mujlisul Ulama of South Africa, “The Concept of Limited Liability – Untenable in 
Shari’ah”, Young Men’s Muslims Association, South Africa, 2007, available at 
http://books.themajlis.net/node/251, also see Zainal Zuryati, Mohamed Yusoff, and Ahmad 
Azrae,"Separate legal entity under Syariah law and its application on Islamic banking in 
Malaysia A note." International Journal of Banking and Finance, 2009, 8. 
245 See Sana Abdou, “posterity Waqf”, knowledge Jornal, Egypt, 2009, 219, and also see 
Monzer Kahf, "The role of waqf in improving the ummah welfare", International Seminar on 
“Waqf as a Private Legal Body” organized by the Islamic University of North Sumatra, 
Indonesia. 2003, 6. 
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world246, even if a company is not formed as Waqf it too can enjoy limited liability 
by referring to the following clause in its contracts, which is based on Sunnah:  
“All the conditions agreed upon by Muslims are upheld, except a condition that 
allows what is prohibited or prohibits what is lawful”247. 
3.1.2.2 General duties 
The recognised duties of directors within the Islamic context will be considered 
within this context and compared to duties within contemporary jurisdictions. 
 
A number of authors consider that the Islamic view of directors’ duties is based 
only upon transparency, accountability and trustworthiness. However, this is only 
half of the view of Shari’ah248. Such views only consider prescriptive duties, yet 
ignores proscriptive duties, which require action, whilst the latter require 
restraint249. The duty to promote a company’s success is balanced with the duty 
not to accept benefits from third parties. This section will consider both types of 
duty.  
                                                             
246 See Zainal Zuryati, Mohamed Yusoff, and Ahmad Azrae, "Separate legal entity under 
Syariah law and its application on Islamic banking in Malaysia: A note." International 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 2009, 8. 
247 See Mohammed Altirmithy, AL-Sunan, Dar Alma’arif, 200, vol 1, p.253. 
248 See Esfandiar Malekian and Abbas Ali Daryaei, “Islamic values forward into better 
corporate governance systems”, corporate integrity system in Malizia, available access at: 
http://cism.my/cismv2/modules.php?module=portfolio&do=portfolio&productname=Islamic-
Values-Forward-Into-Better-Corporate-Governance-Systems. [Accessed 25 January 2014]. 
249 More in depth about the difference between mentioned types of duties, see Rosemary 
Teele Langford, "The Duty of Directors to Act Bona Fide in the Interests of the Company: A 
Positive Fiduciary Duty? Australia and the UK Compared," Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
11.1, 2011, 215. 
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3.1.2.2.1 The duty to act in good faith 
 
Directors of companies in both the UK and Saudi Arabia have a duty and 
responsibility to act in good faith, honestly, fairly, and reasonably, and with due 
diligence in promoting the success of the company, as well as having a regard for 
the interests of stakeholders, including shareholders, in order to achieve the main 
objective of the company250. 
 
Shari’ah law has recognised stewardship from the beginning. Prophet 
Mohammed –peace be upon him - said “All of you are guardians and 
responsible for your wards and the things under your care”251. This statement 
means that when a director is appointed, he or she will have a responsibility and 
liability to act in its best interests. The realisation of profits for shareholders must 
be compatible with the principles of Shari’ah, such as, equitable distribution of 
wealth to all stakeholders and disadvantaged members in the form of Zakat (alms 
giving)252 and the prohibition of interest ‘usury’253, insider dealing, fraud and 
                                                             
250 S.172 and 1157 of the UK CA 2006, and s.55 of the Saudi CL 1965, s.65 of the CL 2015, 
and Article 11 of the Saudi CGC 2006.  
251 Translator: M. Muhsin Khan, “Sahih Albukhari”, Mika'il al-Almany, 2009, P209.  
252 See Abdussalam Abu-Tapanjeh, "Corporate governance from the Islamic perspective: A 
comparative analysis with OECD principles," Critical Perspectives on accounting, 2009, 
20.5, 556. 
253 See Racha Ghayad, "Corporate governance and the global performance of Islamic banks" 
Humanomics, 2006, vol 24.3, 207. 
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money laundering254. The most important rule in business under Islam is honesty 
and fair dealing. The owner of a Muslim business should therefore be a person 
with high moral values, who would not seek to exploit or deceive others. 
Monopolies are also prohibited, because they harm the wider society255. 
The modern view of promoting the success of a company does not only mean 
maximizing the wealth of shareholders, but also taking into account stakeholders 
interests and long term issues256.   
Islamic texts and the viewpoints of jurists included this new approach. One form 
of company within the Shari’ah context is Mudharabah, whilst Mudharib 
represents the board of directors, and capital owners represent the shareholders257. 
Mudharib is required to invest the funds of a company in a manner that will 
produce good financial return; he or she is also required to take the company’s 
long-term success into consideration by avoiding the taking of unusual risks. Ibn 
Qudamah (1223) stated that the Mudharib is considered to be a trustee, and if 
                                                             
254 See Siti Faridah Abdul Jabbar, "Financial crimes: Prohibition in Islam and prevention by 
the Shari’a Supervisory Board of Islamic financial institutions", Journal of Financial Crime, 
17.3, 2010, 287. 
255 See Mervyn K. Lewis, “Accountability and Islam”, Fourth International Conference on 
Accounting and Finance in Transition Adelaide, April 10-12, 2006. 
256 See David Milman, National Corporate Law in A Globalized Market, Edward Elgar, 
2009, p.70. 
257 See Ali, Alkhafif, Companies in Islamic jurisprudence, Dar Alnahdhah Alarabiyyah, 
Egypt, 1978, p.62. 
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unusual risks are taken, he will be held personally liable and responsible towards 
the aggrieved parties258.  
 
3.1.2.2.2 Duty of care, skill and diligence 
 
Directors have a fiduciary duty to the company before its existence in formal 
codified law. The two basic fiduciary duties of directors are the duty of loyalty, 
or duty of fair dealing, and the duty of care259. This duty is included in both the 
UK260 and Saudi Law261. However, it is has been argued that the duty of care is 
not fiduciary in nature262.   
 
The duty to exercise reasonable care, skills and diligence was also recognised in 
Islamic texts. Prophet Mohammed – peace be upon him- said “If any of you 
undertakes to do any work, God loves to see it, do it well and with 
efficiency”263. Since the 7th century, Islam has emphasised the importance of 
behaving in good faith and with efficient care. 
 
                                                             
258See Abdullah, Ibn Qudamah, Alkafi, Dar Hajar, Egypt, 1997, vol 3, p.350. As has been 
mentioned in s.125 in the Saudi CL 1965, s.128 of the CL 2015, that directors are required to 
maintain the company’s capital. 
259 See Bernard Black, "The core fiduciary duties of outside directors”, Asia Business Law 
Review, 2001, 3. 
260 S.174 in the CA 2006. 
261 Article 11 of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code 2006. 
262 See Ch 3, para 3.3.2.2. 
263 Abu Ya’ala , Musnad Abu Ya’ala, Dar Alma’amon, Damascus, 1984, vol 7, p.349. 
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Under Shari’ah law, if an unskilled employee works in employment that requires 
specific skills, he will held liable for damages created by his or her actions264. 
Therefore, Islamic jurists considered the Mudharib to be responsible for damages 
if he or she does not exercise sufficient diligence and care265.   
 
3.1.2.2.3 Duty to act within powers 
The duty to act within powers requires directors to abide by the rules that are 
established either in the law or the company’s constitution266.  
 
In Shari’ah law, Mudharib must act within certain powers267, so Islamic jurists 
assume that directors (Mudharib) must act in accordance to the agreement 
between them and shareholders, as decided by the board of directors268. 
Acting beyond powers is prohibited, and it is considered as aggression, so if a 
director acts beyond powers he or she will held accountable for damages created 
by his or her actions 269. 
                                                             
264 See Ibn Al-Qayyim Jawziyah, Altteb Alnabawy, Dar Ehyaa Alkutob, Egypt, 1957, p.105. 
265 See Abdullah, Ibn Qudamah Alkafi, Dar Hajar, Egypt, 1997, vol 3, p.357 
266 S.171 in the UK CA 2006, and s.73 of Saudi CL 1965, s.75 of Saudi CL 2015. 
267 See Sultan Alhashimy, provisions of the agent’s actions, Dar Albuhooth Alislamiah, 
Dubai, 2002, p 440-444. 
268 See Abdullah Ibn Qudamah, Alkafi, Dar Hajar, Egypt, 1997, vol 3, p350. Although 
contracts and agreements are preferred to be written, they were mostly dependent upon 
spoken words, for in depth see Abdul Qadir Odah, Islamic Criminal Legislation, Alkitab 
Alarabi, Beirut, 1981, p.56. 
269 See Abdullah Ibn Qudamah, Alkafi, Dar Hajar, Egypt, 1997, vol 3, p.350. 
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A number of examples were given to certain transactions which required 
permission by shareholders, such as, arranging loans270. In addition, the agent is 
unable to act on behalf of the seller and the buyer at the same time, as well as he 
is not allowed to purchase property of individuals that have connections with him 
or purchase his own property271. 
3.1.2.2.4 Duty not to accept profits from third parties  
It is unacceptable for directors to receive any benefits not specifically allowed for 
or provided for in the constitution of the company272. The Prophet appointed a 
man to collect the Zakat. When he returned he said, "This (i.e. the Zakat) is for 
you and this has been given to me as a present." The Prophet said, "Why hadn't 
he stayed in his father's or mother's house to see whether he would be given 
presents or not?”273. This text reveals that under the principles of Shari’ah law, 
employees of any kind, including directors, are forbidden from accepting any 
benefits from others under any circumstances. 
 
3.1.2.2.5 Duty to avoid conflicts of interest 
                                                             
270 Abdullah Ibn Qudamah, Almugni, Dar Hajar, Egypt, 1989, vol 7, p.147, also see 
Mohammed Alhattab, Mawahib Aljalil, Beirut, 1995, vol 7, p.455. 
271 See Sultan, Alhashimy, provisions of the agent’s actions, Dar Albuhooth Alislamiah, 
Dubai, 2002, pp.226, 227. 
272 S.176 of the CA 2006. 
273 Translator: M. Muhsin Khan, Sahih Albukhari, Mika'il al-Almany, 2009, p.590. 
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Directors are forbidden from placing themselves in a position where they may 
receive direct or indirect benefit from any transactions made for the company, 
except with the permission of shareholders274. 
 
One of the basic legal maxims in Shari’ah law suggests that public interest is 
superior to private interest. Directors must therefore avoid conflict of interest. If 
a company employee is faced with an issue of conflict of interest between their 
personal interests and the interests of the employer, the interest of the company 
must be superior, or the employee will be in breach of duty275.  
 
According to Shari’ah law, if transactions could lead to a conflict of interest, these 
could be grounds for prohibiting them; for example, if a company had been 
attempting to raise capital, but the Mudharib had accepted capital from another 
source without the permission of the shareholders, this could cause risk to the 
company’s investment. In addition, the Mudharib could pay insufficient attention 
to the needs of the investors of the company if it is spending more time in seeking 
new business, which takes up too much time276. 
An agent is also subject to other legal restrictions, so that unless the company 
representative that appoints the agent gives specific authorisation, then the agent 
                                                             
274 S.175 of the CA 2006, ss.69,70 of  Saudi CL 1965 and ss,71,72 of Saudi CL 2015. 
275 See Ibrahim Alshatiby, Almowafakat, Dar Ibn Al-Qayyim, 2003, vol 3, p88. 
276 See Abdullah, Ibn Qudamah, Almugni, Dar Hajar, Egypt, 1989, vol 7, p160, also see 
Mohammed Alhattab, Mawahib Aljalil, Beirut, 1995, vol 7, p457. 
98 
 
cannot act on behalf of the seller and the buyer, or cannot purchase property of 
individuals that have connections with him or purchase his own property277. 
These findings explain that if transactions involve any conflict of interest, then 
this should be prevented, and is clearly forbidden under Shari’ah law.  
 
3.1.2.2.6  Duty of disclosure and transparency 
The duty of disclosure and transparency is one of the fiduciary duties that allow 
shareholders to sue by claiming a violation of the duty of loyalty.  This duty is 
intended to prevent any conflict of interest transactions from arising278. Directors 
must declare any personal interest in proposed transactions279.  
 
In Shari’ah law, the purpose of accounting information is to serve the public 
interest. Within an Islamic context, the wider society has a right to know about 
the effects of the operations of an organisation upon its well-being, as well as 
being advised that the activities of the company are within the requirements of 
Shari’ah. Relevant and truthful disclosure of information is essential in different 
areas of Islamic life, with responsibilities such as paying Zakat. Disclosure and 
                                                             
277 Although some scholars accept the contract in this case after being authorised, some 
jurists prohibit with or without mentioned permission, more in depth see Sultan Alhashimy, 
provisions of the agent’s actions, Dar Albuhooth Alislamiah, Dubai, 2002, pp.226, 227. 
278 See Bernard S, Black, "The Principal Fiduciary Duties of Boards of Directors" 
presentation at Third Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance Singapore, 2001, 33, 3. 
279 S.177 in the UK CA 2006. 
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transparency is important for predicting future obligations and assessing 
investment risks of companies280. 
 
3.1.2.2.7 Duty: Loans may not be taken from the company 
Any type of cash loans cannot be provided by a company to individuals of the 
board of directors, or to act as guarantor for directors who take loans from third 
parties. Although, loans from credit companies or banks could be excluded for 
specific purposes, conditions or situations when dealing with the general public 
by individual members of the board of directors. Therefore, the provisions of this 
article define that cash loans to directors for all contracts would be null and 
void281. 
Islamic scholars perceive a fund manager or Mudharib to be only acting as an 
agent for a company, so they would not be able to arrange loans without the 
permission of the shareholders or capital. Islamic literature explains that an agent 
is defined to be a trustee, so that they cannot take risks. In addition, the Mudharib 
cannot use credit to sell or buy goods without authorisation from the trustee of 
the company, as this type of action involves high-level risk282. 
                                                             
280 See Mervyn K. Lewis, "Islam and accounting," Accounting Forum. Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd, 2001, Vol. 25. No. 2.,103. 
281 S.213 of the CA 2006. 
282 See Abdullah, Ibn Qudamah, Almugni, Dar Hajar, Egypt, 1989, vol 7, p.147, also see 
Mohammed Alhattab, Mawahib Aljalil, Beirut, 1995, vol 7, p.455. 
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When the directors of a company undertake an agreement whereby debt cannot 
be incurred by any director in carrying out the business of the company, if a 
director then of the company incurs debt in a manner that violates this condition, 
this director will be personally responsible for losses resulting from the debt. A 
Mudharabah or a pool of assets that is diversified within an asset management 
portfolio is different to the earlier issue explained, as there is a limited liability of 
owners of money related to the extent of investors’ total capital contribution283, 
except when an individual director has given personal permission to the Mudharib 
to incur debts284. 
 
3.1.2.2.8 Duty: Confidentiality should be maintained 
Apart from general meetings, directors cannot divulge any information to 
shareholders or third parties when this knowledge is a result of their position as a 
company director, but if directors break their duty of confidentiality, then they 
will be personally accountable for compensation285. 
Throughout the history of Islamic countries, businesses and bazaars have been 
monitored by a Muhtasib that ensured that Shari’ah law was applied in all cases 
                                                             
283 See Abdulaziz Khayat, Companies in the Shari’ah law, Alrrsalh Press, Beirut, 1983, 
p.237. 
284 See Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An introduction to Islamic finance, Brill, 2002, vol. 20, p 
32. 
285 S.72 of the CL 1965. 
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of practice and quality286, but was also responsible for monitoring the work of 
doctors and other professions, and to ensure that they applied confidentiality 
when carrying out their work. This example demonstrates the importance for 
employers to maintain confidential information about their business and 
employees287.  
According to Shari’ah law, great emphasis is placed on upholding agreed 
conditions, so that to serve the interests of the company, directors need to ensure 
confidential information about the company remains secure.            
3.1.2.3 Relief from Liability 
In terms of breach of trust, breach of duties, default or negligence, directors are 
generally considered to be liable, but directors can sometimes be found to be 
relieved of their liability either in part or completely due to legal regulations. In 
the UK, the CA 2006 neutralises a breach of directors’ duties if their action is 
ratified by the company under section 239. Also section 1157 describes actions 
by directors that are fair, honest and reasonable such as would give power to 
courts to relieve liability from directors, when liability was caused by negligence 
or default. However, liability relief claimed in many courts under section 1157 is 
often unsympathetically dismissed288.  
                                                             
286 More in depth about the public monitoring in Islamic history, see Mervyn K. Lewis., 
"Islamic corporate governance" Review of Islamic Economics 9.1,2005, 14. 
287 See Mohammed Alshihry, “Professional Responsibility in Sunnah”, Dar Aluloom jornal, 
Egypt, 2011, 257. 
288 See Ben Pettet, Company Law, Pearson Education, England, 2005, p.176. 
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When applying Shari’ah principles, directors are required always to act in good 
faith and honestly289, but if directors are found to have committed aggressive or 
negligent actions, then they cannot claim this as an excuse290. Section 1157 of the 
UK CA that could apply the power of the courts for forgiveness is not supported 
by Shari’ah law.  
There are two main reasons why Shari’ah law does not support the provision 
found in s. 1157. Firstly, from the Shari’ah perspective, directors can be found to 
be relieved from liability to God (Allah)291 if they acted honestly, fairly with good 
faith, yet cannot be relieved from liability to people. In the Islamic context, the 
reason behind this is that the rights of God (Allah)292 are based upon forgiveness, 
pardon and leniency, while the people’s rights are likely to be incontestable293. 
Therefore, in order to protect the rights of humans, a director who is held liable 
on the grounds of negligence cannot be relieved from liability towards the 
aggrieved parties. 
 Secondly, from the point of view of Islamic scholars, the terms of negligence and 
of reasonableness are seen to be contradiction, due to the fact that, if a director 
                                                             
289 It has been clarified earlier in the sub-section of “director’s liability”. 
290 See Wahbah Zuhayli, Islamic Jurisprudence in its new style, Dar Alkitab, Damascus, 
1967, p.488. 
291 To be relived from liability to God means to be forgiven of a sin.  
292 The rights of God in Islamic religion is clarified in Sunnah, Prophet Mohammad - peace 
be upon him said, "Allah's right on His slaves is that they should worship Him (Alone)”, 
see translator M. Muhsin Khan“Sahih Albukhari” Mika'il al-Almany, 2009, p. 658. 
293 See Mahmoud Al-Mniawi, Altamheed: Sharh Mukhtasar Alousool, Alshamilah Press, 
Egypt, 2011, p.42.  
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acted reasonably, he could not be found to be negligent294. In Re D’Jan of London 
Ltd295, Hoffmann LJ stated that… 
“It may seem odd that a person found to have been guilty of negligence, which involves failing 
to take reasonable care, can ever satisfy a court that he acted reasonably. Nevertheless, the 
section clearly contemplates that he may do so and it follows that conduct may be reasonable 
for the purposes of sec. 727296 despite amounting to lack of reasonable care at common law”297  
The first sentence may support the Islamic jurists’ point of view. It means that, 
when a director has committed negligent action which involves the lack of 
sufficient care, and claimed that he had acted reasonably, this may seem odd. 
However, the s.1157 of CA 2006 may consider this action to be reasonable when 
the court thinks it fit. 
In contrast, the Saudi CL 2015 includes s.78 that defines joint liability of directors 
for compensation by third parties, shareholders or companies if, as a result of their 
violation, abuse or misconduct of the company’s constitution or company law, 
damage has been caused. Besides this, the Saudi law is not in favour of the power 
of forgiveness of the CA 2006298. 
According to Shari’ah law, there is a recognition of the principle of ratifying 
wrongful action, so that if shareholders or capital owners ratify the action, they 
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are not able to make a financial claim against the company’s investment manager 
or Mudharib299, and in these circumstances directors could be forgiven.           
Excluding directors from liability through exemption clauses is rejected in Saudi 
and UK laws300, and if this situation arises in disputes, then they are regarded as 
void clauses under Shari’ah law301.  
In addition, one may ask, would Shari’ah law permit a company to insure 
directors against the risk of liability? A key issue in Saudi Arabian law and one 
that has been laboured over by scholars of Islam for hundreds of years is the 
insurance contract. As regards directors, the question arises whether Shari’ah law 
could allow a company to insure its directors against the chance of liability. 
Situated in a Muslim setting, insurance contracts are considered to come in two 
forms, commercial and cooperative, depending on its characteristics and 
objectives302. This is a deeply divisive and complex issue and as such will only 
be given in summary in this section. The focus will be on commercial insurance 
as it is this form of insurance that is most like Directors’ and Officers’ Liability 
Insurance. 
Commercial insurance’s connection with a number of different elements has lead 
most scholars of Shari’ah law to denounce it. These elements are: the 
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inappropriate transmission of risk to the insurer from the insured, interest (Riba), 
extreme uncertainty (Gharar) and gambling (Qimar and Maysir). Overall, 
commercial insurance has been considered to be at odds with proper and moral 
ways of earning money as it involves duplicitousness and enticement303.  
Yet, there are Islamic scholars who support commercial insurance claiming that 
the uncertainty of commercial insurance is not extreme304. Also, while Shari’ah 
law forbids usury and gambling, a legal adage (Al dharourat Tobeh Al 
Mahdhorat) exists according to which unlawful transactions can be permitted in 
specific situations. This adage could be used here. Additionally, Shari’ah law is 
founded on the public interest (Maslaha) 305. Considering this, the advantages 
afforded to the public and society by commercial insurance, in terms of protecting 
individuals and organisations from liability and the potential for significant and 
devastating financial losses, commercial insurance may indeed be allowable in 
the eyes of Shari’ah law306. According to Shari’ah law, the need for what is held 
to be an unlawful arrangement must result in a different and appropriate 
resolution being identified. Consequently, it has been considered vital by Islamic 
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scholars to establish a structure or arrangement that is in accordance with Shari’ah 
law but prevents hardship and cost307. 
Despite the fact that Shari’ah law is enshrined in the Saudi Arabian constitution, 
there are no shortage of organisations within the country that do, in fact, offer 
commercial insurance308. As commercial insurance contravenes Shari’ah law, 
these companies are engaging in an illegal and unconstitutional practice. 
3.2. The Duties of Directors in Saudi Law 
The duties of directors arising from the Shari’ah perspective were identified in 
the previous section. This section clarifies and extends the understanding of the 
duties of directors within Saudi Law.  
Fiduciary duties are considered to be the basis of general duties in statutory law. 
Hence, this section aims to focus upon the fiduciary duties in Saudi Arabia, as 
well as to clarify the general duties of directors under CL 2015. The sub-sections 
will briefly identify actions that are considered to be a breach of these duties. For 
the purpose of this research, this chapter is limited to the duties of directors to 
shareholders. 
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A breach of these duties can lead directors to be held liable, and consequently 
legal ways of relieving directors from such liability are considered. 
3.2.1. Fiduciary Duties 
The governing statutes of most corporations provide that the business affairs of a 
company will be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors. The 
relationship between a director and the company is a fiduciary duty, which has 
long been recognised by the courts.  Many court cases have led to the recognition 
of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.309 Directors of a company are fiduciary 
agents, and their powers should be implemented as required by law, as well as for 
the benefit of the company.310 
No such specific mention of the fiduciary duties of directors exists in the CL 2015 
or CGC 2006 within Saudi Arabia, and fiduciary duty is not recognised by 
legislation311. Evidence suggests that concept of the fiduciary duty is 
underdeveloped in the Middle East312. It is claimed that in Saudi Arabia, a duty 
of care from members of the board has not been clearly defined in the CL 2015 
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or the CGC 2006. As a result, the Saudi regulator discovers that both pieces of 
legislation are irrelevant when determining the level of care appropriate for the 
board members of a corporation. It is therefore difficult to hold directors to 
account for dereliction of their duty of care under Saudi law, despite CL 2015 
identifying two primary responsibilities for board members: civil and criminal 
liabilities against breaches that include cheating and management malpractice313. 
 
It may be assumed that, despite loyalty and care not being referred to specifically 
under Companies Law or the Corporate Governance Code, Saudi law recognises 
the concept of fiduciary duties. In Saudi Arabia, Shari’ah law is the only 
constitution of the state, which suggests that the major role of the Shari’ah law is 
to reject inconsistencies with Shari’ah principle, and to deal with specific 
circumstances where there is no legal precedent314. Although fiduciary duties fail 
to be mentioned clearly under Saudi Law, they have been addressed clearly under 
Shari’ah law, and discussed in the earlier section. 
 
In addition, there was legal action against the chairman of Abdar company who 
was sued on the grounds of negligence in failing to arrange loan of 13 million $, 
as required, which caused a significant losses to the company. The Commercial 
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Court stated that the chairman was liable to the company for any damages caused 
by his negligence315. The author considers this verdict to be in accordance with 
Shari’ah law. Therefore, the director shall be held liable, since he is in breach of 
the duty of care. Furthermore, the duty of loyalty, which is at the core of fiduciary 
duty, is defined as the prevention of conflicts of interest and insider dealing,316 
which are both prohibited under CL 2015317. In fact, it is suggested that the 
definition and concept of fiduciary duties should be clarified and specified clearly 
in Saudi Companies Law, rather than being subjected to a scattered range of 
principles and regulations. 
3.2.2. General Duties 
3.2.2.1 Duty to undertake the purposes of a company  
It is stated in the Saudi CL 2015 that companies will determine the purpose of 
their incorporation in their articles and memorandum of association, as well as 
their prospectuses.318 Therefore, the first responsibility of boards of directors of 
companies is to ensure that the purpose, as stated in the articles and memorandum 
of association of a company, is upheld. Boards of directors also need to ensure 
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that the purposes of the company, as stated in the Memorandum of Association 
are realised. Boards of directors may not take on any work or business that does 
not meet these criteria; otherwise it is regarded as unauthorised activity beyond 
the competence of the company319 and regarded as null and void. S. 99 of CL 
2015 states that any decision taken by a gathering of shareholders breaches the 
Companies Law, articles and memorandum of association of the company or 
Department of General Companies, and is regarded as null and void.320   
3.2.2.2 Duty to avoid a conflict of interest 
S.71 of CL 2015 states that members of boards of directors do not gain direct or 
indirect personal benefits that are related to businesses or contracts used by the 
company without the agreement of the GM, which is reviewed on an annual basis. 
The interests of members of the board of directors may contradict the interests of 
the company with regard to some contracts. For instance, a board member making 
a contract with the company for his own personal interest, or a member having 
an interest in a project that is linked to the business of the company. Such 
examples would increase the probability of the member’s personal interest at the 
expense of the interests of the company. 
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Companies Law attempts to ensure that members of the board of directors operate 
discretion in their dealings with the company in order to maintain accuracy and 
loyalty to the company, as well as preventing board members from using their 
influence and position to gain financial privileges that are illegal, and which 
would be at cost to both stakeholders and shareholders.321 This rule includes any 
personal contract made by the member with the company, as well with any other 
party connected to the company. This rule is also applied to the relatives of board 
members. It also includes any contract or business with the company, such as the 
rental or sale of property, money owned by the board member, renting company 
property in favour of the board member, or making contracts with the company 
as an agent for another company.322 
S. 69 of the CL 1965 may exempt the member if the business transaction went 
through a public tender process, and the member gained the best offer. In such 
cases there is no need for permission to be granted by a GM. A number of 
researchers criticise this exceptional condition on the grounds that members of 
the Board of Directors have ready access to privileged information, and members 
may use their position to their personal advantage at cost to other competitors. 
This may lead the company to lose future opportunities, because competitors 
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would not submit tenders for projects due to their previous negative experience 
with the company323. A member of the Board of Directors may use the 
information available because of his position to gain personal interest or for 
relatives. This is considered to be both illegal discretion and an abuse of authority. 
Such violations are subject to accountability324. Should a director use information 
available for public tenders, due to his position with the company, this is 
considered as an abuse of authority subject to liability. 
In reality, offers from board members during the general bidding process are 
likely to be the most successful in winning, because board members are expected 
to be familiar with the information and affairs of the company325. It is therefore 
generally regarded that exceptional terms are unnecessary, since they damage 
accountability and equality, thereby permitting a monopoly by board members. 
Both the CGC 2006 and CL 1965 have unwittingly provided an opportunity for 
board members to trade in their contracts of their companies. It is therefore 
considered appropriate that exceptional terms be removed from the CL 1965 and 
CGC in order to avoid misrepresentation by top executives and board members326. 
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This suggestion was made prior the introduction of the new CL 2015. This 
exception has been repealed by s.71 of the CL 2015.  
There is a well-known legal case of conflict of interest that concerned a decision 
made by the chairman of the board and board members of the Saudi Chemical 
Company. This was to allow the purchase of 15 per cent of the shares of one of 
the company’s subsidiary groups, without informing the company’s general 
meeting, even though the chairman had an interest in the transaction. The Saudi 
Chemical Company also failed to announce either on the stock exchange website 
or the company’s website that the transaction was associated with a related group. 
The CMA Board consequently levied a fine of $13,333 on the chairman of the 
board, as well as on each board member.327 
3.2.2.3 Duty to disclose any personal interest related to contracts and 
business carried out in favour of the company 
S.71 of CL 2015 states the responsibility of members of the board of directors to 
disclose any personal interests relating to contracts and businesses carried out in 
favour of the company to the board of directors, and registered in the minutes of 
the meeting. Members are not allowed to participate in any subsequent discussion 
relating to a decision. It is also required that the chairman publicly announce the 
GM, together with all contracts and businesses carried out in the interest of the 
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company. A notification of any members of the board of directors who have a 
personal interest is to be included in a special report prepared by the accounts 
controller. However, s.71 of CL 2015 introduces a new provision that if directors 
failed to disclose their interest, they could be subject to a litigation by the 
company or stakeholders. They could be forced to cancel the contract or to 
compensate or indemnify the company or the stakeholders for any financial gains 
made by the members from these contracts. 
It is clear that Saudi CL 2015 adopts the principle of transparency and disclosure 
in order to clarify the relationship between the company and members of the 
board of directors.328 The Minister of Commerce issued a Circular in 1994, which 
included regulations of disclosure, as discussed below: 
a. Members are required to give notice to the board of directors of any 
personal interest in business and contracts carried out by the company, 
which is to be registered in minutes of the meeting of the board of directors.  
b. Members who have a personal interest in any of the company’s business 
and contracts are not allowed to participate in decision voting. 
c. The chairman of the board of directors will notify the Ordinary General 
Assembly when members of the board of directors have a personal interest 
in the company’s contracts and businesses.  
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d. A special report of these contracts and businesses is to be prepared by the 
accounts controller and presented to the Ordinary General Assembly of the 
company. 
e. The Ordinary General Assembly of the company may give permission for 
a member to engage in such businesses, which would be renewed annually. 
3.2.2.4 Duty not to engage in business that would be in competition to the 
company  
Within the CL 2015, s.72 states that members of the board of directors cannot 
engage in activities, such as trading in one of its branches, or to be involved in 
any business that competes with the company. If this does take place, then the 
company could claim any profit or income from members’ personal benefit to be 
its own revenue, as well as claiming compensation. However, if a member were 
to be authorised to engage in such business activities by the GM, then this activity 
would be considered an exception. This authorisation should comply with the 
Ministry of Commerce Circular issued in 1994 regarding permission regulations, 
as well as issues of disclosure discussed earlier.           
Engaging in business that could compete with the company’s interests when 
exceptions are made for members of the board of directors has been challenged 
by some researchers, as harm can be caused to stakeholders, shareholders and the 
company. Therefore, if a member of the board of directors is to be given 
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permission that would raise a conflict of interest situation, then this would 
prohibit such competition.329 When considering the trading and business 
competition concept within a branch of the company, this normally includes 
engaging in similar activities in a partnership company or proprietorship. In 
addition, irrespective of the category or type of company, this concept would 
include being a director or manager of a partnership company or proprietorship.330  
This issue also includes a member involved in competition activity or similar 
trading activities in a branch of the company, when working explicitly or 
implicitly as a trader agent.331 To clarify the issues of conflict of interest and 
competition, competitive activity is not interpreted within a company structure 
that is similar, but in activities with a similar purpose to the company.332  
S.72 of CL 2015 has produced criticisms that its nature is too general, as all 
activities are deemed to form competition for the company, or even participation, 
which are strictly prohibited, but this includes harm if a member purchases shares 
in a competitor company, when members should only be restricted from 
involvement in managing another company333. However, if members of a board 
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of directors engaged in business activities that would be considered competition 
for the company, they could be forced to compensate or indemnify the company 
for any financial gains made by the members from these business activities, or 
consider that these gains are its own revenues.334 The penalties for these activities 
have been considered to be inadequate and too lenient, so that if members violate 
this ban on business activities that would compete with the company, they have 
to repay any financial gains they make from any profits, revenues or pay the 
company compensation due, but critics have suggested that these members should 
also be dismissed from the board of directors335. 
One example of a director being dismissed due to involvement in business 
activities that were in competition to the company was shown by Methanol 
Chemicals in Saudi Arabia. In this case, the member of the board of directors had 
been given three months to terminate his competitive business activities, but 
refused to comply, and so his suspension from the board was enforced. This 
action by the board of directors complied with ss. 68 and 81 of the CL 2015 and 
Article 18B of the CGC to remove the member336. This action demonstrated that 
the interests of the company had been harmed by this member of the board of 
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directors when participating in competitive activities, and showed that the 
penalties for members in breach of their duty were insufficiently covered by the 
provisions of s.72 of CL 2015. The company concluded that dismissal (expulsion) 
of the member was appropriate. 
3.2.2.5 Duty: Confidentiality should be maintained 
Other than during General Assembly Meetings, members of the board of directors 
cannot publically announce or disclose secret information to shareholders or other 
parties, and penalties for breaking company confidentiality could include the 
payment of indemnification and compensation subject to liability, and could be 
dismissed337. These types of secret information referred to by the CL 12015 would 
normally be made available to members of the board of directors due to their 
position within the company338. In addition, information made available to 
members of the board of directors cannot be used by them to gain benefit or 
interest for themselves or their relatives.339 
The evaluation of company secrets by some researchers suggest that this would 
be company information that it does not wish to announce publically to 
shareholders or other parties, and could use penalties of compensation or 
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dismissal for members found to liable of contravening this policy.340 This 
interpretation could be confusing, as members of the board of directors should 
not disclose or announce publically any information made available to them in 
their position, which could disregard whether or not the company might wish to 
communicate certain information to shareholders. This confusion arises because 
although s.74 of the CL 2015 states no information can be publically announced 
or disclosed to shareholders other than at General Assembly Meetings, this 
section does not identify whether or not the company might wish this information 
to be communicated. It remains unclear who has authority to dismiss a member, 
and even under Saudi Law, but the section has the intention of giving the board 
of directors full authority to claim compensation or dismiss a member, or the 
member in question gaining personal interest could acquire influence in deciding 
any legal case that occurs341. 
The issue of members of the board of directors being stopped from disclosing 
secret information to shareholders has been challenged by some researchers, who 
argue that shareholders are partners of the company and this prevention or 
prohibition for members should be expected. The argument is that it would be 
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better to assign responsibility and liability for secrets of companies that are 
disseminated or disclosed to other parties342. 
3.2.2.6 Duty to act within powers 
The board of directors has responsibility for the administration of the company, 
which is defined by law as having full powers. However, the board has a scope 
of competence that entitles it to delegate an activity or certain actions to one or 
more of its members.343  This scope of competence does not extend to the board 
of directors offering cash loans to individual directors, or guaranteeing a loan 
taken out by an individual member, and if such contracts were to be arranged, 
then they would have not validity.344 
However, there is an exception in the case of banks, as Saudi Companies Law 
enables the board of directors within certain terms and conditions and for the 
purposes of the bank’s business activities, to arrange loans for individual 
members to carry out deals and transactions, open L/Cs or guarantee a loan 
arranged by a member with a third party345. This permission under Saudi law is 
justified as it is not considered acceptable or reasonable to stop members of the 
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board of directors in arranging transactions or ordinary deals that other clients of 
the bank would be likely to carry out. 346 
The board of directors cannot arrange loans that would exceed a maturity of three 
years, which is defined by s.73/2 of the CL 1965. Other restrictions on the board 
of directors identified by this section include writing off debts of debtors of the 
company, taking a mortgage or selling on the assets of the company unless 
permission is provided by terms and conditions stated in the memorandum and 
articles of association of the company.  In such cases, the GM would need to give 
permission to the board of directors when such provision is not included in the 
memorandum and articles of association of the company, and the board would 
otherwise not be able to carry out any of these discretions or actions347. However, 
this provision was modified by s.75 of the new CL 2015 which states that the 
directors can arrange loans regardless of their length, taking a mortgage or selling 
on the assets of the company or any actions mentioned above, unless these actions 
were restricted by the company’s article or GM. 
3.2.3. Relief from liability 
If damage has been caused to the company by directors as a result of their 
misconduct, abuse or violation of Companies Law or the constitution of the 
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company, then s.78 of the CL 2015 states that directors have a joint liability for 
compensation by other companies, shareholders or third parties. 
Therefore, any shareholder of a company could begin proceedings on behalf of 
the company against directors under Saudi law if wrongful action has caused 
harm to the company. However, shareholders need to notify the company of their 
intention of starting liability proceedings, and to have a valid right to institute 
this. When such action is taken by a shareholder, the level of compensation will 
be based on the financial damage caused to this individual. However, the Saudi 
legal system in the CL has no requirement for shareholders to gain permission 
from the courts to begin legal action against member of a board of directors, but 
are required to inform the company of this intention before legal proceedings 
begin.348 Other countries have a different interpretation of liability, such as the 
UK, where directors can have their liability removed when in breach of their 
duties as a result of legal regulations349, but this contrasts with Companies Law 
in Saudi Arabia where liability is more strictly applied.       
Saudi law gives permission to the board to carry out various discretions and 
activities, such as gaining authorisation from the Ordinary General Assembly to 
engage in business that would be in competition to the company350. In terms of 
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ratification, s.78 of the CL 2015 rejects the ratification of wrongful action under 
Saudi law. Originally, liability for unlawful action by directors could be ratified 
by a majority decision at the Ordinary General Meeting, and defined in law by 
s.76 of the CL1965, except for incidents of cheating or malpractice. However, in 
1992, the Royal Decree no 22 amended s.76, so that ratification of unlawful action 
by individual directors was strictly rejected.351  
In contrast, the UK CA 2006 (section 1157) gives courts the power to remove 
liability from directors if their activities were reasonable, honest and it was just 
and equitable to do so, but when negligence or default caused liability. This is not 
supported by the Saudi CL 2015, because this law considers that if directors carry 
out negligent or aggressive actions, this cannot be used as an excuse to remove 
liability from directors, as this violates elements of Shari’ah Law, and is 
rejected.352 Also, under Saudi law, exemption clauses that exclude directors from 
liability are considered to be without validity353. In conclusion, under Saudi 
Companies Law, if a company has been harmed under any circumstances, 
directors cannot be relieved of their liability. This is justified as a protection for 
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the rights of stakeholders, investors and shareholders, and to guarantee that a 
company is managed well354.   
3.3. Directors’ Duties in UK Law 
Positive corporate behaviour has always been seen to rest on the duties of 
directors. In 1992, the report Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (the 
Cadbury Report) provided illustrations of the chief responsibilities of directors. 
According to the report, directors decide on a company’s strategic goals and 
provide the management to bring these goals about. They oversee the running of 
the company and ultimately must give an account of their supervision to 
shareholders355. 
Prior to the Companies Act 2006, the common law of negligence and equitable 
principles of fiduciary duties guided company directors in their responsibilities 
in the UK. These principles were summarised in sections 171 – 177 of the CA 
2006 and are the most noteworthy aspect of the Act in that they provide a statutory 
foundation for director responsibilities, something that did not previously exist356.  
In the current part of this paper, the effects of the CA 2006 and common law 
principles on board of directors’ responsibilities will be explored. The following 
                                                             
354 Mohammed, Al-Jeber, The Saudi Commercial Law, King Fahad National Library, Riyadh, 
2000, p.344. 
355 Adrian Cadbury, et al. Committee on The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Gee, 
London, 1992. 
356 Derek French, Stephen W. Mayson, and Christopher Ryan, Company Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2015-2016, pp.476-478. 
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question will be answered: are these two elements enough to assure that board 
members will not act outside the rules in the UK or is further reform needed? 
Fiduciary duties, as the foundation of the duties in the CA 2006, will be examined 
as will the statutory responsibilities as outlined in the CA 2006. A summary of 
behaviour deemed to be a violation of these responsibilities will be given. The 
current research will only offer an appraisal of the responsibilities of directors 
who protect shareholders’ rights. 
As a final point, the ability of the court to offer directors relief from liability will 
be looked at as some violations of their duties can, indeed, lead to them being 
held personally responsible. 
3.3.1 The beneficiaries of directors’ duties 
The enforcement of the responsibilities of directors is closely linked to who these 
duties are, in fact, intended to serve. Section 170(1) of the CA 2006 clearly 
stipulates that companies are the intended beneficiaries of directors’ duties to the 
exclusion of any individual or group outside the company. As a result, the 
responsibilities of directors can only be policed by someone who has the authority 
to act on the company’s behalf357.  
What the CA 2006 is silent on, however, is whether individual shareholders of a 
company are owed fiduciary responsibilities. In the case of a business with a large 
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amount of shareholders, the only circumstance in which fiduciary duties are 
thought to be applicable is when directors provide guidance during a bid for a 
takeover358. It has been held by Hoffmann J in Re a Company359 that guidance 
concerning takeover bids is not required from a director. However, if such 
guidance is offered it has to be given with the intent of obtaining the premium 
price for shareholders360. 
 
However, it was found by Swinfen Eady J in Percival v Wright361 that the 
directors had not violated their responsibility to not reveal discussions involving 
the company to shareholders of the vendor when a contract was arranged to buy 
shares belonging to the company. Directors do not have to act in the best interests 
of individual members but for the whole of a company362. 
 
In Hawkes v Cuddy363, the Court of Appeal resolved the issue of nominee 
directors. According to this ruling, a shareholder who has nominated a director is 
not owed any duties from the director based on this nomination364. However, in 
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practice a nomination may hinder a director’s responsibility to judge matters 
independently as a shareholder who nominates a director will want that director 
to think of their interests first. To deal with this, ss.173 and 175 of the CA 2006 
stipulate that only when a board of directors has officially allowed it can a 
nominee director act in the best interests of the nominator rather than the 
company365. The commercial truths of an appointment of this kind continue to 
pose legal problems. There appears to be a conflict between an appointment like 
this and the responsibilities of directors, especially the duty to encourage the 
success of the company as per s.172 of the CA 2006 . The situation of nominee 
directors highlights the issue of just how much influence commercial practice 
should have on the duties of directors and the standards they need to achieve. 
There is currently no legislation that deals directly with nominee directors which 
means that CA 2006 fails to address this issue. The courts have recognised that 
nominee directors will deliberate on the best interests of the people who nominate 
them. However, it has mostly been held that this is acceptable only if the actions 
of directors in favour of a nominator do not have any adverse effect on the 
company’s welfare366. 
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Furthermore, by its reticence in this area, UK company law allows the 
acknowledgement of directors’ duties owed to creditors, separate employees and 
other stakeholders367.Yet, when a company is insolvent, s. 172 (3) of the CA 2006 
states that directors must act in the best interests of creditors. This is reinforced 
by Street CJ in Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd368 who affirmed that creditor 
interests intercede when a company is insolvent as it is now assets belonging to 
creditors rather than shareholders that are being administered by directors. This 
is the case until liquidation occurs, the company is again solvent or different 
management is installed369. 
A report by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants claims that the 
Company Law Review did not properly deal with the issue of whose interests 
should be served in the running of a company370. This issue will not be addressed 
at present but will be explored during the discussion of a director’s duty to 
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3.3.2 The fiduciary duties 371 
The fiduciary character of the association between a company and company 
directors poses a number of problems. The issues of who a fiduciary actually is, 
what a fiduciary relationship consists of, and its importance in a corporate context 
all need resolving372. 
 
The definition of a fiduciary is someone who assumes the responsibility of acting 
in someone else’s interests in regards to a specific issue which, in turn, results in 
an association of close trust between the two373. There are two parties to a 
fiduciary relationship: the ‘power holder’ and the dependent party. The dependent 
party gives the power holder (and the power holder accepts) responsibility for the 
management of a certain element of the dependent party’s existence. The 
dependent party now relies upon the power holder’s management in this area374.  
 
Fiduciary principles and obligations are used in place of direct monitoring and, 
as a result, the expense of complicated commercial transactions is lessened. This 
is because these obligations do not necessitate the employment of an expensive 
                                                             
371 Since there are some duties considered to be fiduciary duties but now are found in Chapter 
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supervisor to oversee work. Instead deterrents are in place, much the same as a 
library will fine you for returning a book late rather than come knocking on your 
door when the book is due375. 
Fiduciary obligations strike a balance between equity and effectiveness. Power 
holders are stopped from taking advantage of their role and the characteristically 
substantial expense of direct supervision and complex bargaining is lowered 
which cuts down the transaction costs linked to the relationship376. 
 
Minority shareholders are also benefited and protected by directors’ fiduciary 
responsibilities as directors must act in the interests of the whole of a company. 
Decisions made at general meetings do not have to adhere to fiduciary 
responsibilities so if management decisions were able to be made minority 
shareholders would be at a disadvantage377. 
 
Reliance theory provides the core structure to fiduciary duty and comes about 
when one party places trust or, generally, reliance in another party378.  
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A board of directors is usually entrusted with the management of the business and 
affairs of a company according to normal corporation statute. The courts have 
repeatedly acknowledged that a director of a company owes that company a 
fiduciary duty with innumerable court cases highlighting that loyalty and due care 
are particular fiduciary obligations379.   
 
These two duties sometimes seem to overlaps but can be distinguished in that the 
duty of care is founded on law of negligence principles whereas the responsibility 
to be loyal to a company is founded on equitable principles set down by courts of 
equity380. 
 
3.3.2.1. Duty of Loyalty 
The key fiduciary principle of loyalty demands that board members avert any 
insider trading or conflicts of interest381. Additionally, if a board member 
provides information that will result in personal benefit this situation must be 
divulged382. Franks has explained insider trading as arising when board members 
employ their experience and knowledge of particular information to deal on the 
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stock exchange or otherwise buy/sell their company shares and do not, in fact, 
receive a direct advantage from a different contractual party383. 
Scholarship in this area and relevant court cases repeatedly stress the tight 
association between the responsibility of loyalty and fiduciary relationships to 
such an extent that it has even been proposed that the two terms equate to exactly 
the same thing384. Indeed, a fiduciary relationship can be identified if a duty of 
loyalty is present385. 
It is important to note that a director can resign from a company even if this 
resignation will have negative repercussions for the company. The power to 
resign is not fiduciary386. 
 
3.3.2.2. Duty of Care 
UK common law requires a duty of care, that is, that directors behave in a prudent 
and educated way. This duty of care demands that directors review all pertinent 
information that is reasonably available to them before making decisions. The 
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term ‘care’ is defined as the care that an average, cautious person in the same 
position and situation would take387. 
It has been claimed that this responsibility of care is actually a management duty 
and not a fiduciary duty388. This is because it simply demands that a particular 
level of judgment, skill and ability be satisfied when tasks are carried out and is 
not essentially linked with fiduciary relationships. As a result, a duty of care can 
arise in tortious or contractual relationships389. 
3.3.3 The Companies Act 2006: general duties 
A statutory code reaffirming and elucidating the general common law obligations 
of directors towards companies is provided by Part 10 of the CA 2006390. 
The law regarding the responsibilities of directors has recently undergone some 
serious changes in the UK. The UK has made the choice to follow Australia, New 
Zealand and other common law jurisdictions after traditionally looking to its own 
common law rules and equitable principles for guidance in regards to directors’ 
duties. Additionally, the CA 2006, most notably in Chapter 2 Part 10, has now 
summarised directors’ duties. The Act will now govern the conduct of directors 
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and be used to identify breaches in conduct and directors can refer to it to help 
them in their management activities391. 
The Act is a significant change for two key reasons: firstly, more attention will 
be paid to how directors behave in their role when decisions go wrong as their 
responsibilities have been largely clarified; and, secondly, it is no longer the law 
courts but Parliament that determine directors’ duties392. However, the courts 
retain a fair degree of power through interpretation393. 
The CA 2006 aims to solve the problem of directors’ lack of awareness of their 
legal responsibilities by straightforwardly enumerating these legal 
responsibilities in a statute which is easily obtainable394. 
 
In a House of Lords Grand Committee, Lord Goldsmith responded to the issue of 
whether the CA 2006 does, in fact, deal with all areas of the responsibilities of 
directors. In a ministerial statement, Lord Goldsmith stated that the general duties 
listed in the Act were not meant to be a full list of all a director’s obligations 
towards his/her company but simply core responsibilities that it is appropriate to 
put into statute. A number of other duties may still exist, including those imposed 
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by the Insolvency Act 1986, and a director must adhere to these unlisted duties 
also395. 
 
The responsibilities of directors are listed in Chapter 2 of Part 10 of the Act but 
scattered throughout the Act are other references to duties. For example, the 
impact of one duty on another is explored in s.172 in regards to a director’s 
obligation to further the success of a company, s. 174 in regards to the duty of 
care and s.179 which stipulates that different duties can simultaneously affect 
each other. Finally, a number of sections, such as s.39, s.40, s.43 and s.44, deal 
with directors taking actions that commit their companies to contractual 
obligations with corporations or other third parties396. 
 
The Act includes a nod to previous practice, stating that general responsibilities 
should be understood and applied in the same manner as common law rules and 
equitable principles demand and relevant rules and principles should be reviewed 
when applying the general responsibilities of the Act (s.170(4)) 397. Sir Bernard 
Rix, in Coppage v Safety Net Security Ltd398, stated that the statute develops and 
                                                             
395 Quoting Lord Goldsmith's statement made at the Lords Grand Committee, Companies Act 
2006: Duties of company directors, Ministerial statements (by Margaret Hodge) (DTI June 
2007) available online at: http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file40139.pdf. 
396 Bryan Horrigan, “Directors’ Duties and Liabilities – Where Are We Now and Where Are 
We Going in the UK, Broader Commonwealth, and Internationally?” International Journal of 
Business and Social Science, 2012, vol. 3 (2), 21. 
397 S.170 (4) of CA 2006. 
398 [2013] EWCA Civ 1176 at 28. 
136 
 
even replaces previous rules and principles, but it is not yet fully understood how 
common law rules, equitable principles and statute are supposed to work together. 
 
3.3.3.1. Duty to act within powers 
Members of boards of directors have wide-ranging powers but these are checked 
by substantial limitations determined either in general meetings, a company’s 
constitution or UK law399. To this end, the CA 2006 states that members of a 
board of directors should only use powers that adhere to determinations decided 
upon in general meetings or the management and the constitution of their 
company400. In particular, s.171 of the CA 2006 deals with two key aspects of 
directors acting within their powers, firstly, that a director must act in line with 
their company’s constitution401 and, secondly, that directors must only use their 
powers for the purposes for which they were awarded them402. 
While s.172 of the Act is unequivocal in its stance that a director must encourage 
the success of their company, even if an action is taken that is in the best interests 
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of the company, if it is outside the requirements of an company’s constitution this 
action will still be interpreted as a breach of a director’s duty403.  
 
Additionally, a director could be held to have acted outside their powers even if 
they take an action that, in their opinion, is in the company’s best interests. Eclairs 
Group Ltd v JKX Oil & Gas Plc404 concerns a board of directors who, not long 
before their yearly general meeting, took a majority decision to limit particular 
shareholders’ voting rights. The power to do this came from the articles of 
association of their company. Mann J, although conceding that the directors had 
done what they thought would be beneficial for the company, held that they had 
overstretched their powers. This was because the power that they had used had 
been granted for a specific purpose which did not include limiting shareholder 
voting rights. Thus, the board of directors’ decision was overruled. They had 
violated their duty to act within their powers (s.171, CA 2006) and that they had 
done so to fulfil their responsibility to encourage their company’s success (s.172, 
CA 2006) did not counteract the breach405. Nevertheless, it was held by the 
Supreme Court that directors imposed restrictions with the purpose of persuading 
an upcoming GM. However, the power to impose restrictions had been conferred 
in order to redress a failure to comply with a disclosure notice under s.793 of the 
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CA 2006. Therefore, the purpose of directors deemed improper and the 
restrictions would be revoked406. 
 
It can be argued that, ultimately, directors are not really affected in what they are 
allowed to do for their company. Nonetheless, certain actions by directors will be 
considered unlawful, for instance, if a director uses their powers to stop 
themselves from being removed407. If a director has the full support of the other 
board of director members, however, the very same use of power and results will 
not be considered unlawful but entirely fitting. Directors have been accused of 
acting as chauffeurs for their shareholders with shareholders deciding on a 
destination and directors getting them there regardless of whether it is a hazardous 
trip or a safe one. Small-sized, owner-operated companies are in no real danger 
here, but company’s in which a single shareholder wields a great deal of power 
could face this issue408. 
 
3.3.3.2. Duty to promote success to the company 
Directors need to consider the central purpose of a company before they can run 
one. There are a number of different perspectives on this issue. Shareholder 
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primacy theory asserts that companies exist only for the benefit of shareholders 
and to make a profit. Pluralists, however, see companies as social beings that have 
a responsibility to the community and their stakeholders (e.g. employees, 
suppliers, creditors)409. The Company Law Review Steering Group has 
highlighted a new concept, ESV or the enlightened shareholder value principle. 
This concept holds that the optimum way of ensuring general prosperity and 
safeguarding people’s welfare is the current aim of companies that already exists 
in law, namely, to generate as much value or profit as possible for shareholders. 
ESV falls somewhere between the other two concepts, shareholder primacy and 
pluralism, as a kind of concession to both410. 
 
In Richard Brady Franks Ltd v Price411 it was established that a director’s first 
responsibility is to the company and what is in a company’s best interests is 
typically considered to be synonymous with what is in their shareholders’ best 
interests412. 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, optimizing shareholder value has been a 
contentious topic for legal researchers and scholars. A dispute has been raging 
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over what the purpose of a corporation actually is. Even as far back as 1932 the 
Harvard Law Review published a notorious feud between Harvard Law Professor 
Dodd and Professor Berle of the University of Columbia, a specialist in corporate 
law. They were on two opposite sides of the fence with Dodd asserting that the 
true purpose of a company was not wholly about shareholders but involved the 
acknowledgment of a responsibility owed to employers, customers and the 
community, and Berle who believed that any powers given to directors of a 
company were given solely for the purpose of obtaining optimum profits for 
shareholders413. Berle was supported in 1970 by Milton Friedman, a Nobel Prize 
winner who published a well-known essay in that year claiming that a company’s 
sole true objective is to optimize profits for the benefit of the business’s 
owners/shareholders414. 
 
Due to how shareholders assessed the work of companies, during the 1980s and 
the 1990s the strategic decision-making done in listed firms was driven by the 
shareholder primacy theory415. Eventually, the central consideration of 
optimizing shareholder value did progressively lose ground and the close of the 
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1990s and the early years of the 2000s saw a number of new arguments make 
their way into legal journals. The focus of these articles, usually penned by legal 
professionals, was one key idea that the Chicago School of economists had 
ignored or simply not considered. The real situation was that the duty to optimize 
the value of a company for shareholders has never been demanded by corporate 
law in America416.   
 
The optimization of shareholder value will probably remain the dominant 
approach to business while the Eurozone continues to face serious economic 
stresses. However, maintaining the status quo and not re-evaluating the 
importance of shareholders could lead to the failure of businesses and impropriety 
in business and may have a negative impact on broader stakeholders and the 
environment417. In fact, the recent financial crises of 2007-2009 have been 
blamed primarily on the theory of shareholder primacy and the subsequent 
squeeze on businesses to make short-term gains. A reduction in investment, 
extremely high-risk moves and over-leverage led to a temporary and damaging 
rise in earnings418. 
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Keay, a proponent of the ESV principle, has argued that optimizing a business is 
not all about gaining higher profits. It includes other elements such as improving 
the reputation of a company, something that will positively affect a business’s 
worth in the long run. Keay asserts that members should be advantaged by the 
optimization of the value of a company but only incidentally419. 
A further consideration is the range and variety of concerns and values that 
shareholders have. Shareholders may intend to only hold on to their stock for a 
little while and will care about what share prices are doing right now420. Others 
may not be able to sell their shares, for example, they may hold the market 
through index funds, and will be, therefore, more concerned with the longevity 
of their investment. They will be interested in companies in specific directories 
remaining strong through their adoption of good corporate practices, their 
adherence to legal requirements and their support of considered decisions and 
sensible risks421. 
Before the CA 2006, the optimization of shareholder value and the importance of 
generating profits for shareholders was considered to be the predominant tactic 
                                                             
419 See Andrew Keay, The Corporate Objective, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011, 
pp.273,320. 
420 Lynn A Stout, The shareholder value myth: How putting shareholders first harms 
investors, corporations, and the public, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2012, p.9. 
421 See Leo E Strine Jr "One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and 
Think Long Term." The Business Lawyer 66.1, Nov 2010, 1. 
143 
 
in the UK422. The Act itself aims to exemplify the ESV principle and the key 
objective of companies is dealt with in s.172423.  According to this section, 
company directors have to behave in a manner that the director, in good faith, 
believes will best encourage the success of a company for all of its members. In 
acting, a director has to give particular consideration to: any long-term 
repercussions that may arise; what is best for the company’s employees; the 
importance of supporting the company’s positive relations with customers and 
suppliers and others; what effect may be felt by the community and environment 
because of the company’s actions; the importance of the positive reputation of 
the company regarding its conduct in business; and the necessity to act equitably 
between company members.  
 
The definition of success becomes important at this point. The definition offered 
by Lord Goldsmith posits that success is simply what members as a whole want 
a company to accomplish. While community-based companies and charities will 
seek to accomplish the goals that their company was expressly created to attain, 
for commercial companies, success typically equates to a long-term rise in 
worth424. 
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The CA 2006 has as one of its principal aims the promotion of a culture that 
encourages longer term investment and an increase in the participation of 
shareholders. The ESV principle is deeply ingrained in the statute and can be seen 
in the clauses that demand that directors encourage the success of a company in 
the interests of shareholders. To achieve this success directors have no choice but 
to consider both immediate and future concerns as well as broader issues, for 
example, environmental repercussions and the impact of the company’s actions 
on consumers, suppliers and employees425. 
The stance taken by the UK is not approved of by the Australian Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services. The Committee argues 
that there is now a lot of ambiguity surrounding the legal manifestation of the 
responsibilities of directors. One ambiguity is the purpose of companies and the 
impossibility of anticipating whether a court may hold that a company’s purpose 
goes beyond simply benefiting members and, if it does, in what way it extends 
beyond this. It is argued that a director may not be privy to the required basic 
information about their company and unaware of who they owe a duty to without 
a decision on the purpose of their company having been made426. 
The Australian Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (2006) has also 
weighed in. The Committee highlighted the danger that any alteration to the 
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Corporations Act that explicitly necessitates or licenses directors to act in 
accordance with the interests of particular stakeholders or particular issues would 
have. Instead of elucidating the issue, the Committee argues that such an 
amendment would put the purpose of a company, which a director must work 
towards, in doubt. The rights of other parties would not be bolstered and, in fact, 
it would have the effect of reducing director accountability to shareholders427. 
 
Indeed, in the CA 2006, s.172 does not actually confer on any individual or group 
of shareholders the right to enforce the duty owed by a director to the company, 
except in the case of a shareholder derivative suit. However, this is how it has 
always been; as a director owes its duty to a company it is only the company that 
can pursue a director for any breach of these duties428. 
Any potential breach cannot be evaluated based solely on financial aspects, for 
example, by comparing the share price of a company before and after the disputed 
behaviour429. In a derivative suit, the court will look at whatever the claimant 
presents, showing that courts have the capacity to establish whether a director’s 
actions were intended to further the interests of the company or not430.  In Madoff 
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Securities International Ltd v Raven & Ors431, it was held by Popplewell J that 
the fact that a director would have acted differently if left to his own devices does 
not consist of a breach of duty if he did what he thought, in good faith, was in the 
best interests of the company.  
The discussion over the purpose of a company has now moved on. It is no longer 
a question of whether a company should harmonise shareholder, non-shareholder 
and community concerns but how and for what purpose this should be done432. In 
order to establish a standard that should be applied by the court when reviewing 
the directors’ conduct to determine whether the relief can be granted or to liability 
can be imposed, a model of application of the business judgment rule has been 
introduced into statutory provisions in Australia433. That can be considered when 
the new modified law is introduced434. 
3.3.3.3. Duty to exercise independent judgment 
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A company director is under an obligation to judge situations independently. This 
duty is not breached if the director acts in line with any limitations on his/her 
discretion sanctioned by the company’s constitution or through an agreement 
appropriately entered into with the company435. 
 
One example of a possible breach of the duty to exercise independent judgement 
is in relation to nominee directors. A nominee director comes about when a 
nominator (either an individual shareholder or the company) from the controlling 
company assigns its employees to sit on the board of a subsidiary company. In 
doing this, a nominee director must consider the nominator’s interests and not 
those of the company which may occasion a breach of the independent judgement 
duty. This is dealt in s.173 and s.175 of the CA 2006 which allows this situation 
if the board of directors has sanctioned it436. 
 
The duty to use independent judgement implies that what a director may not 
always reflect the needs of members. However, s.172(2)(b) of the CA 2006 
absolves directors of having to worry about the use of their own judgement so 
long as what they do meets with the approbation of members, a stipulations that 
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appears to be a contradiction and ignores the responsibility of directors to think 
about employees’ interests437. 
The Cadbury Report makes a number of suggestions designed to safeguard 
independent judgement. Every board of directors should have at least three non-
executive directors (the chairman of the company may hold one of these spots) 
of which the majority should come from outside of the company438. 
 
3.3.3.4. Duty to exercise reasonable care, skills, and diligence 
In UK common law, the term ‘standard of care’ is a subjective one. Romer J, in 
Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd439, held that the standard of care owed 
by a director was that they had to show the level of skillfulness of someone of 
experience and intelligence440, a claim that has been censured as it has long been 
considered that directors are not subject to any minimum standard of care 
according to common law. The only requirement regarding care that directors 
must observe is simply that they have to do things to the best of their abilities441. 
The widely held explanation for common law’s approach to the standard of care 
of directors is two-fold. The courts are believed to have been considering only 
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non-executive directors when discussing care and believed that non-executive 
directors did not hold an important position in a company of have a central part 
to play in the running of it442. 
The Insolvency Act 1986 (s.214(4)) went some way to making the standard of 
care a little more objective and was praised in Re D’Jan by Hoffmann LJ443  for 
correctly reflecting the common law position on the duty of care owed by a 
director444. The CA 2006 similarly does not deviate from what has been 
established in common law in its explanation of care, given in s.174445. The care, 
skill and diligence demanded by s.174 of the CA 2006 is the same as that 
demanded in s.214 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The standards required all centre 
around what can reasonably be expected, for instance, a director has to display 
the level of knowledge, conscientiousness and skill that could reasonably be 
expected of someone who holds the position of director446. Although s.174 of the 
CA 2006 has formalised the standard of care it is still considered inadequate as it 
continues to be used a largely subjective yardstick. It is, therefore, subjective 
whether a director has actually breached their duty of care to their company447. 
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The issue of the required level of skill was broached in ARB International Ltd v 
Baillie448. In this case ARB International Ltd sued a former employee, demanding 
that their previous managing director had violated a number of different directors’ 
duties including those falling under s.174 of the CA 2006. The deputy judge 
found that the director did in fact have the required skill and knowledge level and 
did understand the company’s business. This meant that he was able to act as 
managing director and fulfil his duties and ARB lost the trial. It certainly was not 
claimed that the former director had full knowledge of all aspects of the business, 
but he was sufficiently informed to carry out his job and had enough experience 
to make the necessary decisions and take the necessary actions449. 
Further progress in this area was made in Madoff Securities Ltd v Raven & Ors450. 
Similar to the ARB case, in this instance Madoff Securities International Ltd 
unsuccessfully sued their former director for breach of duty of care, skills and 
diligence (s.174, CA 2006). A number of comments were made by Popplewell J 
when he laid down his findings. The suggestion was made that a board of 
directors could come to an agreement by majority about the commercial benefits 
of any transaction. Therefore, in order to fulfill his/her duty of care, a minority 
director did not have to resign or decline to be involved in the practicalities of the 
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majority decision. A violation of a director’s responsibilities would result if the 
minority director allowed themselves to be bullied by majority directors and this 
occasioned a complete denial of their duties. So long as there is no reason to 
distrust other directors, a director is completely justified in having confidence in 
the expertise and suggestions made by other directors451. 
3.3.3.5. Duty to avoid a conflict of interest 
Circumstances in which there is even the possibility of a conflict of interest 
between a director and the company, whether direct or incidental and including a 
conflict of duties or a conflict of interest and duty, must be avoided. Section 175 
of the CA 2006 makes special note of the abuse of property, opportunities and 
knowledge but excludes self-dealing transactions, that is, conflicts of interest 
where a transaction or arrangement is made with the company itself452 which is 
covered by S.177 of the Act. 
 
The most recent case with regards with the breach of this duty dealt with the 
situations in which a director is in breach of their duties but shareholders choose 
to say nothing. In such a situation, the question arises whether the silence of the 
shareholders should be taken to mean that the breach was conducted with their 
knowledge and agreement. The initial finding in Sharma v Sharma & Ors453. was 
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that a director had not violated her responsibilities when she had obtained dental 
practices for her personal benefit and not the company’s. This finding was 
appealed and the appeal unanimously dismissed with Lord Justice Jackson stating 
that as the director had obtained the dental practices with the knowledge and 
agreement of shareholders no breach of the duty to avoid conflicts of interest had 
occurred. Jackson LJ claimed that the facts of a particular case are integral in 
determining what a party’s reticence may mean. It can be rightly concluded, he 
stated, that a party has given their approval to certain actions in any situation in 
which it would be unacceptable to stay quiet at the time and only speak up further 
down the line454. 
3.3.3.6. Duty no to accept profit from a third party  
The CA 2006, s.176 stipulates that directors are prohibited from accepting any 
advantage from a third party given because s/he is a director or has done or 
refrained from doing something in his/her capacity as a director. The definition 
of ‘third party’ does not include an associated body corporate or individual that 
is acting on the company’s or on an associated body corporate’s behalf455. On the 
face of it, it seems that the no-conflict section in s.175 of the CA 2006 could 
include all of the provisions found in s.176, making s.176 redundant. However, 
s.176 does include a clause allowing for uninvolved directors to be sanctioned to 
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accept benefits from third parties. If both ss.175 and 176 are applicable in a 
particular situation, then both sections should be considered456. 
A key issue concerning benefits received from third parties is whether this 
transaction should be considered a secret payment or a bribe and common law 
has established that it should be considered a bribe457. Industries & General 
Mortgage Co v Lewis458 defined a transaction as being a bribe when an agent is 
given a benefit by a third party and that third party is aware of the position of the 
beneficiary as an agent and the payment/benefit is not disclosed to the principal 
for which the agent is acting459. AG for Hong Kong v Reid460 clarified the 
variations between what can be called a secret benefit and what must be 
considered a bribe. Templeman LJ noted that a secret benefit can also be a bribe. 
It is a benefit received by a fiduciary from trust property or because of the 
knowledge obtained in his/her role as a fiduciary. A bribe, on the other hand, is a 
present taken by a fiduciary as an incentive for the fiduciary to abandon the trust 
owed to the principal. A fiduciary is sometimes not liable for a secret benefit 
except when it is, in fact, a bribe, in which case s/he is always liable. 
Nonetheless, it was held by Lord Neuberger, in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v 
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Versailles Trade Finance Ltd461, that a beneficiary cannot claim a proprietary 
interest but only an equitable account of any assets or money obtained by a 
fiduciary in the case of a violation of his/her responsibilities towards the 
beneficiary. This only applies in the case that the assets/money has been owned 
beneficially by the beneficiary or that the trustee obtained the assets/money by 
utilising a benefit, right or prospect that was actually the beneficiary’s. 
In addition, it was held by Lewison LJ in FHR European Ventures LLP v 
Mankarious & Ors462. that Cedar was, in fact, subject to the principle and as a 
result held the advantage of the contract on a constructive trust for the benefit of 
the Investor Group. This was due to the extent of the abuse of the opportunity 
committed by Cedar. As such, the funds paid in pursuance of the contract that 
Cedar held on a constructive trust for the Investor Group were able to be traced463. 
However, this case was overturned and dismissed by the Supreme Court in July 
2014464. It held that the notion an agent is unable to hold a bribe or commission 
on trust because he could not have obtained it on behalf of his principal was not 
consistent with previous precedent465. This could therefore indicate that the 
Supreme Court supported bribes being held on trust for the principal or 
beneficiary466. 
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Section 176 of the CA 2006 is clear in its prohibition of directors from accepting 
third party benefits but says nothing about whether it is appropriate for benefits 
to be given by directors themselves. The Bribery Act 2010, however, is clear and 
affects all companies, especially international corporations. The Bribery Act 2010 
states that it is illegal to both accept and to give benefits or bribes467. 
 
3.3.3.7. Duty to declare interest in proposed transaction or arrangement 
Section 175 of the CA 2006 excludes self-dealing transactions from its provisions 
but s.177 sets down a number of requirements. If a director is directly or indirectly 
interested in a suggested business arrangement or deal with the company the 
director must disclose the character and degree of this interest to all other 
directors. Additionally, this disclosure must be done prior to the company 
entering into the arrangement and must be done so in full and exactly468. Section 
177 is associated with ss.175 and 176 of the CA 2006, which concern the 
responsibility of directors to eschew conflicts of interest and benefits from third 
parties. 
As an example, a director would be accountable for all profits obtained if the 
director had used the information acquired in their role as director for their own 
personal benefit469. This situation can be avoided if a director chooses to tell the 
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members all of the details of the proposed benefit and is granted their 
endorsement to move forward, which can be done as a normal resolution at any 
general meeting470. 
3.3.4. Relief from Liability 
Company law aims to establish a system that balances restrictions with the need 
for freedom. Any misuse of director powers must be checked but directors should 
not be so restricted in their activities that the effectiveness of having a powerful 
central core of management is compromised471. The post of ‘director’ would be 
an incredibly unpopular one if directors were accountable for each and every poor 
choice or error they make472. Directors should be liable for their lack of success 
but they must also feel safe enough to make decisions the results of which may 
be uncertain but could add significant worth to a company473. 
In the UK, ratification is a form of liability relief for directors. A company can 
ratify a variety of behaviour carried out by directors including those that equate 
to default, breach of trust or duty or even negligence. A company can only make 
the choice to ratify this behaviour from their directors by a majority vote. Neither 
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the director nor any member associated with him/her is entitled to act as a member 
in a situation where this resolution is proposed as a written resolution474. 
Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd475  and Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations 
and Estates Ltd476 both brought the problem of exemption from liability to the 
fore. In both cases an attempt had been made to protect directors from liability by 
including far-reaching exemption provisions in the articles of association of the 
companies. In 1926, the Greene Report laid out the alarming issues this situation 
raises477.  
According to UK law, a prudent director cannot be excused from any liability that 
connects him/her to negligence, breach of duty or trust or default through the use 
of exemption provisions. Such provisions will be rejected should the issue come 
to court478. The CA 2006 does, however, enable companies to buy insurance to 
cover these types of liabilities committed by their directors479. 
 
Furthermore, insurance can also be sought against liability brought about in 
association with third party claims (excluding the company or its associated 
companies), for example, an employee, creditor, regulatory organisation, 
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liquidator or member. This QTPIP (qualifying third party indemnity provision) is 
found in s.234 of the CA 2006480. 
Directors and officers insurance is also made available to companies according 
to the provisions in the CA 2006. This type of insurance takes the weight off 
directors’ shoulders as they will not be obliged to personally pay for potentially 
long and costly litigation. Directors and officers insurance will cover situations 
already provided for in the CA 2006 but can actually offer more comprehensive 
protection than can be found in the statute. One difference is that directors and 
officers insurance will cover the costs of the defence of a criminal trial for 
directors (although not criminal penalties) until a director is convicted of an 
offence481. 
Section 1157 describes actions by directors that are fair, honest and reasonable 
would give power to courts to relieve liability from directors, when liability was 
caused by negligence or default. However, liability relief claimed in many courts 
under section 1157 is often unsympathetically dismissed482. Hoffmann LJ Re 
D’Jan of London Ltd stated that when a director has committed negligent action 
which involves the lack of sufficient care, and claimed that he had acted 
reasonably, this may seem odd483. 
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Societal anticipation of how both executive and non-executive directors should 
behave has changed significantly since the publication of the Greene Report484. It 
is now necessary to look at sections of the CA 2006, such as s.1157, in terms of 
their context to appreciate the true objectives of the statute. For instance, the 
clause allowing for relief from liability for directors was enacted for the sake of 
non-executive directors and intended to establish a clearly defined separation 
between non-executive and executive directors. The special situation of non-
executive directors should, therefore, be considered by courts whenever a non-
executive director applies for relief485. 
3.4. The comparison  
The preceding sections have highlighted the various responsibilities of directors 
according to UK, Saudi Arabian and Shari’ah law. While a number of similarities 
between the typical characteristics of directors’ duties can be seen, there also exist 
a number of distinct variations. These differences appear in regards to a director’s 
statutory obligations, fiduciary responsibilities, relief from liability and other 
areas. All of these variations must be taken into account when contrasting the 
obligations of directors under different jurisdictions.   
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As Saudi Arabian law is firmly based on Shari’ah law, this current section will 
conduct an evaluation of Shari’ah and Saudi Arabian law, taken as one, in contrast 
to UK law. The objective is to analyse the three legal systems in regards to 
directors’ duties and identify what is the same and what is different between them. 
3.4.1. The fiduciary duties 
 
It has been previously discussed that the fiduciary relationship of trust is the very 
foundation of Shari’ah law and a concept that that the UK adopted from overseas 
back in the 1200s. Since then, UK common law has built upon the concept of the 
fiduciary relationship and has acknowledged that fiduciary responsibilities 
include fidelity and due attention. In contrast, Islamic scholars have given little 
thought to this area of law. 
In Saudi Arabia, neither the CL 2015 nor the CGC 2006 refers to directors’ 
fiduciary responsibilities. Indeed, fiduciary responsibilities are not acknowledged 
in legislation in Saudi Arabia. It is argued that Shari’ah law’s acknowledgement 
of fiduciary responsibilities exerts its influence in Saudi Arabia and is applied by 
the courts. However, these responsibilities require explanation and codification 
or their integrity will be threatened by a dispersed variety of rules and principles. 
Saudi Arabian legislators should look to UK legislation, in particular, s.174486  of 
the CA 2006 which offers an explanation of the various fiduciary responsibilities 
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of directors, for example, the duty of care, and imposes standards that directors 
must meet.  
3.4.2. General duties 
 
Basic responsibilities of directors share a number of resemblances in Saudi 
Arabian and UK law. For example, both UK and Saudi Arabian law reflect the 
prohibition against conflicts of interest, the responsibility of directors to disclose 
any interest they may have in regards to particular deals or transactions and the 
responsibility of directors to act within their powers. 
However, differences arise when it comes to the remedies available for a breach 
of duty. S.72 of the CL 2015 in Saudi Arabian law stipulates that a director is 
prohibited from being in any way involved with a business that is one of their 
company’s competitors. If this situation arises, the company can claim 
compensation and can also demand profit or income derived for the personal 
advantage of the director. This remedy acts as discouragement to any director 
becoming involved with a competing enterprise and enhances the enforceability 
of this particular responsibility. The CA 2006 does not offer any such remedy for 
UK companies. 
Directors in Saudi Arabia must encourage the prosperity of their company as per 
the requirement to make sure that the company’s objectives are achieved487. If 
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harm has been done to the company because of a director’s breach of their duty 
or misbehaviour, s.79, 80 of the CL 2015 grant the company and the shareholders 
the right to bring a claim against their director/s. Yet, Saudi Arabian law is silent 
in regards to who exactly is owed a duty by directors and whose interests must be 
taken into account when a director is managing the company. This is not so in 
UK law. S.170 of the CA 2006, stipulates that directors owe a duty to the 
company and s.172 highlights the importance of the shareholder value theory, 
demanding that a director is duty-bound to encourage the prosperity of the 
company for the advantage of all members and with an eye on stakeholder 
interests and the enterprise’s long-term prosperity.  
 
The Saudi Arabian CGC 2006 does, in fact, acknowledge stakeholder interests as 
separate from shareholder interests. The CGC 2006 states that its objective is to 
guarantee that optimal corporate governance methods are used and adhered to in 
the administration of joint stock companies listed in the Exchange. The CGC 
2006 goes on to state that this is done in order to safeguard the rights of both 
shareholders and stakeholders although it must be highlighted that the 
applicability of these regulations extends to listed companies only488. 
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What is contained in the CGC 2006 does indicate that the issue of whose interests 
need to be considered when managing an organisation has been highlighted and 
will be dealt with when the CL 2015 is reformed. It can be concluded that Saudi 
Arabian policy-makers will reflect on this issue when making decisions about 
revising CL 2015. 
 
Directors in the UK are required to use independent judgement. Provided that a 
director’s decision-making power is authorised by an arrangement agreed upon 
by the company in the appropriate manner or by the organisation’s constitution, 
a director must evaluate circumstances independently489. However, the issue of 
whether a director must judge a situation independently when making a decision 
through the company’s board is not dealt with in Saudi Arabian law.  
Furthermore, in UK law, a nominee director owes their nominator no particular 
responsibility simply due to the fact that s/he has nominated them. This is because 
of the director’s duty to make independent judgements490. Although there is no 
legislation that deals directly with nominee directors which means that CA 2006 
fails to address this issue491, Saudi Arabian law does not make any requirements 
regarding this subject. The CGC 2006 does clarify that a director is the 
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representative of all shareholders. The Code requires that a director act in the best 
interests not only of members who supported his being awarded the position but 
each and every individual he represents492. It again must be noted that the CGC 
2006 only applies to companies listed in the Exchange and is only guidance, not 
law, and so may be considered to be insufficient. 
3.4.3. The relief from liability 
 
One clear similarity between Saudi Arabian and UK law is that neither allows the 
use of exemption clauses to safeguard discreet directors from liability493. Also, if 
a case is brought and these clauses are presented they will be rejected under both 
Shari’ah law494. Yet, a distinct difference exists in regards to ratification which is 
a form of liability relief allowing a company to ratify a wide range of 
inappropriate behaviour committed by directors that can be likened to negligence, 
default or breach of duty or trust. While this is disallowed in Saudi Arabian law, 
UK law allows it. However, it is argued that ratification will be accepted by Saudi 
Arabian law as prior consent given to directors is permissible and ratification is 
allowed in Shari’ah law.  
A further relief of liability for directors in the UK is Directors’ and Officers’ 
Liability Insurance. As previously explained, directors’ insurance takes 
considerable pressure off directors as they are not personally responsible for the 
                                                             
492 Article 11-d of the Saudi CGC 2006. 
493 S. 232 of the UK CA 2006, s.76 of Saudi CL 1965 and s.78 of Saudi CL 2015. 
494 See Abdullah Ibn Qudamah, Almugni, Dar Hajar, Egypt, 1989, vol 5, p110. 
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costs of litigation, which can be both lengthy and expensive. Shari’ah law does 
not allow this practice and neither the CL 1965 nor the new CL 2015 makes no 
mention of it. There are no shortage of organisations within the country that do, 
in fact, offer different types of insurance contracts such as health and vehicle 
insurance495. Nevertheless, directors’ liability insurance has not been recognised. 
In fact, insurance is vital for both individuals and business496. Considering this, it 
is necessary for Saudi Arabian legislators to identify a substitute for directors’ 
insurance that does adhere to Shari’ah law in order to prevent potentially 
crippling liability. 
Currently, in no circumstances does Saudi Arabian law offer directors relief of 
liability if a company is damaged. A director can only free themselves of liability 
if the board of directors authorises the director to undertaken a range of choices 
and actions, for example, if a director is granted a sanction to organise a loan by 
the Ordinary General Assembly. It is clear that UK law offers directors a far 
broader range of liability relief than is allowed in Saudi Arabia. 
Director liability arising from default or negligence can be relieved in UK courts 
as per s.1157 of the CA 2006 which simply requires that directors behave in an 
equitable, transparent and sensible manner. However, neither Shari’ah law nor 
the CL 2015 makes such a provision. The reason for this stance has been 
                                                             
495 See the official website of Tawuniya Insurance Company at: 
https://www.tawuniya.com.sa/en. [Accessed 27 March, 2016]. 




explained by Al-Jeber as arising from the need to ensure the proper administration 
of an organisation and to safeguard the rights of investors, shareholders and 
stakeholders497. Misbehaving directors have a range of liability relief at their 
disposal in the UK thanks to the country’s relatively relaxed regulations. It is 
widely acknowledged that Shari’ah and Saudi Arabian law is far stricter in this 
matter and offers very limited liability relief for directors.  
3.5 Summary 
 
Chapter 3 has attempted to address one of the research objectives concerning 
directorial duties and those actions considered a breach of these duties. It has 
highlighted the various responsibilities of directors according to UK, Saudi 
Arabian, and Sharia law. While several similarities between the typical 
characteristics of directorial duties can be seen, there also exist a number of 
distinct variations. These differences appear in regards to a director’s statutory 
obligations, fiduciary responsibilities, relief from liability for breach of duty, and 
other areas. The comparative exercise was done in the hope of benefiting from 
other countries’ more advanced legal jurisdictions and avoiding any weaknesses 
identified in the existing Saudi law. Therefore, this chapter provided several 
suggestions and solutions which are intended to contribute to the enhancement of 
the existing Saudi law in terms of appropriate ways in which to deal with 
                                                             
497 See Mohammed Al-Jeber, The Saudi Commercial Law, King Fahad National Library, 
Riyadh, 2000, p.344. 
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directorial duties. This will assist the author in the critical examination of the 
effectiveness of the enforcement of directorial duties in UK legislation when 
compared to Saudi law. Ultimately, this stems from the fact that the evaluation of 
the effectiveness of the enforcement of directorial duties cannot be conducted 



















CHAPTER 4. Private enforcement of directors’ duties 
Over one hundred years ago, Roscoe Pound called for scholars to focus on law 
books rather than old treatises. It was Pound’s belief that more attention should 
be paid to law in action. Law in action theory explores the role of law and its 
application in society, not just the law as it appears in statute498. Hence, if they 
are not efficiently enforced, the duties explored in the preceding chapter are 
unlikely to make any real difference to corporate management in any legal 
system, including that of Saudi Arabia499. In the case of developing nations and 
transition economies, the development of a successful business environment and 
efficient corporate management depends crucially not on regulations, laws on the 
books or voluntary codes, but on enforcement. This is due to the fact that the 
motivation of agents to conform to the rules is influenced by the manner in which 
the latter are applied. Thus, how efficient a regulatory system is depends 
simultaneously on substantive rules and approaches to implementation. 
Furthermore, based on whether the action is taken by a state official or a private 
party, enforcement is classified as either public or private500.  
 
                                                             
498 See Roscoe Pound, “Law in Books and Law in Action”, American Law Review 44.1, 
1910, 12. 
499 Paul Lyndon Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, p.643. 
500 John Armour, “Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and 
Empirical Assessment”. ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 106/2008. April 2008, available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133542 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1133542 . 
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The main difference between public and private enforcers is that, whereas the 
former receive payment irrespective of the results of the action501, the latter are 
paid only when litigation is successful. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that cost 
modifications have a greater impact on private enforcement, and moreover, that 
private enforcement is more comprehensive compared to public enforcement 
when the costs are reduced502. Furthermore, it is easier for the public agencies to 
initiate enforcement due to a higher level of powers and resources which enable 
them to authorise any person or organisation to help them to enforce the law, such 
as appointing the insolvency practitioners to report whether the company 
directors are unfit under S.7 of the CDDA 1986. While the financial 
consequences are more serious in private cases, in public sanctions – when the 
rare penalties are imposed - errant directors often bear little relation to the profits 
made503. Moreover, public enforcement agencies are relatively centralised and 
subject to political control, whereas private claimants are not. By contrast, while 
the public actions are regularly covered, private claimants must fund litigation. 
Whilst this makes public enforcement easier to coordinate, detractors argue that 
                                                             
501 Receiving payment through financial sanctions is not the public enforcer’s main goal. 
Nevertheless, financial sanctions provide a self-sufficient system of securities regulation as 
they deliver public agencies adequate capital sources for future investigation, which, as a 
result, guarantees a more effective enforcement system. 
502 John Armour, “Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and 
Empirical Assessment”. ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 106/2008. April 2008, available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133542 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1133542. Also see 
Jonathan R. Hay and Andrei Shleifer, "Private enforcement of public laws: A theory of legal 
reform." American Economic Review, 1998, 398. 
503 For in depth see Andrew Keay and Michelle Welsh, "Enforcing breaches of directors’ 
duties by a public body and antipodean experiences" Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 2015, 
Vol. 15, No. 2, 255. 
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these features also make public enforcers relatively easy to bribe504. Additionally, 
although scarce, empirical evidence indicates that the efficiency of tools of 
private enforcement exceeds that of public enforcement505. This is not to say that 
public enforcement is irrelevant; rather, the efficiency of private enforcement is 
enhanced by good public enforcement506. Therefore, the mechanisms of private 
enforcement are addressed in the present chapter. 
 
However, one cannot conclude based on that common saying that a company 
should take legal action in each case where a director is considered to have not 
fulfilled his/her obligations towards the company. The key question is whether 
litigation would serve the interests of the company and the answer resides 
exclusively in the facts related to a specific case507. The company could suffer 
more serious consequences if it chooses to pursue litigation than if it chooses not 
to, while the personal interests of a director could also weigh substantially in the 
decision not to take legal action. Given these considerations, the law plays a 
                                                             
504 Jonathan R. Hay and Andrei Shleifer. "Private enforcement of public laws: A theory of 
legal reform." American Economic Review, 1998, 398. 
505 Erik Berglöf and Stijn Claessens. "Enforcement and good corporate governance in 
developing countries and transition economies" The World Bank Research Observer 21.1, 
2006, 123. 
506 Howell E. Jackson and Mark J. Roe, "Public and private enforcement of securities laws: 
Resource-based evidence", Journal of Financial Economics, 93.2, 2009, 207. 
507 Paul Lyndon Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, p.643. 
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central part in appointing a reliable individual to decide if litigation is the 
appropriate strategy to exercise the rights of the company508. 
Al-Abbas conducted empirical research addressing the impact of the absence of 
corporate governance on earnings management behaviour and questioning 
whether regulations should be multiplied or minimised if governance rules are to 
facilitate and promote Saudi commercial development. The findings of this 
research suggested that there is a necessity to regulate governance practices used 
by Saudi companies through the introduction of a monitoring programme509.  
 
The CL 2015 came into force on 3 May 2016. The Law represents a significant 
overhaul and modernisation of Saudi Company Law, aligning it closer with 
global trends in corporate law and governance. For example, the concept of 
holding companies, the possibility of setting up single-shareholder companies, 
provision preventing the combination of the post of chairperson with executive 
positions (including that of CEO) and compulsory cumulative voting have been 
introduced510. Nevertheless, as this chapter will address, the new law has made 
no considerable changes to minority shareholders’ right to sue directors. 
 
                                                             
508 Ibid, pp.643,644. 
509 Ibid. 
510 A cumulative voting system permits shareholders in an election of the board of directors 
for more than one seat to put more than one vote towards a preferred candidate. Minority 
shareholders can concentrate their votes in this way, which increases their chance of 
obtaining representation on the board of directors. 
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The rules regarding the duties and obligations of directors are extensively and 
clearly outlined in CL 2015. However, the question is what are the measures that 
shareholders can take to ensure the protection of their rights if directors fail to 
accomplish their obligations? 
 
A number of researchers have argued that minority shareholders have little 
opportunity to participate in Saudi listed companies, due to the fact that Saudi 
Arabia is still a developing country511. This argument is supported by the findings 
of the majority of financial, legal and political studies focusing on corporate 
governance systems in developing countries, which indicated that the rights of 
minority shareholders are largely ignored. In this context, a widespread 
ownership has been suggested to provide effective protection for minority 
shareholders512. Moreover, it has also been noted that minority shareholders are 
granted few rights by the Saudi legal system. This lack of rights arises from the 
definition provided by the Saudi CGC regarding minority shareholders as being 
those shareholders who have no control or influence over a company. Thus, 
according to European, American and even regional standards, the protection that 
corporate governance provides minority shareholders is insufficient. Being a 
developing corporate regulation system, Saudi CL 2015 displays significant 
                                                             
511 Fahad M. Al-Majed, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance 
of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: a Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal 
Perspective, Hard copy, Unpublished PhD thesis in Manchester University, 2008, p.230 
512 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny 
“Legal Determinants of External Finance” Journal of Finance, 1997, 52(3), 1131. 
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structural flaws associated mainly with the high level of concentrated ownership 
that it authorises in favour of the state as well as some distinguished families. As 
a direct consequence of these flaws, liquidity has been diminished and the stock 
exchange competition is almost non-existent513. 
This perspective invited intense criticism as seemingly the evidence brought forth 
was insufficiently conclusive to allow interpretations of the level of protection 
granted to minority shareholders and of the related aspects of the legal system. 
As proposed by La Porta and colleagues, minority shareholders are better 
protected by the common law system as well as by distributed ownership. 
However, the argument that the common law system and distributed ownership 
concentration are correlated is disproved by the case of Hong Kong, which has 
been under British colonial rule for over a century and consequently adopted the 
British common law system514. According to the findings of an empirical 
research, during the period 1995-2005, civil law systems gained ground on 
common law systems and the distinctions between them diminished. What is 
more, in the same period, the degree of shareholder protection offered by civil 
                                                             
513 Gonzalo Villalta Puig and Bader Al-Haddab, "The protection of minority shareholders in 
the gulf cooperation council", Journal of Corporate Law Studies13.1, 2013, 123. Also see 
Fahad M. Al-Majed, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of 
Saudi Publicly Held Companies: a Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal 
Perspective, Hard copy, Unpublished PhD thesis in Manchester University, 2008, p.230. 
514 Philip Lawton and Yung Boyce, “Corporate political connection as a determinant 
of corporate governance in Hong Kong”, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 2012, 63, 449. 
For in depth in criticising La Porta approach see Philip Lawton “Berle and means, corporate 
governance and the Chinese family firm” Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 1996, 6: 348 , 
and Philip Lawton ”Modelling the Chinese family firm and minority shareholder protection: 
The Hong Kong experience 1980-1995” Managerial Law, 2007, 49.5/6: 249.  
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law systems was greater than that provided by the common law systems not only 
in developed countries, but also in developing ones515. 
In the UK, a complicated network of statutory law has been created in an effort 
to right the balance between directors and shareholders. These laws question 
possible misconduct and stipulate director mechanisms and duties516.  
The UK is considered among the most advanced jurisdictions in the area of 
corporate law, particularly in terms of how it deals with directors’ duties and their 
enforcement. Based on its long experience in this field, this chapter will consider 
a number of sources of UK law. Court cases and legislation, particularly the CA 
2006, have comprehensively covered a number of actions which can be used by 
minority shareholders to enforce directors’ duties. Even after the introduction of 
the new Saudi Companies Law 2015, there remain some essential points that have 
not yet been addressed. Hence, it will be useful to carefully consider relevant UK 
legislation, as it could significantly contribute to the development of the CL 2015. 
The level of efficiency of existing statutory measures and practices under UK CA 
2006 and SCL 2015 in safeguarding the rights of minority shareholders and their 
participation in private and public companies constitutes the focus of the present 
chapter. To this end, the measures and practices introduced under SCL 2015 
compare to UK for preventing the interests of company directors from infringing 
                                                             
515 John Armour, et al. "Shareholder protection and stock market development: an empirical 
test of the legal origins hypothesis." Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 6.2, 2009, 343. 
516 Shuangge Wen, Shareholder primacy and corporate governance: legal aspects, practices 
and future directions, Routledge, 2013, p.74. 
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upon the rights of shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, are 
investigated in detail. The actions that minority shareholders can take to exert 
their rights both within and outside companies are examined as well.  
Based on the analysis, it is argued that minority shareholders are insufficiently 
protected by the statutory measures and practices under SCL 2015 and therefore 
the latter should be reviewed and amended. To better achieve the outlined 
objectives, this chapter is separated into six sections. The first section addresses 
derivative claim under the UK law, which can be taken up by minority 
shareholders on behalf of the company, and whether this is recognised by SCL 
2015. The second section concentrates on the personal suit, while the third section 
will explore the unfairly prejudicial conduct claim. The forth section discusses 
additional measures that shareholders can resort to. The fifth section presents the 
impediments to enforcement arising from the pervasiveness of the principle of 
majority rule, as well as the drawbacks of an enforcement system underpinned by 
shareholder action. Finally, a summary will then be provided to conclude. 
4.1. Statutory derivative claim 
Drawing on Foss v Harbottle517, the company action is a rule which specifies that, 
when a company suffers damage, the company itself acts as the complainant in 
any litigation to rectify the damage incurred. This means that individual 
shareholders or a minority shareholder group are unable to initiate litigation in 
                                                             
517 (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
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the name of the company if the latter does not give its permission first. However, 
several exceptions to Foss v Harbottle have been allowed by the courts, as the 
principle of majority rule could have unjust repercussions if it is unchecked. The 
derivative action is one such exception which permits minority shareholders to 
exercise the right to take legal action against directors for duty violation, right 
which is normally exclusive to the company. Moreover, the company receives 
any compensation that is awarded518.  
 
In the past, the UK lacked codified regulations regarding derivative claims. 
Nevertheless, in a few cases derivative claims were authorised, but in reality it 
was impossible for an individual shareholder to institute a suit on behalf of a 
company. This was established in Foss v. Harbottle in 1843 with exemptions to 
the rule being extremely restricted519. Subsequently, the CA 2006 established a 
codified form of the broad derivative action in ss. 260-264. The uniqueness of 
this wide-ranging legislative derivative action is its placement in the courts the 
judgment concerning whether the action is in the company’s interests in order for 
proceedings to be instigated in any particular case. This implies that any minority 
shareholder interested in instituting a derivative action should obtain court’s 
                                                             
518 Ben Pettet, Company Law, Pearson Education, England, 2005, p219, 220. 
519 Mathias Siems, “Private Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: Derivative Actions as a Global 
Phenomenon” (November 16, 2010). Final version published in: Stefan Wrbka, Steven Van 
Uytsel and Mathias Siems (eds.), “Collective Actions: Enhancing Access to Justice and 
Reconciling Multilayer Interests?” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 93. 




permission in order to take any extra actions in the proceedings520. It has been 
held that obtaining the permission of the court is for the benefit of the minority 
shareholders since they are able to get a judgment on the fundamental issue 
(which is, if it is for the benefit of the company for institution of a lawsuit), 
nonetheless, the minority shareholders’ enthusiasm for derivative litigation is 
dependent on a judge being persuaded that a lawsuit on behalf of the company is 
necessary521. 
 
The CA requires a derivative suit as a claim emanating from an actual or proposed 
company director’s act or omission concerning negligence, breaches of duty or 
trust522. In Part 11 of the CA 2006, a “director” includes de jure, former, de facto, 
as well as shadow directors523. Shareholders might institute a derivative action 
with regard to a cause of action that happened prior to them being company’s 
members524. Nevertheless, an ex-member may not bring a claim even with regard 
to an issue that happened while he/she was a shareholder.525 
 
                                                             
520 Paul Lyndon Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, p.652. 
521 Ibid, p.653. 
522 S. 260(3) of CA 2006. 
523 These directors may owe duties to the company in certain circumstances. This has been 
deeply analysed earlier in this thesis under Chapter 2. 
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The Act continues to recognise three circumstances under which leave should not 
be granted to institute a derivative action by a minority shareholder two of which 
relates to whether the existing or future breach of duty has been ratified or 
authorised526. The tests have been condemned since they are likely to leave out 
such actions against and with regard to common directors’ negligence527. Even 
though the likelihood of approval have been constricted by s 239 of the Act that 
forbids self-interested members in taking part in the ratification vote, instances in 
which the wrong within an issue has been approved shall be encircled with 
contentions concerning whether the ratification is legitimate. This is because s 
263 of the Act plainly insinuates that leave must not be allowed when the wrong 
was ratified. This implies that in several situations the efficiency of a supposed 
ratification shall overshadow the trial for leave, thus it is not expected to cause 
alteration of emphasis supportive of wide court discretion. It is a hard as well as 
a contentious matter that is improbable to be determined using the latest 
process528. In Franbar Holdings v Patel529 the issue of ratification came about in 
a situation where there was an application for permission to continue with a 
derivative claim. In such a situation the court needs to consider whether the effect 
                                                             
526 S. 263(2) (B), (C) of CA 2006. The rules of the ratification and authorisation have been 
discussed earlier in this thesis under Chapter 3. 
527 Arad Reisberg, "Corporate Law in the UK After Recent Reforms: The Good, the Bad, and 
the Ugly." Current Legal Problems 63.1, 2010, 315. 
528 Arad Reisberg, “Derivative Claims Under the Companies Act 2006: Much Ado About 
Nothing?”, Rationality in Company Law: Essay in Honour of DD Prentice, J. Armour, J. 
Payne, eds., Hart Publishing, 2009; University College London Law Research Paper No. 09-
02. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092629 
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of the ratification resolution is in fact to improperly deny the claimant the 
opportunity to bring a claim on their company’s behalf. 
 
It is noteworthy that in Hong Kong, ratification in particular situations effectively 
prevents companies from bringing an action for damages against a director for 
losses resulting from an omission or the ratified act. However, this does not 
necessarily stop a statutory derivative claim or an unfair prejudice claim from 
being brought by dissenting minorities and does not constitute acceptable grounds 
for the court to refuse leave to proceed the aforesaid claims530. 
 
Thirdly, it is required for the judge to not permit leave to institute a derivative 
action where directors working in line with s 172 (which relates to the duty to 
promote the success of the company) would not want to carry on with the 
action531. A question arises as to whether s.172 includes non-shareholders. 
However, it is accepted that the statutory list presented in s.172(1) (which deals 
with non-shareholder constituencies) is not exhaustive. As a result, a director will 
be considered to be in breach of their duty if they do not consider all the issues 
pertaining to the decision under discussion. Yet, this is close to impossible in 
practice. In addition, the courts are not in a position to closely examine if a 
                                                             
530 S.734 of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 2012. 
531 S. 263(2) (A) of CA 2006 
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director has considered all non-shareholder issues as this introduces the potential 
for the court to judge business decisions with the benefit of hindsight.532 
Company beneficiaries have previously been discussed in detail in the current 
thesis.533 
Presupposing that a legal action is not within any of the circumstances above, the 
judge ought to grant permission but through stipulating a few aspects that must 
be considered  when giving a decision as to whether to grant permission as 
recorded under S.263(3)534. For example, to consider if the action is contrary to 
the company’s benefit, if the plaintiff is acting in good faith as well as whether 
the company has resolved not to take up the action. Of significance and as 
demonstrated in Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd535, s. 263 (2) (a) is used just where 
courts are contented that there is no director, working in line with the duty to 
promote the success of the company -section 172- , is looking to proceed with the 
derivative action. However, when a few directors desire to proceed while others 
are not willing, then, section 263(3) (b) is used.  
 
This might create an impediment to the minority shareholders at the time of 
instituting a lawsuit against the company directors. Keay explains that the board 
                                                             
532 Shuangge Wen, Shareholder primacy and corporate governance: legal aspects, practices 
and future directions, Routledge, 2013, p.161. 
533 Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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of directors is a group and certainly is influenced with group features. Company 
board has been depicted as “elite and episodic decision-making groups”. 
Moreover, there appears trivial suspicion that company boards are immensely 
reliant on the social-psychological practices and that they may be influenced by 
such dynamics. So directors might decide not to trigger a claim since they may 
be persuaded with: the truth that the directors have turn out to be friendly to the 
wrongdoer; other company board members, particularly senior managers such as 
the CEO, are backing the wrongdoer; matters of collegiality that may imply that 
the directors gets it hard to examine activities of equals; leaving bare the 
advantage of reciprocity, that is if a director, A, has not voted for an activity 
hostile to a director, B, B may be desirous to return the beneficial behaviour of A 
in the forthcoming events or votes against or in favour of B536. In point of fact, 
even those directors categorised as independent were found to be connected to 
the CEO of the company. According to the Higgs Report, CEOs recruit about 50 
per cent of so-called independent British directors, finding these directors through 
personal networks537. 
It is notable in section 261(2),(3), that during this stage, the company is not a 
defendant against the petition to the court to grant permission to proceed with the 
                                                             
536 Andrew Keay, “The Public Enforcement of Directors' Duties” (January 16, 2013). 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2201598 or 
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537 Randall Morck "Behavioral finance in corporate governance: economics and ethics of the 
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action. Therefore, it is unnecessary for the company to present any hearing or file 
proof. It is only after this claim has survived this assessment shall the company 
be asked to file proof of whether permission ought to be allowed538. 
 
A few people believe that the fresh legislative derivative claim is possibly 
extensive as well as more elastic in range compared to the common law claim 
because the derivative application may only be instituted in line with the CA 2006 
as well as contravention of duty, violation of trust, default by directors, and 
notably, a simple accusation of directors’ negligence, with no any accusation of 
absence of good faith or profit to the directors, may on the face of it be the issue 
of a derivative action by shareholders for the company539. This is an important 
transformation that elevates the directors’ exposure to accountability for 
negligence540. In addition, the judges are not anymore limited by the principle 
established in Foss in making decisions; nonetheless, it should regard some 
factors that are substantial to this principle in making judgment if it is in the 
company’s interest for a claim to be instituted541. Also, as this section will discuss 
shortly, Part 11 of the Act has no effect on the common law rules on double 
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derivative actions, and therefore, only the direct derivative claim may only be 
instituted in line with the CA 2006542. 
 
In spite of this, it is vague if this may actually be considered as a step forward, 
indeed, courts shall carry on preserving an extensive discretion on whether a 
derivative action can ensue. Petitioners shall as a result continue encountering the 
conventional doubt of the courts concerning such actions, although this moment 
the courts are having extremely restricted statute to ‘substantiate’ their positions. 
Further, the court ought to reject the claim (or in other words, refuse to grant the 
leave) on not more than four occasions as stipulated under s. 261–264543. It is 
argued that Part 11 has created a new regulatory pathway and has thus made all 
common law rules irrelevant. However, common law rules pertaining to multiple 
derivative actions are unaffected by Part 11 as it is solely concerned with direct 
derivative actions. Derived from the legislation only, there is an unconvincingly 
apparent inference substitution of the proper plaintiff rule as the substantive 
principle of law544.  
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In England there exist doubts on how frequent these actions shall be permitted. 
Furthermore, a shareholder may survive this legal threshold. Nevertheless, it is 
uncertain the reason she/he might desire to institute such an action. If the action 
was fruitless, the shareholder might shoulder the application’s complete 
expenses, and if victorious, the applicant shall not directly gain the profits545. 
 
A correlated complexity is demonstrated through a Canadian occurrence, that is 
to say, that the derivative application shall be comprehended as the highly 
procedurally intricate as well as less advantageous type of application with no 
limits put on the extent of the unfairly prejudicial conduct action546. The 
derivative claim on occasion does not ensue that far since the permission to go on 
have scarcely been allowed.  A pertinent dataset acquired approximately in the 
past 4 years by Keay demonstrates that from the time when the statutory 
derivative claim was introduced within the legislation that commenced being in 
force in 1st Oct. 2007, it is only sixteen court cases where permissions have been 
desired by the applicants. This figure represents a mean of only 3.2 cases per year. 
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In everybody’s interpretation this figure represents a trivial quantity of lawsuits. 
During the similar time frame there have existed much more suits involving 
accusations of violation of director’s duties in unfairly prejudicial applications 
within section 994, despite Lord Hoffmann’s effort in O'Neill v Phillips547 to trim 
down the prevalence of applications548. 
 
What cannot be clearly determined is the number of cases in which permission is 
granted and the case is then settled before it reaches court. It can reasonably be 
assumed that a considerable number of cases may be in this category, particularly 
given that when courts grant leave they also tend to direct the parties down that 
particular path549. Correspondingly, it is argued that courts in England should 
make a greater effort to manage the settlement of derivative actions. This can be 
achieved through the imposition of a condition whereby the court’s permission is 
needed to settle or discontinue a case, particularly if the court has laid down an 
order for the company to indemnify the derivative claimant against liability for 
the costs resulting from a claim550.  
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However, a few researchers have asserted that the success of any replacement to 
the common law claim is most excellently decided not by the amount of suits 
produced within the latest procedure, but by whether the regulations regulating 
the conditions where such claims might be instituted are more understandable as 
well as available. This is in order that, in extraordinary situations, the instigation 
of a derivative action shall be considered as a solution worth taking up rather than 
excluding it in the first phase of a disagreement due to it being much harder even 
to think about551. 
Though, as revealed from the above, that the statutory derivative claim reform 
has not brought the extreme effect that some analysts had anticipated552 (while 
other people were anxious about), the derivative claim reform surely symbolizes 
a considerable improvement in laws safeguarding shareholders. Definitely, 
arguments of derivative actions within the courts have grown to be more 
common. Regularly these arguments include deliberation on whether such 
assertions ought to be permitted to ensue to full court hearing. Very few cases 
have been recorded as continuing to full court trial553. 
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Judges are not ready to award permission for derivative actions to proceed to full 
trial to an applicant in cases where there are remedies in section 994, for example, 
buying the shares, in case the stock purchase order nearly always wants a majority 
to overthrow the minority shareholders554. In reality, in implementing their 
discretion provided for in section 263(3) (a)-(f), the judges in Mission Capital Plc 
v Sinclair555, permission to carry on with a derivative claim under section 261 of 
the Act was declined in which a notional director was unlikely to append more 
significance to the allegation as well as the supposed damage was notional. The 
applicant had instituted the suit in good faith. Nonetheless, whereas a hypothetical 
director may carry on with the action, the director may not append more 
significance to the action, particularly as the injury that the company may undergo 
from applicant's illegal removal from office was exploratory. It was highly 
probable that the company would substitute applicant compared to taking steps 
against people liable for the injury resulting from their illegal firing. Additionally, 
the applicant may well regain remedies looked for through the use of an unfair 
prejudice petition provided in section 994 of the Act. 
Moreover, in Kiani v Cooper556 permission to continue a derivative claim within 
s.261 was granted in the case in which a director whose activities were at issue 
failed to give any substantive proof supporting his argument against the 
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accusations that the he had violated his fiduciary duties. Milman observed that in 
Kiani v Cooper, it was established that the derivative action was instituted in good 
faith in addition to being well-substantiated and that even though under section 
994 a claim may well be instituted, it does not obstruct the derivative application. 
It was only a single aspect for the court to regard when deciding whether to grant 
permission to continue to trial557. 
In Cullen Investments Ltd v Brown558, a derivative application was permitted to 
continue to trial. The application supposed that a company’s director redirected a 
beneficial company prospect for his gain. In considering allowing the action to 
continue to trial, the judges assessed a few possible obstructions to the quest for 
a derivative action. First, the judges were of the opinion that the claimed breach 
of duty was not authorised. Secondly, the judges discarded the argument that no 
director functioning in fulfillment of his/her duty as provided in section 172 
would have backed the quest of the derivative action. Even though the possible 
benefits of the action were unexceptional, it was not an impediment. A critical 
matter in this case was the taking up of all the financial dangers of the proceedings 
by the shareholder. Therefore, there exists no risk of the company encountering 
a negative expenses order. In regard to each of these issues, permission to 
continue to trial was awarded559. 
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Many of the suits relating to the derivative actions mainly involve private 
companies and not public companies; this is due to the rarity of the cases relating 
to the latter companies. In Bridge v Daley560 a petition for the permission to 
proceed with a derivative action was instituted by the minority shareholder of a 
publicly listed company. Permission to proceed was denied along with the 
shareholder being directed to bear the suit’s expenses. The court observed an 
unusual characteristic of this suit as it involved a public trading company and not 
a private company; nevertheless shareholders must be safeguarded from a minor 
minority person shareholder looking to take up an action for the company in 
which they are shareholders at a time they do not desire the company's properties 
to be utilised for that cause. This is the entire aim of the derivative action 
process561. Consequently, HHJ Hodge was of the opinion that the grievances 
could be tested within the content of section 994 instead of drawing the company 
into the derivative action. Since the permission to continue to trial was denied, 
the litigation expenses were granted against the plaintiff. Furthermore, indemnity 
expenses were granted against the plaintiff with regard to expenses suffered 
following the time of an earlier trial, after which the plaintiff had disposed of his 
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lawyers and became a petitioner personally. The financial dangers for 
shareholders in the quest of derivative claims are therefore clear562. 
People might inquire whether a member of a holding company may make an 
application in court for a derivative action in subsidiary’s name in which such 
member does not hold direct shares. This circumstance is termed double (or 
multiple) derivative action. It arises where a plaintiff C has stocks in company A. 
The company A in turn holds the only stocks in company B. It is this company B 
that is the injured party of an illegality done by respondent D. In the event that 
Company B does not institute an action against D, then is it possible for plaintiff 
C to institute a derivative action for the company B? The response to this concern 
at common law seems to be affirmative563.  
In Waddington Ltd v Chan Chun Hoo Thomas Lord Millett describes these 
actions as ‘multiple derivative actions’.564 Lord Millett gave the leading 
judgement in the Final Appeal Court of Hong Kong’s decision, allowing multiple 
derivate actions where an individual, specifically one who controls a parent 
company’s subsidiary by controlling the parent company itself, defrauds a 
subsidiary or sub-subsidiary as this inevitably leads to the defraud of the parent 
company also.565 The question is now whether Part 11 of the CA 2006 affects this 
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action by introducing a new statutory derivative action. It has been suggested by 
Reisberg and Prentice that Part 11 of the CA 2006, in particular s.260(20), 
provides that a derivative claim can only be brought in line with the statutory 
provisions, meaning that Part 11 supplants common law (as advised by the Law 
Commission).566 Furthermore, under the statute’s provisions, the right of action 
is vested in a company member, in that a cause of action is vested in the company 
itself (s.260(1)(a)), who is endeavouring to obtain relief on the company’s behalf 
(s.260(1)(b)). From this it can be concluded that the statute does not allow for 
multiple derivative claims and these cannot be established at a common law level 
either567. 
 
It has been claimed by Lightman that the Act only regulates direct derivative 
claims as these are what the Act itself defines as constituting a derivative claim. 
The Act is silent on other kinds of derivative actions.568 However, it has been 
determined by the Law Commission that it is for the courts to decide whether to 
allow multiple derivative actions and these actions should not form part of the 
relevant statutory law.569 It has thus been concluded by Kershaw that the CA 2006 
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does not exclude multiple derivative actions and the rule in Foss v Harbottle570 
has not, in fact, been relegated to the rubbish bin given that these actions have 
been recognised by common law in Waddington Ltd v Chan Chun Hoo 
Thomas.571 
 
In Universal Project Management Services Ltd v Fort Gilkicker Ltd 572,  Briggs J 
was of the opinion that the common law acknowledged double derivative claims 
prior to the enactment of the CA 2006, further that double derivative actions had 
endured the Companies Act's establishment. In making judgment, Briggs J. 
backed the attitude assumed by Lord Millett in Waddington Ltd v Chan Chun Hoo 
Thomas573 in the Court of Final Appeal.  
Furthermore, the judge in Bhullar v Bhullar574 was clear, taking notice of case 
laws since realisation of the statutory derivative claim that the common law 
persists to offer the option of double or multiple derivative actions unchanged 
with the launch of the legislative process in the year 2006. 
Outlining all potential actions contained in any kind of legislation is a good 
method of determining if the derivative action has been acknowledged by the 
legal system in Saudi Arabia. Initiation of litigation against board members is a 
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statutory right in the Saudi legal system575. The legal representative of a company 
acts independent of the shareholders, but has the power to open litigation on the 
part of the shareholders in particular situations. The company action is intended 
to ensure that no harm comes to the rights and interests of a company, which 
could have an impact on its business operations. There are different ways in which 
a company can suffer harm, such as trust violation by its directors which leads to 
financial damage, breaches of duties, negligence, default or allocation of 
fraudulent revenue to shareholders. S.78 of the CL 2015 specifies the 
accountability of company directors for such damage; more to the point, the 
section states that directors are to be held accountable for any harm sustained by 
the company, its shareholders or third parties as a result of ineffective corporate 
management on infringement of the provisions of related laws or of the bylaws 
of the company. Any contravention to this stipulation is deemed to be null576. 
In the present case, the decision of shareholders made at the GM enables the 
company itself to initiate litigation against wrongdoing actions of the directors, 
the shareholders designating a plaintiff at the GM577; a question thus arises 
regarding the similarities between such an action and the derivative action 
existent in the UK578. According to some, no provisions related to this area are 
included in Saudi law. As previously mentioned, derivative action allows 
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minority shareholders to commence litigation against directors who have 
breached their duties in the name of the company, if the company has suffered 
harm due to their activities and if legal action is not taken by the majority 
shareholders. Based on this definition, minority shareholders have no right under 
CL 1965 to initiate litigation against company board members in the name of the 
company579. The situation stays with no change under CL 2015. 
No guidelines are provided in CL 2015 and particularly in s.79 as to the steps that 
should be taken if no decision is made at the GM regarding litigation against the 
wrongdoers, and no mention is made about whether shareholders are allowed to 
take derivative action on the part of the company580. Under no circumstances do 
the minority shareholders have the right to initiate litigation in the name of the 
company581. Al-Ibrahim noted that, in practice, minority shareholders cannot 
bring liability claims on behalf of the company582. Being underpinned by the 
principle of majority rule, the company action in Foss v Harbottle583 has been 
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incorporated in CL 2015, whereas the exception of derivative action is yet to be 
adopted. 
A different perspective has been proposed by some researchers, who argued that 
there are close similarities between s.79 of SCL 2015 and the derivative action 
applicable in the UK arising from the fact that company members are granted in 
both legal systems the statutory right to initiate litigation in the name of the 
company584. In this regard, the purpose of derivative action is to prevent the 
majority shareholders from violating the rights of the minority shareholders on 
grounds of the principle of majority rule from Foss v Harbottle585. However, it is 
clearly specified in s.79 that the consent of the GM, where decision-making 
depends on a majority of more than 50%, is essential in commencing litigation 
against company directors586. However, the most crucial point in this discussion 
is the provision of s.80 of CL 2015. 
As observed by Al-Jeber, the failure of the GM to take legal action against 
wrongdoing directors has prompted legal authorities in various systems to grant 
every shareholder the right to commence litigation in the name of the company 
on the condition of the validity of the right of the company to institute it and if 
he/she is at risk of personal harm due to the misdeeds of the directors, which is in 
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compliance with s.80 of CL 2015587. In addition to the previously mentioned 
conditions, s.80 of CL 2015 also specifies that the shareholder has an obligation 
to inform the company of his/her intent to initiate litigation and the compensation 
that the shareholder is awarded is directly proportional to the damage that he/she 
has suffered. To sum up the provisions of this section, a shareholder can take legal 
action on behalf of the company against directors if his/her personal interests have 
been affected and if the company’s right to litigation is valid; furthermore, the 
shareholder has to provide notice to the company of his/her intent. However, this 
right to bring legal charges against directors may be misused by some 
shareholders, with negative implications for the public image of the company. 
The requirement to notify the company is intended to afford directors the 
opportunity to defend themselves against allegations of duty violation and as a 
result the shareholder may choose to drop the charges588. In this case, s.80 of CL 
2015 states that compensation is offered to the shareholder who made the petition. 
An additional condition has been formulated by some researchers, in that 
evidence must be brought regarding the failure of the GM to initiate litigation in 
the name of the company589. 
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On the other hand, s.80 of CL 2015 also contains several ambiguous and uncertain 
points, in particular the lack of a clear distinction between personal suits filed by 
shareholders and derivative action, for which it has been considerably 
criticised590. Hence, the phrasing of the section has led to the conclusion that it 
makes reference to action in the name of the company, although implementing 
derivative action in the format available in other countries has never been the 
intention of the Saudi Legislature591. Moreover, the section specifies that the 
purpose of any legal action is to provide compensation only for the damage 
sustained by the shareholder. This is in contrast to derivative action where 
compensation is offered to the company. It must be noted that the goals and scope 
of the derivative suit are incompatible with the aim of litigation, as outlined in 
s.80 of CL 2015, as well as with damage compensation592. A further limitation of 
this section is that it could foster multiple and aggravating actions, while at the 
same time it is incongruous to grant every shareholder the right to initiate 
litigation in the name of the company without any regulations593.  
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Nevertheless, as asserted by some researchers, the law in Saudi Arabia allows 
shareholders to initiate litigation against directors alongside in the name of the 
company and to protect their personal interests if the directors’ duty violation 
caused them direct damage. Furthermore, due to the fact that these two actions 
are not linked, the minority or individual shareholders still have the right to take 
personal action as a result of unfairly prejudicial conduct, even if their derivative 
action on the part of the company is unsuccessful594. Attention has also been 
drawn to the fact that the compensation does not classify the claim under s.80 of 
CL 2015 solely as unfair prejudice action. In this respect, the section specifies 
that the shareholder making the petition is entitled to a part of the compensation 
prior to its allocation to the company, as is stipulated for cases where a 
shareholder files a legal suit on behalf of the company595. 
The case of Jazeera Cement is an eloquent example; the company directors were 
taken to court by the minority shareholders on grounds that they reduced the 
company’s capital without the EGM permission. This constitutes a breach of the 
CL 1965, s.142  (now s.144 of the CL 2015).which stipulates that the EGM has 
the power to decrease the capital if it is too much for the requirements of the 
company or if the company has sustained losses; the capital can be reduced 
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beyond the limit sanctioned by the law only in the latter situation596. This can 
demonstrate that CL 1965 –CL 2015- acknowledges the derivative action. 
Ultimately, the question that has to be addressed is not the recognition by the 
Saudi law of the derivative action as applied in the UK under CA 2006, but rather 
the efficiency of the derivative action available under CA 2006 in protecting 
shareholder rights by ensuring that directors fulfil their duties appropriately.  
Although some hold the belief that the statutory derivative claim under UK law 
has not had the radical effect a few analysts had anticipated, it is still seen as a 
considerable improvement in terms of shareholder protection597. Yet, in order to 
ensure that derivative actions in the UK are more understandable as well as 
accessible, some additional reforms can be suggested. As was discussed earlier, 
when wrongdoing has been ratified, directors cannot be held liable for their 
breach of duty, and the court will refuse to grant leave to bring an action. As is 
the case in Hong Kong,598 it is suggested that ratification should not, in certain 
circumstances, prevent minority shareholders from pursuing derivative claims 
nor can it be grounds for the court to refuse to grant leave to proceed with such 
actions. The existing measures under s.263 are sufficient to prevent shareholders 
from implicating the company in a legal suit without acceptable reason for 
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bringing a claim, or from seeking to cause damage to the company or other 
shareholders instead of focusing on problem resolution. 
 
As Milman suggests, the legislative derivative claim reform surely symbolises a 
considerable improvement in laws safeguarding shareholders599. Therefore, this 
derivative claim must be included in Saudi’s CL 2015. Nonetheless, when 
considering the introduction of this claim there is a need to balance the prevention 
of unreasonable claims by minority shareholders, which can damage the 
company, by imposing some limitations and filters on such actions, with the 
guarantee that the claim is available to minority shareholders, as it can redress the 
equilibrium between shareholders and directors and protect shareholders’ rights. 
 
In Johnson v Gore Wood & Co600 it was decided that only a company may sue 
for a loss when that loss is the result of a breach of duty the company is owed. In 
this situation a shareholder can thus only pursue a derivative claim for company 
losses and may not allege they have personally suffered a loss for a personal right. 
This type of loss is referred to as a ‘non-reflective loss’ and will be examined in 
greater detail below. 
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4.2. Personal claims 
When a company director is established to be in violation of his or her duties that 
she or he owe to the company, then the derivative action may be utilised to 
implement and enforce the duties. Nevertheless, as discussed from the preceding 
parts of the thesis601, the directors’ duties may be owed – even though not often -
to individual shareholders instead to the company. For that reason, the duties 
owed to shareholders personally, within the common law, must be enforceable 
upon making use of the derivate action by an individual shareholder (personal 
claims)602. A share within a company is an assets right furthermore, obviously 
some rights private to the shareholder are created due to the ownership of the 
shares. The major question in practice is whether or not an individual claim is 
obstructed by the reflective-loss rule that preclude a shareholder from regaining 
reimbursement for defeat that purely replicates the defeat experienced by the 
company603. 
The thing needed to activate the rule is the company as well as the shareholder to 
find an allegation in opposition to the directors coming out of similar collection 
of proofs, and that a fraction or the entire shareholders’ injury may be viewed as 
imitating the damage instigated by the board of directors to the company604. Like 
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in Prudential Assurance v Newman Industries Ltd605 the company is the 
appropriate applicant and company’s members shall be prohibited from regaining 
the reflective damage. 
Nonetheless, this rule does not bar any shareholder from bringing an application 
to regain distinct damage that is a damage which is different from the damage 
experienced by the company. The distinguishing feature concerning the reflective 
and separate damages is demonstrated in Heron International Ltd v Lord 
Grade606.  In the midst of a contested take-over bid, it was alleged that the 
directors of the target company (who owned a majority of voting shares) were in 
breach of their duties to the company and the company’s shareholders. This 
alleged breach involved the directors accepting proposals that would lower the 
value of the organisation’s assets. This would then lower the value of shares and 
would force shareholders to accept the lower of two competing offers for the 
company. The court decided that the loss suffered by the shareholders was 
separate from that suffered by the company. The shareholders could recover their 
losses through a personal claim as they would have been prevented from choosing 
the higher offer. This loss would only affect shareholders. It would not constitute 
a company loss which would not have more or less funds in its reserve. 
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Nevertheless, many legal practitioners think that such difference between the 
reflective and separate damages is difficult to extract607. 
But in a stringent comparison to the stance at common law, the courts use section 
994 of the CA 2006 in such a way lenient of a shareholder’s capacity to plead for 
a redress symbolic of a reflective company injury. Shareholders cannot recoup 
personal damage that is just reflective of the injury experienced by the company. 
On this issue, the court construal of section 994 offered to a member’s advantage 
is debatable608 and shall be examined in the subsequent part. 
 
 
4.3. Unfairly prejudicial claim 
Under section 994 of the CA, shareholders are entitled to institute a court case if 
they consider the company’s affairs are conducted in ways that are unfairly 
prejudicial to their interests. Formerly it was among the highly inactive parts of 
the law regulating companies, due to the stringent conditions presented under 
section 210 of the CA 1948. United Kingdom CA 1948 section 210 was 
substituted with the CA 1980 section 75 that ultimately turned out to be ss. 459 – 
461 of the CA 1985. At present, it is incorporated under ss. 994 – 999 of the CA 
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2006. Based on the lawmaking history of this provision, it is apparent that it 
preferred the notion of “unfair prejudice” so as to liberate the judges from 
technical matters of legal right (and wrong) as well as to grant an extensive power 
to the judges to enforce matters that seemed just and equitable609. 
The unfair prejudice prohibitions are incorporated into the Act in order to 
safeguard the company members’ rights but also their interest. Further, it is 
undeniable that any wrong done against the company impacts negatively on the 
company members’ interests.  Previous to the inclusion of the term “of its 
members generally” within section 459 of the Act 1985, contentions were 
advanced that a misconduct executed against the company that impacted on every 
member uniformly was beyond the scope of this provision, however, these 
contentions are not anymore advanced610. 
In numerous legal actions the judges have emphasized that section 994 of the Act 
necessitates prejudice to the minority that is unfair and not merely a prejudice per 
se. Besides, in exceptional suits it might be that the thing done to the claimant 
was unfair although it may have not resulted into prejudice of the said claimant611. 
From McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd612, the courts have stated that 
prejudice does not imply that financial damage must exist. It might be adequate 
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to demonstrate that the rights of the plaintiff have been violated not including that 
it resulted in a monetary injury. So as to demonstrate unfairness, a breach of a 
legal right granted by the company’s articles or the shareholders' agreement ought 
to be underscored. 
Since this study is more related to the claims where a director’s duties might be 
enforceable, it is imperative to note that a breach of the duty of a director is not 
necessarily a reason for unfairly prejudicial conduct claims. In Re Saul D 
Harrison613 in a wide examination of the function of the provision in section 459 
of CA 1985 and presently section 994 of CA 2006, the court stated that a violation 
of director duties is not a threshold adequate for a claim of unfair prejudice. 
Additionally, in O'Neill v Phillips614, Lord Hoffmann asserted that a shareholder 
is not usually permitted to protest of unfairness except where there is a violation 
of the contract terms where it was consented on the manner in which the 
company's affairs must be carried out.  
For a shareholder to institute a court case within section 994, it must be on the 
foundation that she has been unfairly and prejudicially treated. In some instances, 
the courts have held that a breach of the duties by a company director might 
constitute a ground for a triumphant application within section 994. However, 
essentially the shareholder ought to prove that the director’s conduct resulted in 
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his unfairly and prejudicial treatment. Hence, for an applicant to be successful 
under section 994, he has to connect the breach of duty to his unjust well as 
prejudice treatment615. In Maidment v Attwood616 the unfair prejudice was made 
up of the violation of duties by company directors, therefore, an unfair prejudice 
as well as a derivative action would be incorporated within the similar application 
and founded on similar proof617. 
In this case Maidment v Attwood618, the judges stated that the conditions 
established in O'Neill v Phillips619, might incorporate through inference a 
concurrence that a person in the position of a company director shall carry out her 
duties under that capacity. Chief among the duties is the seven responsibilities 
that are presently codified within s. 171-177 of the Act. Six of these duties are 
fiduciary duties, i.e., duties obligatory by the law for people who use authority 
for others’ benefit. Disobedience to these duties shall commonly denote that 
unfair prejudice has taken place620. 
In this regard, failure to comply with the transfer provisos within the articles of 
association or shareholders’ contract does not constitute an act in the management 
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of the company’s affairs621. But in Graham v Every622 it was stated that even 
though failure to comply with the pre-emption stipulation may not, normally, 
constitute an act in the management of the company's affairs behaviour (as 
mandatory under s.994), this lawsuit was an exemption. It was excluded from the 
purview of s. 994 due to a contract that the company directors ought to be 
remunerated via dividend payment but not via wages and in the court’s opinion, 
such contract of remuneration as well as allotment policy was inside the 
company's affairs. Other justices sitting in this court, Lord Justice Vos as well as 
McCombe LJ, remarked on the pre-emption argument as well. As for Vos LJ 
weakening the shareholding of a shareholder might unfairly prejudice his/her 
interests. As for McCombe LJ, he asserted that not adhering to the conditions of 
pre-emption stipulation was a vital element of the general image of unfairly 
prejudicial behaviour claimed within the application and it was insincere to strike 
it out on the basis that, looked at in isolation, it might not be an act of the 
company623. 
In Apex Global Management Ltd & Anor v FI Call Ltd & Ors624 the issue whether 
s. 994 application is suitable in every suit in which the parties’ confidence and 
within the quasi-partnership that has collapsed was tackled. The court stated that 
the collapse should be as a result of a few violations of a legal right or equitable 
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limitation influencing the carrying out of the company's affairs. The court 
observed that insulting behaviour is not normally adequate. However, it may be 
in circumstances where a quasi-partner has degraded the actions of another quasi-
partner concerning the latter's management of the company affairs. This 
behaviour will make the degraded quasi-partner’s productive continuance with 
the quasi-partnership impracticable625. 
Prevention from taking part in management within a close company situation is 
a frequent basis of complaint appearing in unfair prejudice applications. In Re 
BC&G Care Homes Ltds Crowley v Bessell and Ors626the keeping out from 
company’s administration of a third of the shareholder with no realistic proposal 
to purchase their shares constituted unfair prejudice. The company affairs were 
built on a previous partnership and thus equitable limitations were involved627. 
Thomas v Dawson628 involved an assertion for redress within the unfair prejudice 
remedy within a company having two shareholders, each one having a share. The 
company’s balance sheet was insolvent. The hearing judge directed the applicant 
to be given an option of buying the other shareholder’s stocks within the company 
at the value of £55,000. The applicant shareholder lodged an appeal contending 
that the stock was valueless and thus ought to be transmitted at the nominal worth. 
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The appellate judges unanimously sustained the hearing judge’s judgment 
establishing no procedural unfairness. It was the appellate judges’ opinion that 
the original court’s decision was in some ways extraordinary; however, the 
judgment was in the range of discretion bestowed by s. 996 of the Act. In this 
respect, the judges approved Oliver’s LJ dictum in Re Bird Precision Bellows 
Limited629 by stating that in awarding remedy for unfair prejudice, the judge was 
bestowed with an extensive discretion to undertake that which they regard as just 
as well as equitable in every circumstance of the situation, so as to appropriately 
remedy the unfair prejudice that the applicant has experienced from other 
shareholders within the company. 
From the discussions in the preceding parts, it has been illustrated that there exists 
high number of cases that involves claims of breach of director’s duties in unfair 
prejudice applications within section 994 of the CA contrasted with the latest 
statutory derivative claim, in spite of Lord Hoffmann’s endeavor in O'Neill v 
Phillips630 to trim down the occurrence of applications631. In McKillen v Misland 
(Cyprus) Investments Ltd632, the court stated that suits within section 994(1) are 
inclined to be highly resource-exhaustive and require extensive trials. 
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Consequently, it is submitted that courts need to consider whether the issues can 
be reduced. 
Indeed, minority shareholders encountering problems in view of their status in 
the company are highly probable to regard unfair prejudice applications within 
section 994 of the Act as a road to a possible solution instead of engaging in 
derivative or personal actions. Having stated that, section 994 applications shall 
not draw an advance indemnity as to expenses, while it is hypothetically 
accessible for the derivative actions633. Nevertheless, it is imperative to note that 
if the unfair prejudice cases triumphs, the shareholder can apply for 
reimbursement of his cost, however, the company shall not receive anything. The 
judge may issue a directive within section 996 for a derivative application be 
instituted against a company’s director in violation of his or her duties634. 
The right to bring an unfairly prejudicial claim is guaranteed not only by the Saudi 
CL 2015, but also by the Saudi CGC 2006, according to which shareholders must 
be granted all rights related to the share, especially the right to initiate litigation 
against members of the board635. Similarly, s.110 of CL 2015 stipulates that 
shareholders should be afforded every right associated with the share, in 
particular the right to take legal action against directors as well as to challenge 
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the decisions made at shareholder meetings636. S.80 of CL 2015 grants 
shareholders the right to start unfairly prejudicial conduct action against the board 
members if they have suffered harm due to the wrongdoings of the latter. As 
previously highlighted, shareholders have to inform the company of their intent 
to take legal action and are compensated depending on the level of damage they 
have been caused637. 
 
In one case, an individual shareholder took legal action against company directors 
on grounds that they stopped him from taking part in the GM and requested 
compensation for the harm suffered. However, the accused justified their action 
by arguing that the shareholder failed to meet the key requirement for GM 
attendance, namely, to demonstrate that he was in possession of company shares. 
According to the ruling of the court, the shareholder would have to be 
compensated only if the directors breached the provisions of the CL or the bylaws 
of the company. The directors were not found guilty of any transgression and 
therefore the shareholder was not given any compensation638. This case 
substantiates the fact that a personal action is acknowledged by the Saudi legal 
system both in the law and in practice. 
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In 2014, an unfair prejudice case was brought against both the Chairperson and 
the CEO of Ahsa Development, a listed company on the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul), by a minority shareholder for violations of the provisions of the 
Companies Law and for breach of their duty as they acted in their own interests, 
causing the company and the company share price considerable damage. A 
petition was initiated to recover all losses that the company and shareholders 
suffered as a result of the misconduct of the CEO and Chairperson, which was 
estimated to exceed £25 million. The court refused the shareholder’s request for 
compensation for the company and aggrieved shareholders as s.78 of the CL 
1965639 states that ‘If a stockholder files such claim, he shall be adjudged 
compensation only to the extent of the prejudice caused to him/her’. Therefore, 
the Chairperson and CEO were ordered to pay around £5,000 to the shareholder. 
Also, the Chairperson and CEO were held liable for the litigation costs which 
exceeded £11,000.640  
This case clearly emphasises a notion discussed earlier: that although an unfair 
prejudice proceeding is likely to succeed, only the petitioner can recover his or 
her loss, while the company itself will not receive any compensation. In this case 
the company’s right and the petitioner’s right to claim damages resulted from the 
same directors’ wrongdoing, thus law-makers in Saudi Arabia should give the 
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court power to authorise a lawsuit on the company’s behalf, even without the 
approval of a GM. To this end, they should look to UK legislation, in particular, 
s.996(2)(c) of the CA 2006 which allows the court  to grant permission for the 
petitioner or petitioners to bring an action in the name of the company and on the 
basis of the court’s directions if the unfair prejudice claim is well-founded. If 
accepted by legislators, this suggested reform would not play the same role as 
that of the derivative action under s.260-264 of the CA 2006, due to its 
complexity. Having said that, given that the corresponding Saudi law has not so 
far allowed derivative actions on the company’s behalf, it is suggested that this 
can be a step towards allowing the use of a full derivative claim in the country. 
4.4 Additional enforcement methods available to shareholders 
In order to protect their rights, selling their shares is another option that minority 
shareholders should have at their disposal. Since direct intervention with 
management is limited, the only other way in which shareholders can exact 
discipline is indirectly, via the markets. In this regard, the corporate control 
market maintains that investors can terminate their shareholding if management 
performance does not meet expectations. Thus, share price will decline, exposing 
the company to the threat of leveraged buyout which would lead to board 
dissolution. The directors are well-aware of these consequences, which makes 
214 
 
them more focused on enhancing organisational performance in order to preserve 
share values and avoid crises641.  
 
The English Law Commission suggested that the ideal article ought to have a 
stipulation offering the minority shareholders the exit privileges to require to be 
produced by other company members at a fair valuation in some conditions. This 
stipulation should make easy the departure of a shareholder from a private 
company after a disagreement, with no necessity for litigation within section 459 
–presently section 994-642. Section 996 of the CA stipulates that the court might 
issue order that it deems proper where an application for unfair prejudice is 
instituted within s. 994, to offer for the buying of the stocks of a company member 
by any other member or by the company. 
Indeed, this mandatory acquisition seems as a remedy but not as a right for the 
minority shareholders and they might not demand it. However, this redress is 
widespread with regard to any unfair prejudice done by directors. Even though 
company members might negotiate for the unilateral exit entitlement to be 
integrated within the Articles of Association, these entitlements are scarce due to 
the overall right for the minority shareholders to remove their stocks at the time 
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in which such removal appear probable of destabilising the investment purpose 
of the stocks643. 
However, this right is enforced by the Saudi CL 2015644. Despite not resulting in 
actual enforcement, this strategy is a cost-efficient method for shareholders to 
exit a company they are not satisfied with. However, shareholders in a private or 
non-listed public company may have to struggle with various difficulties and 
obstacles when deciding to withdraw. Under the Saudi CL 2015, minority 
shareholders in a limited liability company (LLC) must first try to sell their shares 
to the majority shareholders and inform them of their intention to leave the 
company. The minority shareholders have the right to sell their shares to third 
parties only if the majority shareholders do not purchase the shares within a 
month of the notice given645. However, the company does not receive 
compensation for directors’ transgressions and the directors are not held 
responsible for their illegitimate actions as a result of the minority shareholders 
selling their shares. What is more, the withdrawal of minority shareholders could 
cause the share value to diminish, with negative implications for all the other 
shareholders646. 
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Another enforcement action which can be instituted by minority shareholders is 
the company’s winding up. In the UK, courts might wind up companies 
compulsorily through a petition instituted and founded on just as well as equitable 
basis647. Along with these orders, the judges must not award a winding up order 
if he or she believes that there are other options available. Nonetheless, some 
circumstances exist in which the only choice is the winding up of the company648. 
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd649 provides that a company that is 
essentially a partnership can be wound up when this would be the most equitable 
result. E and N established a company, with E and N each taking 500 shares. G, 
N’s son, joined the company at which time E then held 400 shares, N held 400 
and G held 200. N and G voted to have E removed as a director. E petitioned the 
court and was granted a winding up order on the grounds that the winding up of 
the company was a just and equitable result. 
 
Pertaining to the judge's discretion within s. 996, it was affirmed in Apex Global 
Management Ltd & Anor v FI Call Ltd & Ors650 , by Hildyard J that the discretion 
may expand to modifying the percentage of allotments on winding-up. The judge 
clarified that courts must not issue winding-up orders under this provision since 
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the particular stipulations for such solutions as well as the clear safeguards are 
germane to the use of such powers. Consequently, the winding-up of the 
defendant company based on fairness and equity was allowed651. 
Indeed, the likelihood of a shareholder making an application under section 
122(1) (g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 for the company to be wound up based on 
fairness and equity is rare because the introduction of the unfair prejudice redress 
as well as the chances of obtaining an order for winding-up are minimal. 
Nevertheless, this result cannot completely be overlooked652. But the legislative 
redress of company’s winding up shall result in the termination of a solvent 
company that will in turn lead to job losses with the majority of the minority 
shareholders being disadvantaged by this action653. Consequently, such 
applications hardly ever thrive due to the presence of other efficient redresses that 
courts are presently providing to the displeased shareholder without terminating 
the whole company654. 
Furthermore, ss. 148 and 180 of the Saudi CL 1965 also stipulates that minority 
shareholders have the right to request company liquidation by the court, but only 
if the company is a LLC or a joint stock company (JSC). When the LLC or JSC 
                                                             
651 Apex Global Management Ltd & Anor v FI Call Ltd & Ors [2015] EWHC 3269 (Ch) at 
49-51 and 182. 
652 David Milman, “Shareholder law: recent developments in practice” Co. L.N. 2015, 378, 1. 
653 Jon Rush, Michael Ottley. Business Law. Thomson Learning Publishing. London. UK. 
2006, p.266. 
654 David Milman, “Winding up, dissolution, restoration and other status re-characterisation 
features in UK corporate law: latest developments” Co. L.N. 2013, 333, 1. 
218 
 
accumulates losses amounting to three-quarters of the corporate capital, the board 
has to hold an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) with the purpose of 
discussing whether or not the company should be dissolved. Failure to do so 
(within a period of one month in the case of LLC) will result in anyone with an 
interest in the company having the right to seek to wind up the company655.  
 
The act of closing down a company does not hold its directors responsible for 
their illegitimate activities and neither does it determine the enforcement of 
directors’ duties. The act is merely intended to liquidate the company, while the 
shareholders stop their involvement in the company. Therefore, for the 
shareholders, this procedure is the last solution. Before the introduction of CL 
2015, it was suggested that the stakeholders’ right to wind up the company in the 
circumstances stated under s.180 of CL 1965 had to be narrowed. For instance, 
some limitations are imposed on the process of winding up in the UK. For 
instance, the court may deny a dissolution request if the claimants have other 
options at their disposal, like a derivative action or unfair prejudice petition656. 
However, this provision has been repealed by the new Saudi CL 2015. This 
replacement arose because granting each shareholder the right to seek to wind up 
the company can put the company and its stakeholders at risk. Also, as this thesis 
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concludes, this may be an indication of Saudi legislators’ desire to encourage 
more public enforcement actions than private ones657. 
 
The new ss.150 and 181 of SCL 2015 has amended s. 148 and 180 of old SCL 
1965. Section 150 of the CL 2015 requires that if at any point throughout the 
financial year a JSC’s losses reach 50% of paid capital, an extraordinary meeting 
of the shareholders must be called by the board within a specified time limit. At 
this meeting it must be decided whether the JSC’s share capital should be 
liquidated, increased or decreased. If this meeting does not take place within an 
appropriate timeframe, if no decision is reached at the meeting or if it was decided 
that the capital would in increased but fundraising was not completed within 90 
days of the issuance of this decision then the result would be the dissolution of 
the JSC by force of law.  
Also, section 181 of the CL 2015 requires that in cases where an LLC’s losses 
reach 50% of capital, a general meeting of the shareholders must be called by the 
directors. This meeting must be held within 90 days of the shareholders receiving 
notification of the meeting to give them time to reflect on whether the LLC should 
be dissolved or should continue. The dissolution of the company will occur by 
force of law in cases where the partners are not contacted by the directors or 
where the partners take no action to dissolve or continue the company. 
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Previously, failure to do so will result in anyone with an interest in the company 
having the right to request the court to terminate the company. The CL 2015 has 
now repealed this provision. 
In the 2011 case of the chairman of Abdar Company LLC, the court ordered the 
chairman to pay compensation for the damage that the company suffered as a 
result of his wrongdoings658. Three years later, the company’s losses were three-
quarters of the corporate capital; after a period of over a month, the shareholders 
made a court appeal for company dissolution. The appeal was granted and the 
company was liquidated. The ruling of the court was in accordance with s. 180 of 
the CL 1965, which specifies that every stakeholder is entitled to request 
company termination if no action is taken by the directors or majority 
stakeholders within the one-month period since the report of the company’s 
losses659. The CL 2015 has now repealed this provision, and therefore, the 
minority shareholders are no longer able to initiate such an action. 
4.5 Private enforcement challenges 
4.5.1 Cost 
One significant impediment for minority shareholders in taking derivative action 
in the name of the company is the matter of cost. Hence, providing minority 
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shareholders access to sources of funding for derivative action is essential to 
ensure that any damage to the company is effectively dealt with660.  
 
The first case to acknowledge and successfully overcome the financial difficulties 
hindering derivative action was Wallersteiner v Moir661. In the Court of Appeal, 
Lord Denning MR declared that, as agents serving the interests of the company, 
the minority shareholders have the right to be reimbursed by the company for 
their expenditure during the procedures they have undertaken. However, in the 
event that the action is unsuccessful and considering that the action taken was 
justified, the minority shareholders should not be held accountable since they 
were serving the cause and not their personal interests, and moreover, should be 
compensated by the company for the costs they incurred. The court ruling in 
Wallersteiner v Moir662 was that the individual shareholder was exercising a right 
obtained from the company and not a right granted to him, and therefore he 
deserved compensation. 
 
By contrast, in Smith v Croft (No.2)663, Walton J argued that the company should 
pay compensation to the minority shareholders only under the most 
straightforward, unquestionable circumstances. Consequently, in order to make a 
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decision about whether to award an indemnity order immediately or to defer it, 
the court had to conduct a thorough investigation of all the data. Ultimately, in 
Smith v Croft, the court denied the indemnity order on grounds that a strong case 
must first be made before such an order is to be awarded. 
 
It has been argued that, in the second case of Smith v Croft (No.2)664, Knox J 
abided by the principle of collective decision-making and majority rule from Foss 
v Harbottle. Knox J admitted to be sceptical of the notion that the legal action 
initiated by a single minority shareholder to recover indemnity for the company 
can have a fair outcome if all the rest of the minority shareholders have grounds 
to believe that such action would have more negative than positive results. 
The perspective of Knox J highlighted anew the crucial role played by collective 
decision-making in enforcing the duties of directors as well as the principle of 
majority rule from Foss v Harbottle. This perspective maintains that, even if not 
all shareholders participate in collective decision-making, it is better for a group, 
instead of individual, shareholders to make judgements regarding the 
appropriateness of taking legal action against directors who have breached their 
duties665. On the other hand, Pettet maintained that the use of an adaptation of the 
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principle of majority rule to decide against litigation in Smith v Croft (No.2)666 
was entirely unexpected and unwarranted. No clear conclusion can be drawn 
about the manner in which Smith v Croft unfolded667. 
A principle comparable to the one applied in Smith v Croft is also exercised by 
the Saudi courts in cases of indemnity and they are even tougher because they 
rarely award an indemnity order during an early stage or indeed rule that the 
shareholders should be compensated once the proceedings are finalised, 
regardless of whether they have been successful668.  
 
Nevertheless, there was a well-known case of litigation in Saudi Arabia, when 
the chairman of the Abdar Company was charged with negligence for not 
arranging a loan worth £8 million, as a result of which the company incurred great 
losses. The ruling of the Commercial Court was that the chairman was 
accountable for the damage resulting from his negligence and therefore had to 
pay compensation to the company. In addition, the Court ordered the chairman to 
reimburse the claimant the costs accumulated, including legal fees669. No specific 
provision is made in the CL 2015 with regard to the party responsible for paying 
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the litigation costs in cases where the minority shareholders take legal action 
against directors; however, some researchers have argued that the costs should be 
covered by the company irrespective of the outcome of proceedings, as the action 
is brought not only on its behalf, but also in its interest670. This perspective has 
invited ample criticism, being considered to be damaging to the company. The 
business affairs of the company could be seriously affected by granting every 
shareholder the right to take derivative action in the name of the company without 
supporting the costs if the claim is unsuccessful671. As the UK Law Commission 
put it, this would mean killing the company by kindness, not to mention 
squandering financial resources and management time with unjustifiable 
lawsuits672. 
 
In Cullen Investments Ltd v Brown673, the vital factor was that the shareholder 
took up all of the monetary risks of the legal action, as a result there existed no 
threat of the company dealing with a negative expense court directive. In view of 
this permission to continue with the derivative action was allowed674. 
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672 Law Commission report, Shareholders Remedies, No 246, Cm 3769, London, TSO, 1997, 
Para 14.11. 
673 [2015] EWHC 473 (Ch). 
674 David Milman, “Shareholder law: recent developments in practice” Co. L.N. 2015, 378, 1. 
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Two distinct rules exist with regard to who is responsible for paying the legal 
fees. The American rule specifies that each party has to pay their own costs, 
regardless of the lawsuit result. A successful lawsuit does not exempt the 
shareholder from paying his/her own costs. However, it is possible to request 
compensation against the company. Known as “the common fund theory”, this 
principle signifies that part of the compensation awarded to the company for the 
damage suffered can be allocated to the shareholder who made the petition to 
cover the costs he/she incurred. An additional provision mentions that if the 
company stands to gain a considerable sum from a lawsuit, it will pay the costs 
of the shareholder. If the lawsuit is unsuccessful, the shareholder is not 
responsible for paying the fees of the opposing party. On the other hand, 
according to the English rule, the losing side is required to pay the costs of the 
winning side. Therefore, an unsuccessful lawsuit is particularly costly for the 
shareholder as he/she has to pay the lawyer fees of the opponent in addition to 
his/her own fees675. 
 
Another notable feature of the English rule is that, theoretically speaking, in legal 
proceedings between two parties, party A, if unsuccessful, would have to pay all 
                                                             
675 Siems, Mathias M., “Private Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: Derivative Actions as a 
Global Phenomenon” (November 16, 2010). Final version published in: Stefan Wrbka, 
Steven Van Uytsel and Mathias Siems (eds.), “Collective Actions: Enhancing Access to 
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the costs accumulated by party B in relation to the litigation. Practically, however, 
the court usually decides costs on a “standard” basis, in other words, the costs 
that the court deems to have been required by the litigation676. 
 
The application of conditional or contingent fee agreement in derivative actions 
has been extensively debated as a solution to this financial issue677. The 
conditional fee agreement specifies that, if the lawsuit is successful, the lawyer 
receives a significant premium regardless of the amount awarded, whereas the 
contingent fee agreement means that the lawyer receives a portion of the amount 
awarded678.  
 
If the courts are efficient in getting rid of suits in which the derivative actions are 
instituted to promote the personal interests of the individual shareholder, 
therefore, what encouragement shall the claimant shareholder have so as to look 
for the court’s leave to institute a derivative action for the company? Although 
companies might be instructed to compensate the claimant for the expenses of the 
court case, this does not generate a more constructive encouragement to institute 
a derivative action for the company. Further, when the plaintiff owns just a trivial 
                                                             
676 Antony Morris, “Does an indemnity for costs in a commercial contract mean anything?” 
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shareholding within the company, it might not either function as a size sufficient 
to generate positive motivation679. 
 
Indeed, the reasonableness of sponsoring a shareholder’s lawsuit shall stay as a 
main impediment to the derivative actions. The statutory derivative action 
procedure will not persuade a rational shareholder that he or she is at an advantage 
by taking the company to court (filing a derivative action) instead of trading off 
his or her stocks. Disappointingly, the common law stance on expenses of 
derivative actions remains unaffected. Litigation expenses as well as litigation 
charges regulations should be re-examined if a genuine transformation is to take 
place680. 
In Bhullar v Bhullar681 permission to proceed was allowed with regard to some 
costs paid to a different company, however, the court settled that it was 
unacceptable to allow an anticipatory indemnity on the expenses out of 
company’s properties. The Bhullar682 lawsuit is a beneficial pointer of a 
circumstance in which it may be proper to look for an indemnity for the expenses 
while taking up a derivative action as well as the factors courts may possibly have 
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in contemplation at the time of making judgment on the grant of such a security 
of costs. 
4.5.2 The issue of the Saudi private enforcement regime  
The main limitation of the CL 2015 is that it does not outline clearly the duties of 
company directors and the enforcement measures that can be taken. More 
specifically, as presented in earlier chapters, the CL 2015 fails to provide 
clarification on issues such as fiduciary duties, different directorial positions (e.g. 
shadow, de facto and nominee directors), as well as the parties towards which 
directors have obligations and whose interests have to be considered in corporate 
management683. The present part has extended a detailed discussion of whether 
the CL 2015 or other legislations can afford minority shareholders the right to 
take legal actions against wrongdoing directors in the name of the company. In 
particular s. 80 of the CL 2015 has been the focus of ample debate as to whether 
it makes provision for a derivative action for minority shareholders. The 
ambiguous phrasing of the section is considered to be the cause of this debate 
between Saudi researchers, whilst also blurring the distinction between the 
personal and derivative actions that shareholders can take684. 
 
Saudi Government has just introduced CL 2015 that came into force on 3 May 
2016. Nevertheless, unfortunately, as this chapter illustrated, the new law has 
                                                             
683 See Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. 
684 As discussed under the section of “The statutory derivative claim”. 
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made no changes to minority shareholders’ right to sue directors. Indeed, the 
minority shareholders’ right to wind up the company is no longer available under 
the new CL 2015. Before the introduction of SCL 2015, it was suggested that the 
stakeholders’ right to wind up the company in the circumstances stated under 
s.180 of SCL 1965 had to be narrowed but not to be ceased. Although the winding 
up remedy has a severely negative impact on the company and its shareholders, 
employees and other stakeholders, it can be the last weapon to the minority 
shareholders in certain circumstances – if the court thinks fit. 
Although the new CL 2015 symbolises a substantial overhaul and modernisation 
of Saudi Company Law, the new law is still in need to be  amended. It is possible 
to put forth recommendations to amend the CL 2015 according to fresh 
developments and requirements. The main aspects that demand attention are 
improvement of the structure of corporate governance, better enforcement of 
directors’ duties, and consolidation of shareholder protection based on the 
efficiency of enforcement actions.  
4.5.3 Unawareness 
Minority shareholders enjoy a range of rights under Saudi law, enabling them to 
interfere in organisational activities. For instance, s.90 of the CL 2015 specifies 
that shareholders may summon the GM if they represent a minimum of 5% of the 
capital. Also in the UK, this right is granted to both shareholders who represent 
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5% of the share capital and those who represent 5% of total voting power in cases 
where the company has no share capital.685  
 
Moreover, shareholders accounting for a minimum of 2% of the capital may 
demand the MOCI to order a GM to be assembled after a period of 30 days since 
the date established for the meeting. Under the new CL 2015, s.90 states that 
shareholders who represent 2% of the capital may request that the MOCI, or the 
Capital Markets Authority (in the case of listed companies) call a GM, but only 
in certain circumstances, such as if there has been a violation of the CL 2015 or 
the company’s articles. In this case, the MOCI or the Capital Markets Authority 
must call a GM within 30 days of receiving the shareholders’ request. 
 
 Furthermore, as stipulated in s.96 of the CL 2015, shareholders have the right to 
address inquiries at the GMs to all board members and auditors. The latter have 
to respond to the inquiries, provided that the interests of the company are not 
undermined. If the answers given are unsatisfactory to the shareholders, they 
make take the matter up with the GM, which has to formulate a judgement.  
 
Under the Saudi CGC 2006, companies listed on the stock market must give 
shareholders adequate information on the issues up for deliberation at annual 
                                                             
685 S. 303(2)(a)(b) of CA 2006. The required percentage was 10% but it substituted to be 5% 
by The Companies (Shareholders' Rights) Regulations 2009 (S.I. 2009/1632) reg. 4(2). 
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general meetings. This enables shareholders to reflect on how they will vote and 
fully prepare for AGMs.686 Additionally, s.110 of the CL 2015 states that the 
documents and records of the company must be readily available to the 
shareholders, to help them assess the situation of the company and make decisions 
accordingly687, as well as to serve as evidence in the event that they decide to 
initiate litigation against directors. 
One aspect that is considered to be pervasive in Saudi Arabia is that shareholders, 
and especially minority shareholders, are unaware of the rights that they have, or 
if they are aware of their rights, they do not do anything about it688. Moreover, 
since selling their shares is easy, the majority of shareholders, particularly those 
in large public enterprises, are negligent or ignorant of corporate matters689. This 
situation is aggravated by the mechanisms of rights enforcement which are yet to 
become fully developed as well as by the risks associated with involvement in 
legal proceedings in a system with a judicial structure that still needs to be 
improved and strengthened690.  
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In this respect, shareholders are advised to read all the company’s books and 
records in order to use them as evidence when they decide to initiate litigation 
against directors.  The Supreme Court of the New York State, New York County  
in January 2014 rejected a shareholder derivative court case in favour of the 
Travelzoo, Inc. This was due to the failure by the claimant to declare that request 
on the company’s board of directors to bring a claim could have been 
unsuccessful. The judges opined that the claimant did not assert with distinctively 
adequate evidence to elicit a reasonable suspicion that the board of directors 
operated in bad faith. The judges stressed that claimants bringing such derivative 
actions must deal with assertions founded on absence of facts through probing 
the company’s accounts books as well as other reports and records prior to 
instituting a court case. Through that, claimants shall be assisted in pleading with 
exactness, the particulars justifying request excusal. The judges rejected the case 
as well as declining the claimant’s application to re-plead691. 
4.6 Summary 
 
Chapter 4 attempted to answer the first part of the research question regarding the 
effectiveness of private enforcement actions for directorial duties provided by UK 
legislation, and to what extent Saudi law can benefit from them. In addition, the 
chapter discussed the possible actions that can be taken against directors by 
shareholders. For example, the author explored the derivative claims, personal 
                                                             
691 Kebis v. Azzurro Capital Inc., No. 650253/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 21, 2014). 
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suits, unfairly prejudicial conduct claims, as well as other measures that 
shareholders can resort to. Finally, the chapter presented the difficulties and 
obstacles in the way of private enforcement actions, and this examination helped 
the author to assess the level of private enforcement with respect to directorial 
duties in Saudi Arabia. As revealed by the chapter, there is no effective legal 
course by which private actions can be initiated to punish the wrongdoers in Saudi 
Arabia. For instance, minority shareholders are prevented from initiating any 
legal action against directors on the company’s behalf. This thesis has outlined 
several potential changes to existing Saudi law and has argued that the legal 











CHAPTER 5. Public enforcement of directors’ duties  
Chapter 4 identified the significance of directorial duty enforcement, which is a 
crucial component in the improvement of Saudi Arabia’s corporate governance 
processes. Whilst the previous chapter outlined private enforcement, the current 
chapter evaluates public enforcement activities. Public enforcement relates to the 
state-imposed sanctions applied to directors who have acted against the best 
interests of the company692. Whether public organisations have the right to get 
involved in this area has long been a matter of debate. There are two key reasons 
for this intervention. Firstly, the law granting the company the right of limited 
liability was introduced by the state. This concession by the government allows 
companies to act as a legal person693. Limited liability needs to be reviewed by 
the state given that public policy is an issue of public interest. Secondly, 
safeguarding society from the damage that miscreant directors can cause comes 
at great cost to the national exchequer. The government pays the costs when a 
company fails and there is thus a public interest in attempting to ensure that 
companies in trouble survive694. 
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693 See Michael Phillips, "Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation" 21 Florida 
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Whereas there are some who are of the belief that it is pertinent to consider 
enforcement costs because it is generally the case that there are inadequate 
resources for public regulators to identify, probe and consequently enforce all of 
the infringements of the law that they become aware of695. Nevertheless, public 
enforcement possesses a securities regulation system that is self-sufficient 
because it is able to apply significant financial penalties696. Whilst empirical 
research remains limited in quantity, findings suggest that public enforcement 
methods are less effective than private enforcement methods697. In fact, effective 
public enforcement facilitates the effectiveness of private enforcement698, which 
provides the rationale behind the discussion of public enforcement methods in 
this chapter of the thesis.  
At the extreme end of public enforcement, prosecutions into any fraud and deceit 
can occur. In the past this was uncommon and investigations attracted limited 
investment. However, in UK, at the end of 2011 the creation of a specific crime 
agency placed more emphasis on preventing illegal activity. In contrast to this, at 
the other end of public enforcement, prosecutions target what is known as 
                                                             
695 See Andrew Keay and Michelle Welsh, "Enforcing breaches of directors’ duties by a 
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technical offences. An example of this is the failure to file company accounts 
whereby prosecution seeks to underpin open disclosure through a public registry. 
This can result in companies being struck off the register, yet this often only 
applies to companies in debt and directors of smaller businesses699. Indeed, 
research indicates that it is extremely uncommon for directors of publicly traded 
companies to be excluded700. 
 
This chapter is primarily divided into four main sections in order to tackle the 
discussed aims. In the first part, public enforcers will be discussed. This part of 
the chapter outlines the public decision-making bodies possessing the authority 
to penalise directors who have violated their responsibilities in the UK and Saudi 
Arabia. The second part of the paper focuses on the possible measures that can 
be applied by the state officials – in the UK and Saudi Arabia- to a director who 
has violated civil or criminal law. These measures could be outcomes such as 
director disqualification, financial sanction, or even punishment under criminal 
law. The third section will emphasise the obstacles to enforcement actions. 
Finally, a summary is provided at the end. 
 
                                                             
699 See Brenda Hannigan, "Board failures in the financial crisis: tinkering with codes and the 
case for wider corporate reform in the UK (Part 1)" Comp. Law. 2011, 32(12), 363. 
700  See John Armour, Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins and Richard Nolan "Private 
enforcement of corporate law: An empirical comparison of the United Kingdom and the 
United States." Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 6.4, 2009, 687. 
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5.1. Public enforcers 
5.1.1. Public enforcers in the UK 
Within the United Kingdom, numerous methods of public enforcement exist. 
However, as already indicated, these systems are often more significant in 
practice when compared to formal private enforcement. Within the UK, four 
fundamental public enforcement agencies oversee businesses and organizations. 
These are the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the Financial Reporting 
Review Panel (FRRP), the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (DBEIS) and the Bank of England. These agencies promote enforcement 
by adopting a combination of formal and informal actions701. 
 
5.1.1.1. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
The FSA (Financial Services Authority) was abolished in the second part of the 
Financial Services Act 2012. Its role was split between two authorities, those 
being the PRA (Prudential Regulation Authority) and the FCA (Financial 
Conduct Authority). The PRA’s task involves aiding the Bank of England’s FPC 
(Financial Policy Committee) achieve its objective for financial stability.  The 
responsibilities of the PRA include advocating the soundness and safety of firms 
authorised by the PRA and, in more general terms, helping the FPC through the 
                                                             
701 See John Armour, “Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap 
and Empirical Assessment”. ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 106/2008. April 2008, available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133542 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1133542. 
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minimisation of all unfavourable consequences for the financial system in the UK 
if any distressed firm failed702. The FCA operates independently, and the tactical 
objective is to ensure the smooth functioning of financial markets. As such, 
consumer protection, competition and market integrity is the responsibility of the 
FCA. Further, the FCA is charged with advocating effective competition that is 
in the consumers’ interests703. The integrity of the market in this instance includes 
transparency of formation of prices in the markets, not being utilised for any 
purpose in connection with financial crimes and not being impacted by any 
behaviour that abuses the market704. The scope of this thesis is restricted to how 
director duties are enforced in solvent companies; therefore, the mechanisms and 
measures of the FCA are more pertinent throughout this chapter. 
 
A large amount of powers of enforcement were inherited by the FCA from the 
FSA according to provisions outlined in the second part of the 2012 Financial 
Services Act. Such powers are permitted by FSMA 2000. More specifically, 
Section 6 (1-A) declares that the FSA is to be renamed to be called FCA. Further, 
Section 16 of this Act approves of the FCA exercising functions under FSMA 
2000 Part 6. Therefore, a key role of the FCA is to write and impose Listing Rules, 
Disclosure and Transparency Rules and Prospectus Rules for listed 
                                                             
702 S 6 (2-A,B,and C) of the Financial Services Act 2012. Also see the Bank of England and 
FSA, “The Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority: Our approach to banking 
supervision” 2011, p.3. 
703 S 6 (1-A) of the FSA 2012. 
704 S 6 (1-D) of the FSA 2012. 
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businesses705.For listed companies, it has the ability to demand disqualification 
of securities. It also regulates and prohibits exploitation of the market such as 
insider dealing706. Meanwhile, the FCA is able to enforce penalties on civil and 
criminal actions707. Individuals or companies can also be targeted by the FCA and 
penalized via public censure708. 
 
5.1.1.2. The Financial Reporting Review Panel (‘FRRP’).  
 
A second public enforcement agency is the Financial Reporting Review Panel 
which is involved in preventing managerial opportunism in listed businesses. The 
FRRP is supported by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and was developed 
in 1991 so as to identify material deviations from standard accounting practice by 
sizable businesses and to encourage organizations to correct this where able709. If 
companies fail to remedy any anomalies the FRRP is able to seek a court order to 
authorize correction of any data710. 
                                                             
705 Part VI, esp. ss 72, 77, 89, 91 of the FSMA 2000. 
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Importantly, the FRC is governed by the UK’s Corporate Governance Code 
which is underpinned by a ‘comply or explain’ principle. The Code requires 
businesses to report their compliance with the Code and to clarify any reasons for 
non-compliance. These reasons must include a full explanation as to why a 
business does not deem it suitable to comply with the provisions of the Code711. 
The position of the FRC in relation to the ‘comply or explain’ principle will be 
examined later in this section. 
 
5.1.1.3. The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy  
(DBEIS).  
UK companies are also governed by this Department which until 2007 was called 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 712. It then enjoyed a short life as the 
Department of Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR).  Since 2009, the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS) had also been in control 
of public enforcement. The department was again renamed in July 2016 in the 
wake of the nomination of Theresa May as Prime Minister. It became the 
Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. In the following 
                                                             
711 See Andrew Keay “The Public Enforcement of Directors' Duties” (January 16, 2013). 
Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=2201598 or 
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712 John Armour, “Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and 
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discussion, the position of the DBEIS with regards to public enforcement will be 
identified in relation to company instigation procedures. 
 
Bearing in mind the important of the Department’s role, the UK Government is 
unwilling to take initiate proceedings against directors due to its resistance to 
spend public finances on issues which should be the responsibility of the 
company members713. 
 
5.1.1.4. The Bank of England 
In conjunction with the FCA, PRA and the Treasury, the Bank of England 
safeguards and promotes financial processes within the UK and helps to protect 
investors, public funds and stability of banking processes within the UK. In turn, 
public confidence in banking systems is promoted714. All three authorities have 
the legal authority to enforce these objectives. For example, the Bank of England 
is able to make a share transfer instrument so as to handover a failing bank to a 
private buyer. Meanwhile, the Treasury is entitled to take a bank into temporary 
public ownership via a share transfer order715. These methods of enforcement thus 
permit these authorities to alter and terminate the employment of a bank director 
and are able to assign new directors if deemed necessary716. 
                                                             
713 See Paul Lyndon Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law, 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, p.668. 
714 S. 4 of the Banking Act 2009. 
715 S. 11,13 of the Banking Act 2009. 




5.1.1.5. Companies’ investigation regime 
Public enforcement does not incorporate the authority to examine company 
affairs. An investigation into a company and its consequent report is the main 
method of identifying any wrong-doing by directors. Reports can result in 
disqualification of directors, financial restrictions, prison sentencing and the 
termination of a company if it is deemed to be in the public interest. All of these 
actions can be legally undertaken by the agent who has authorized the 
investigation report. 
Company matters and any consequent inquiries must be reported by experienced 
enforcement agents to the UK Secretary of State by whom they are employed717. 
Indeed, the DBEIS has been provided with investigative powers. In R v. Board of 
Trade, ex parte St Martin Preserving Co Ltd718, Winn J defined “the affairs of a 
company” to incorporate all business matters, interests and transactions together 
with its financial outlay, property interests, monetary gain or loss and its 
goodwill719. Sachs LJ in Re Pergamon Press Ltd determined that inspectors must 
seek to ascertain if the facts require increased action by other parties. It was held 
that rules of natural justice are not applicable to the questioned party and there is 
no compulsion for the inspector to reveal the reason behind the inquiry720. 
                                                             
717 S.431 (1) of CA 1985. 
718 [1965] 1 QB 603. 
719 R v. Board of Trade, ex parte St Martin Preserving Co Ltd [1965] 1 QB 603. 
720 Re Pergamon Press Ltd [1971] 1 Ch 388 at 401. 
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As a result of Re Pergamon Press Ltd, it is evident that directors who are involved 
in wrong-doing or auditors who have behaved negligently may be fearful of 
providing evidence and co-operation with inspectors due to apprehension 
regarding potential criminal or civil litigation based upon any disclosure721.The 
Court of Appeal noted in the cases of Re Pergamon Press Ltd and Maxwell v 
Department of Trade and Industry that a criticized party should not be able to 
transform the process into a full trial of each criticism levied at them. It refuted 
an appeal for inspectors to provide the evidence on which their criticisms were 
founded which incorporated paperwork and interview transcripts722.  According 
to Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal, inspectors are permitted to acquire the 
information they require by the best possible method but must allow a party a fair 
prospect of disputing any criticism before they are able to judge or criticize them. 
Inspectors need only to outline any charges rather than disclose full details723.  
Consequently, this provision has been adopted by the DBEIS.724 
 
S. 447 of CA 1985 enables the Secretary of State to request documents and 
material from companies. This provision for informal investigation is widely 
used. It has been modified under s.21 of the Companies (Audit, Investigations 
                                                             
721 See Mohammed Hemraj “Audit failure due to negligent audit: lessons from DTI 
investigations” Comp. Law. 2003, 24(2), 45. 
722 See Derek French, Stephen Mayson, and Christopher L. Ryan, Company Law. Oxford 
University Press, 2015-2016, pp.600-605. 
723 Re Pergamon Press Ltd [1971] 1 Ch 388 at 399-400. 
724 See Mohammed Hemraj “Audit failure due to negligent audit: lessons from DTI 
investigations” Comp. Law. 2003, 24(2), 45. 
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and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 and was not repealed by CA 2006. The 
investigator is able to stipulate the inclusion of specific information within each 
document and requires directors to comply with these instructions. Where need 
be, the director is able to request evidence of the investigator’s relevant power to 
do so725. 
 
Consequently, if a director provides a declaration in agreement with section 447, 
this can be used as evidence against them. However, during criminal proceedings 
where an individual is charged with an offence – (a) no evidence relating to the 
declaration may be presented by or on behalf of the prosecution, and (b) no 
question relating to it may be asked by or on behalf of the prosecution, unless 
evidence relating to it is presented or a question relating to it is posed in the 
proceedings by or on behalf of that person726. 
 
If an individual purposefully impedes an inspector or investigator, the individual 
to whom the inspector or investigator is accompanied by, as he deems suitable, is 
guilty of a wrong-doing and accountable to a fine on conviction on indictment; 
(b) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum727. 
Additionally, the imposition of a fine can be authorized by the Secretary of State 
                                                             
725 S.447 of CA 1985 which is still in force. 
726 S.447A of CA 1985 which is still in force. 
727 S.453 (A) (5) of CA 1985. The inspector is a person who is appointed by the Secretary of 
State to investigate the affairs of a company and to report the result of their investigations to 
him. See Ss. 431,432 and 442 of CA 1985 and S.1035 of CA 2006. 
245 
 
or an investigator if the individual fails to comply with a request stipulated by the 
inspector728. This can be endorsed in writing to the court by the Secretary of State, 
the inspector or the investigator. If the court deems that the individual 
unsuccessfully complied with the request with no reasonable reason, the court 
may find the individual guilty of contempt of court729. 
 
Research by Davies identified that the first enforcement period consisted of 
twelve investigations and seven prosecutions. The second period consisted of 
fifty-five investigations and forty-five prosecutions whilst the final period 
included ninety-six investigations and fourteen prosecutions. In its entirety, 163 
investigations led to sixty-nine completed prosecutions. There is therefore a 
challenge in procuring convictions and somewhat minimal sentences apply to 
those convicted which do not always reflect the extent of their malpractice730. 
 
An inquiry into TransTec in 2000 was considered superior to the quality of any 
insider dealing cases undertaken by the DTI. Following the collapse of the 
Barings Bank in 1995, little positive input was provided to support the Bank of 
England, raising questions regarding the monitoring priorities of the DTI731. 
Indeed, in a 2003 study Sikka believed that the TransTec’s collapse was linked 
                                                             
728 S.453C (1-b) of CA 1985. 
729 S.453C (2) and (3) of CA 1985. 
730 See Jack Davies “From gentlemanly expectations to regulatory principles: a history of 
insider dealing in the UK (Pt.2)” Comp. Law. 2015, 36(6), 163. 
731 Ibid.  
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to the auditors’ negligence. He criticised that no action had been taken against the 
TransTec auditors732. One year after of the publication of the Sikka article, the 
chief executive Carr and the finance director Jeffery were both charged in October 
2004 after publishing dishonest financial statements and deceiving auditors. A 
settlement of US$18 million was reached, but this was not divulged to the 
TransTec board nor was it exposed as a liability in the accounts733. Jeffrey 
returned from Australia to face the proceedings and pleaded guilty to all charges 
in January 9th 2006734. Carr was acquitted on 31st March 2006735. 
 
When considering the costs of an investigation, S. 439 (1) of the CA 1985 
stipulates who will be liable. Notably, this expense can be significant due to the 
high rank of the inspectors together with the prolonged nature of investigations736. 
Importantly, any expenses are initially shouldered by the Secretary of State. 
Subsection (2) identifies that if an officer is found guilty of an offence resulting 
                                                             
732 See Prem, Sikka, "A comment on the DTI’s ‘review of the regulatory regime of the 
accounting profession" (January 2003), http://visar.csustan.edu/aaba/DTIJan2003.pdf  
[Accessed August 23, 2015].  
733  See The annual report of SFO in 2006, The Official website of Serious Fraud Office 
(SFO) at: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/annual-reports--accounts/annual-reports/annual-
report-2005-2006/proceedings-underway-.aspx [Accessed August 23, 2015]. 
734 See the Official website of Serious Fraud Office (SFO) at: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-
room/press-release-archive/press-releases-2006/transtec-plc.aspx [Accessed August 23, 
2015]. 
735  See the annual report of SFO in 2006, The Official website of Serious Fraud Office (SFO) 
at: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/annual-reports--accounts/annual-reports/annual-report-
2005-2006/proceedings-underway-.aspx [Accessed August 23, 2015]. 
736 See John Birds, Robert Miles, Robert Hildyard, Nigel Boardman. Annotated companies 
legislation. Oxford University Press. 2012, p. 1228. Also see Derek French, Stephen Mayson, 
and Christopher L. Ryan, Company Law. Oxford University Press, 2015-2016, pp.600-605. 
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from an investigative matter, then he or she may be instructed to meet the costs 
of the investigation. In certain situations, the corporate or applicant(s) will be 
responsible for the investigation expenses, as governed by subsections (4) and 
(5)737. In respect of this, it is proposed that no guidance exists for how courts 
should implement its discretion in terms of recovering investigation expenses738. 
 
MGRG manufactured MG and Rover cars, and they entered administration in 
2005. The DTI appointed independent inspectors who compiled a report which 
was referred by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills to the 
SFO on July 6th once the findings had been studied. The report was delivered by 
the inspectors on June 11th 2009. Following a lengthy investigation, the Office 
for Serious Fraud announced its intentions to not commence any criminal 
investigations into the selling of MGRG, once documents that had been provided 
by the Business, Innovation and Skills Department had been reviewed.739. On 
April 2011, the directors of MGRG (Phoenix Four) were disqualified after a 
lengthy and complex investigation740. Apparently, the Phoenix Four were held 
liable for recovering investigation costs. The director is required to repay any 
investigation costs, in accordance with Section 439 (2), once it has been found as 
                                                             
737 S.439 of CA 1985. 
738 See Andrew Lidbetter, Company Investigations and Public Law, Hart Publishing, 1999, 
p.193.  
739 See the Official website of Serious Fraud Office (SFO) at: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-
room/press-release-archive/press-releases-2009/mg-rover.aspx [Accessed August 23, 2015]. 
740 See Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, “MG Rover’s Phoenix Four 
disqualified as directors”, May 9th 2011. 
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a result from the investigations that they are guilty of committing an offence. 
Therefore, the directors of MGRG did not have to pay the expenses of the 
investigation. Further, the MG case results potentially uphold the notion that the 
rates of the conviction and prosecution rates for criminal penalties are not high 
enough. 
5.1.2. Public enforcers in Saudi Arabia  
5.1.2.1. Company investigation 
There are many shareholders in joint stock companies. Consequently, company 
issues are subject to board governance, whilst the shareholders’ general assembly 
has little authority. Therefore, the rights of minority shareholders require greater 
safeguarding. In Saudi Arabia, the aim is to offer minority shareholders the ability 
to ask for company activities to be inspected as an extension of rights protection. 
Here, the judiciary court can be avoided, which offers shareholders time- and 
cost-saving benefits that they otherwise could not achieve741. Because the 
inspection procedure derives from the state administration body’s capabilities, as 
per comparative law, it is an important topic to include in this paper; hence its 
exploration in this chapter. For instance, company inspection applications can be 
approved by the minister of economy under Egyptian law742. This is also the case 
in KSA, where inspection applications must be sent to the Commercial Disputes 
                                                             
741 Saleh Al Balwi, Control on Board Members in the Joint Stock Companies, Riyadh, Law 
and Economy Library, 2012, p.119. 
742 S.158/2 of Egyptian Companies Law no. 159 dated 1981. 
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Settlement Body (CDSB). The CDSB is thought of as being associated with the 
minister of commerce as an administrative body743. In this case, the commercial 
court adopts the CDSB’s capabilities, as explained below.  
 
Since 1965, shareholders (of 5% ownership or more) have been granted the ability 
to apply to the CDSB for company inspection. In this case, shareholders must 
expressly articulate that the company’s activities are likely being mishandled by 
accounts managers or board members. The CDSB then arranges for the 
company’s managerial staff to be inspected following a meeting with the 
company’s board members. The shareholders may be required to present a 
guarantee if the CDSB requests it. The CDSB has the authority to enforce 
preventative actions and hold a meeting to outline the required solutions if the 
shareholders’ complaint is found to be accurate. Solutions and actions can include 
the dismissal of managers and directors. The CDSB can also select an interim 
manager whilst the investigation procedure is being conducted744. It should be 
noted that everything associated with the CDSB is overridden by Royal Decree 
in July 1987745 after the Board of Grievances managed its terms of reference 
under the Ministers’ Council resolution in June 1987746. After passing the new 
                                                             
743 S.232 of CL 1965. 
744 S.109 of CL 1965, this section has been reformulated under s.100 of the new CL 2015, yet 
the provision stays almost the same. 
745 Royal Decree no. M/63 (26-11-1407 H) 
746 Ministers’ Council resolution no. 241 (26-10-1407 H). 
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Law of Judiciary in 2007, the commercial court was formed and the Board of 
Grievances transferred the commercial department’s terms of reference747. 
 
In the KSA, company inspection for shareholders with 5% capital ownership is 
managed by the lawmaker, who does not grant the administrative body the 
capability of managing company inspection. It appears that the rationale behind 
the restriction on the Saudi administrative body is based upon an 
acknowledgement of the notion of market freedom. Furthermore, unless it is 
unavoidable, the Saudi government does not intervene in company business. 
 
Under Saudi legislation, there is no precise definition of wrongdoing associated 
with the approval of an inspection request. Instead, shareholders may ask for the 
company to be investigated in the event of ‘suspicious’ behaviour. This means 
that there will be some ambiguity involved in the meaning applied to this part of 
the legislation since ‘suspicious’ behaviour is a challenge to accurately define748. 
Therefore, it is suggested that shareholder investigation requests can stem from 
the observance of apparent misconduct of duties by a board member or by 
apparent abuse of the company system. 
 
                                                             
747 S.9 of the Law of the Judiciary 2007. 
748 Saleh Al Balwi, Control on Board Members in the Joint Stock Companies, Riyadh, Law 
and Economy Library, 2012, p.125. 
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Whilst legislation allows for investigation-requesting shareholders to provide a 
guarantee to bare the expense of the investigation, the power of evaluation is 
judicial. The reason for this is that unless the judiciary body (i.e. commercial 
court) rules that a guarantee is needed, shareholders are not required to submit 
one. Some scholars have expressed negative reactions to the Saudi lawmakers 
under this point since it is believed that if their inspection request is to be 
considered in earnest, shareholders must submit a guarantee749. Other researchers 
perceive this approach to be a compromise between accommodation and 
deterrence, since the requirement for shareholders to carry the expense of the 
complaint or submit guarantee will cause many shareholders to avoid requesting 
an investigation of the company750. Furthermore, shareholders acting with 
malicious intent against the company can often be deterred through the granting 
of power to the judicial body to request a shareholder guarantee. 
 
S.100 of the CL 2015 states that if the request is taken seriously, the judicial body 
is able to propose the required solutions through a general assembly and enforce 
preventative actions where required. When the complaint is time-sensitive, board 
members and managers may be dismissed from their posts and an interim 
manager may be recruited during the process. It is noted that this is not offered 
                                                             
749 See Mohammed Almadhi, CMA role in protecting the minority shareholders’ right, Law 
and Economy Press, Riyadh, 2012, p.194. 
750 Saleh Al Balwi, Control on Board Members in the Joint Stock Companies, Riyadh, Law 
and Economy Library, 2012, p. 126. 
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under Saudi law if the shareholders’ complaint is invalid751, which suggests that 
the ruling is down to the judgment of the legal system and the professionals within 
it. This highlights a level of incongruence that needs to be addressed by Saudi 
lawmakers752. 
 
In 2001, in the case of senior shareholder Allahidan, who owned 5% of 
Mubarrad’s capital, the Saudi Board of Grievances ruled in favour of the 
shareholder. After eight sessions, the ruling allowed the shareholder to enlist the 
assistance of a chartered accountant to visit the company and investigate its 
accounting records. The shareholder’s original claim was submitted on 9th August 
2010, and took seven months to approve. The company’s board of directors was 
given an appeal period of one month following the ruling date. This case was 
unique in Saudi history, and no other previous ruling had enabled a senior 
shareholder to review the company’s accounts753. This case provides an 
encouraging basis for requests under S.109 of the Saudi CL 1965 (now s.100 of 
the CL 2015). 
In Saudi Arabia, shareholders who hold five percent or more can apply to the 
court for a company inquiry whilst in the UK only the Secretary of State is 
permitted to do so. Allowing the court the right to authorize an investigation does 
                                                             
751 Ibid, p.135. 
752 See Mohammed, Almadhi, CMA role in protecting the minority shareholders’ right, Law 
and Economy Press, Riyadh, 2012, p.200. 




allow increased autonomy. However, this can be both expensive and time 
consuming. In some situations, it has been proposed that alongside the court 
power permitted within Saudi law, the legislator could provide the Ministry of 
Commerce the authority to commence an investigation so as to help lower the 
case load754. 
5.1.2.2. Capital Market Authority 
Since the start of the 21st century, the Saudi Stock Market has experienced 
significant development. During the period 2001-2005, there was a nine-fold 
increase in the market value of shares, from SR. 275 billion to SR. 2438 billion755. 
However, this promising growth was cut short by the market crash in early 2006. 
The CMA reacted to this critical situation by publishing a detailed corporate 
governance regulation mandate with the purpose of informing Saudi state-owned 
companies about best governance practices756.  
 
In addition, CMA has a highly significant influence on the management of 
securities firms and the security issuances of public joint stock companies. The 
CMA also acts as a financial market mediator; possessing the authority to 
                                                             
754 As this chapter will discuss, in the UK, the “undertakings” is an alternative of the 
disqualification order. It was formed in order to reduce the case load. 
755 See Christopher Robertson, Sulaiman Al-AlSheikh and Ali Al-Kahtani "An Analysis of 
Perceptions of Western Corporate Governance Principles in Saudi Arabia." International 
Journal of Public Administration 35.6, 2012, 402. 
756 See Mohammed, Al-Abbas “Corporate governance and earnings management: An 




sanction lawbreaking financial market firms757. Under S.5 (A) of Capital Market 
Law 2003, the CMA’s role is to ensure the implementation of Capital Market 
Law rules through the provision of relevant guidelines. The CMA primarily 
functions as a managing force of companies’ operations and actions in order to 
protect shareholders and the public from fraudulent, immoral or otherwise 
dubious practices. In order to achieve effective management of capital market 
companies, S.5 (c) of CML 2003 grants the CMA and its members the authority 
to take evidence, request the necessary documentation and call for witnesses. 
When reaching a judgment decision, the CMA is able to review the received 
documentation so as to form an opinion of the violation of the CMA’s rules, 
senior management regulations, or the company system. 
 
The CMA representative is granted the authority to take part in companies’ 
general meetings for the purpose of management. The representative is not 
granted the authority to participate in judgements or rulings during the meetings. 
Under s.5 of Capital Market Law758, the CMA’s role is to organise and manage 
companies’ operations and activities, as well as to manage the duties of the board 
of directors through the review of the company’s financial documents. Under 
Section 45 of Saudi Arabia’s Capital Market Law, the quarterly and annual 
                                                             
757 Saleh Al Balwi, Control on Board Members in the Joint Stock Companies, Riyadh, Law 
and Economy Library, 2012, p.126. 
758 Ibid, pp.140,141. 
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reports (cash flow, profit and loss, and balance) of security-issuing firms should 
be forwarded to the CMA for review. These reports should also include details of 
any changes that may significantly impact the firm’s economic status. In order to 
ensure confidentiality, the firm must not share the reports with any other 
institution that is not duty-bound to the confidentiality of the reports prior to 
submitting them to the CMA. Furthermore, the CMA requires that reports should 
be accompanied by an account of the company’s business, as well as the details 
of senior investors and shareholders, senior management, board members and 
executive officers759. 
 
Under Section 25 of CML2003, the Committee for the Resolution of Securities 
Dispute is addressed. The Committee is granted authority to manage conflicts 
related to this Law and its Implementing Regulations, as well as the CMA’s 
regulations plus private and public activities under the Exchange. The Committee 
is comprised of securities, financial affairs and commercial experts as well as 
legal advisors specialising in capital market and transaction principles, and is able 
to conduct inspection, request relevant documentation, and issue rulings, 
sanctions and subpoenas760. Committee member positions can be renewed after a 
period of 36 months and are selected by the Board of Capital Market Authority. 
Committee members are not permitted to have a fourth-degree or closer family 
                                                             
759 S.45 of CML 2003. 
760 S.25 of CML 2003. 
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tie with the company or complainants, nor any commercial or economic interest 
(whether direct or indirect) in the case. The Committee is granted a maximum of 
14 days (following the filing date to the Committee) to commence judgement on 
the case761. The Committee is able to deal with appeals over Exchange or CMA 
rulings as well as to award compensation and order a judgment reversal or 
amendment in the interests of the complainant762. The Committee is bound to 
adhere to the CMA’s regulations when managing lawsuits and complaints763. 
Additionally, all complaints must be registered with the CMA at least 90 days 
before they are registered with the Committee unless otherwise informed by the 
CMA764.  
 
In the event of an unsatisfactory ruling, it is possible to appeal to the Appeal Panel 
for up to 30 days following the announcement of the Committee’s ruling765. The 
Appeal Panel is granted the right to reject appeals against the Committee for the 
Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD), to support the Committee’s 
judgements, to conduct a new evaluation using the account of the Committee’s 
hearing, and to offer any ruling that it believes to be suitable. The Appeal Panel’s 
rulings cannot undergo further appeal766. 









In the case of the Resolution of Securities Disputes, at the IPO shares stage, 
against Mohammad Al Mojil Group’s board of directors (November 2014), the 
CMA issued an Authority Council judgement to take legal proceedings before the 
Committee based on the misconduct of the company’s accountants and senior 
executives, who breached Capital Market Law between 2008 and 2011. 
Furthermore, the CMA requested to conduct a further inspection and raised 
breaches of Companies Law with the Ministry of Commerce with regard to the 
duty of compensation towards the complainant shareholders. The CMA maintains 
that capital market firms’ board members, accountants and senior executives must 
comply with the assumptions of Capital Market Law767. On 15th June 2016, the 
CRSD gave judgement in Mohammad Al Mojil Group’s case and sentenced two 
of its executives from three to five years in prison and there were banned from 
being employed by listed companies between five to ten years. Of note, a director 
was obliged to pay approximately $427 million to Capital Market Authority for 
the illegal profits achieved as a result of violations of the CML 2003768. 
 
Studies within the legal field emphasise that the position of the CMA as a 
claimant for compensation on behalf of shareholders’ losses was the first of its 
kind. It appears that this position was granted under s.59 of the  CML 2003, which 
                                                             
767 See the announcement by CMA in this regard on 
http://www.cma.org.sa/Ar/News/pages/CMA N 1560.aspx. 




permits the CMA to request legal action as a representative of parties injured due 
to market system misconduct. S.59 (A) states that the CMA is permitted to take 
legal action to obtain compensation or sanction for the affected party if the CMA 
recognises that any individual has acted, or is acting, in such a manner that 
represents a breach of market regulations, CMA regulations or the company 
system. Clause 4 of s.59 expressly states that the damage incurred due to the 
breach should be compensated, which grants the CMA the right to act on behalf 
of the affected party without the requirement of approval769. 
The CRSD acts as a third-party committee able to provide judgements under the 
CMA Board’s executive authority. This being said, it is proposed that the CRSD 
is not entirely third-party in nature because its members are selected and 
remunerated by the CMA Board, which effectively puts members in a position 
similar to that of a CMA Board employee. Consequently, it is suggested that if 
the CRSD is to truly act in a third-party role, its members should be selected by 
the Council of Ministers (i.e. as is the case in the Appeal Committee for the 
Resolution of Securities Conflicts). Additionally, the CMA necessitates that 
complaints are registered for 90 days prior to a ruling unless the complainant is 
otherwise informed by the CMA that the complaint can be raised with the CRSD 
at an earlier time, under Section 25 (E) of Capital Market Law 2003. As such, 
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companies are restricted from submitting their defense to the CRSD until it has 
been registered with the CMA. Consequently, it is evident that the CMA has an 
impact on the procedures of Committee and, therefore, the Committee is not 
entirely independent770. 
Only for publicly listed companies, s.216 of the CL 2015 grants the CMA the 
power to impose sanctions for violations of the CL 2015 provisions.  Under s.220 
of the CL 2015, the CMA is in charge of ensuring that the companies’ by-laws is 
in compliance with CL 2015 provisions. Also, it has the power for the company’s 
investigation, inspection, requiring any documents and information when it sees 
fit. 
5.1.2.3. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
In the MOCI, the General Department of the Companies (GCD) is assigned a 
highly influential managerial function under Saudi Law, wherein the GDC 
monitors the operations of registered companies under Saudi CL 1965. Under 
s.52, it is stated that the GCD is granted permission to enforce changes to 
company by-laws where necessary prior to the companies’ registration, so as to 
adhere to the assumptions of Companies Law. This section has been annulled 
under the new CL 2015. However, the MOCI still has the power to monitor the 
                                                             
770 Faleh Al Kahtani, Current practices of Saudi corporate governance: A case for reform, 
PhD thesis, Brunel University, 2013, pp.108,109. , available at 
http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/7382/3/FulltextThesis.pdf [Accessed March 27, 
2016]. Two articles were published as a result of this thesis, see Faleh Al Kahtani, “Current 
Disclosure and Transparency Practices in Saudi Corporate Governance”, Arab Law 
Quarterly, 28(2), 2014, 176. Also see Faleh Al Kahtani, “Current Practices of Saudi 
Shareholders’ Rights: A Case for Reform”, Arab Law Quarterly, 27 (3), 2013, 231. 
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company’s affairs for all companies, except in the case of listed companies where 
CMA is in charge. S.216 grants the MOCI the power to impose penalties for 
breaches of the CL 2015 provisions.  Under s.220 of the CL 2015, the MOCI is 
in charge of ensuring that the companies’ by-laws is in compliance with CL 2015 
provisions. Also, it has the power for the company’s investigation, inspection, 
requiring any documents and information when it sees fit. Under s.86 of the CL 
2015 it is stated that the Minister of Commerce is granted permission to assign at 
least one company representative (excluding board members) for participation in 
the general assembly. 
Under s.87 of the CL 1965, subsequent control entails that GM can be arranged 
at the request of the board. S.87 also grants GCD the ability to request a GM at 
the wish of shareholders with 2% or more capital, as well as at the decision of the 
Minister of Commerce providing a period of one month has passed from the 
proposed assembly date without assembly request.  Under the new CL 2015, s.90 
states that shareholders who represent 2% of the capital may request that the 
MOCI, or the Capital Markets Authority (in the case of listed companies) call a 
GM, but only in certain circumstances, such as if there has been a violation of the 
CL 2015 or the company’s articles. In this case, the MOCI or the Capital Markets 
Authority must call a GM within 30 days of receiving the shareholders’ request. 
In March 2015, the Ministry requested a GM for close joint stock company, Al 
Salheya Union, shareholders. This assembly was called in response to the failure 
of Al Salheya Union’s board members to reply to written communication sent to 
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them by the Ministry. This lack of action breached s.84 of the CL 1965 -s.87 of 
the CL 2015- (failure to call for general assembly) and s.86 of the CL 1965 -s.89 
of the CL 2015- (failure to respond to the shareholders’ complaints)771. 
Authority over companies’ operations and activities is granted under s.99 of the 
CL 2015, which states that any decision made during shareholders’ assemblies 
that breaches company by-laws or Companies Law is invalid, with the exclusion 
of damage to the rights of genuine independent institutions. Here, the invalidation 
of decisions can be requested by a company’s general managers. If approved, 
shareholders do not achieve resolution. If a period of over one year passes 
following the decision announcement, there will be no hearing of any 
nullification claim772. 
 
5.1.2.4. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (Central Bank) 
Saudi’s Central Bank, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), has a high 
level of influence over the creation, monitoring and maintenance of the nation’s 
financial system and banking sector, as well as control over the actions of 
commercial banks and the financial market, as supported by the provisions of 
Saudi Law773. Whilst the country’s domestic banking sector is considered to 
                                                             
771 See the official website of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
http://mci.gov.sa/MediaCenter/News/Pages/02-03-15-02.aspx . 
772 S.97 of the CL 1965. 
773 See Waleed Al-Ajlan, Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia: The Roles and 
Responsibilities of the Board of Directors in the Banking Industry, Hard copy, PhD thesis, 
University of Nottingham, 2005, p.240. 
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perform more competitively and efficiently than Saudi’s other industries, it is 
argued that the SAMA is primarily responsible for its success. Consequently, it 
should be highlighted that it would be wise for the conduct of Saudi Arabia’s 
commercial banks to comply with the practices adopted in more developed 
regions774. 
 
 In 1966, the Saudi Banks Control System was issued, which placed restrictions 
on certain board activities for banks. For instance, banks were from this point 
onward unable to offer guarantees, credit or loans to any individual possessing 
more than 25% of the bank’s capital775. This permitted the Agency to inflict 
sanctions on the board members of any bank that breached these or any other 
component of the banking system. Any board member or bank employee found 
to have breached these rules is subject to temporary or permanent dismissal upon 
the authorisation of the Minister of Finance. Furthermore, the Agency is granted 
the power to enforce a maximum prison sentence of 6 months and/or a maximum 
penalty of $26,666, on board members found guilty of wrongdoing under sections 
8, 9 and 10 of the Banking Control Law 1966. Offences include offering credit, 
loan without guarantee, surety or guarantee, or offering to carry another type of 
                                                             
774 See Fahad M. Al-Majed, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate 
Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: a Comparative and Analytical Study from a 
Legal Perspective, Hard copy, Unpublished PhD thesis in Manchester University, 2008, p.48. 
775 S.8 of Banking Control Law 1966. 
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financial responsibility on behalf of an accounts manager or board member who 
purchases shares in any Saudi bank before obtaining the Agency’s permission776. 
 
5.2. Public enforcement actions and mechanisms 
5.2.1. Shaming or reputational sanctions777 
Application of shaming or ‘reputational’ sanctions can occur in a variety of ways. 
One such sanction includes, for example, the publication of a public statement to 
the effect that a company has failed to meet a particular standard. If necessary, 
this publication can urge other companies not to engage in business with the 
company at hand. Importantly, if a company is brought into disrepute this can 
affect any future dealing and interaction with other business parties. Although 
reputational sanctions against a company can be commenced by discontented 
trading partners, these sanctions tend to be most effective where an impartial and 
qualified agency investigates company behaviour and discloses the results778. 
Additionally, in developed capital markets, the SEC in the USA together with 
                                                             
776 S.23 of Banking Control Law 1966. 
777 The following paragraphs discuss legal shaming sanctions. Besides these legal sanctions, 
if a company makes a critical decision that are seen to be socially unacceptable and/or 
contrary to the company's previously stated values, this may be damaging the company’s 
reputation. If the reputational damage is sufficiently high, a company may go out of business 
as a direct consequence. For in depth see Albertha Wielsma, “Corporate Reputation and the 
family business” in Mattias Nordqvist, Lief Melin, Mattias Waldkirch and Gershan Kumeto 
(eds), Theoretical Perspectives on Family Businesses, Edward Elgar, 2015, 233. 
778 See John Armour, “Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap 
and Empirical Assessment”. ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 106/2008. April 2008, available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133542 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1133542 . 
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other public authorities, strongly oversee corporate disclosure and will reprimand 
and penalise them for any inaccurate disclosures779. 
 
In this respect, the Takeover Panel can issue to directors public or private 
statements of censure where they are not complying with their duties that are 
stated in the Code of the Takeover or the rulings of the Takeover Panel780. 
Whether a director in breach may be censured publicly or privately is dependent 
on the parties’ conduct. Where breaches are only minor, it is likely that a private 
reprimand will apply. However, if the matter is more significant, the director may 
be censured publicly via a statement781. On February 23rd 2015, a public censure 
was published by the Panel for the failure to submit an obligatory cash offer in 
accordance with the Takeover Code’s Rule 9 and in association with breaches of 
Rule 2 and Rule 5. Between 2009 and 2011, Morton the Chairperson of Armour 
Group Plc, had committed further substantial Code breaches and was privately 
censured for not instantly announcing the same in accordance with Rule 2.2(b)782. 
As a result, the Panel issued the public censure statement. Such statements issued 
by the panel are infrequent and, as such, they are regarded as severe disciplinary 
                                                             
779 See Howell E. Jackson and Mark J. Roe, "Public and private enforcement of securities 
laws: Resource-based evidence", Journal of Financial Economics, 93.2, 2009, 207. 
780 S.11 (B) of the Takeover Code’s Introduction. 
781 See John Armour, “Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap 
and Empirical Assessment”. ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 106/2008. April 2008, available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133542 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1133542 . 
782 See The Takeover Panel, “Armour Group Plc - Criticism of Mr Bob Morton”, Statement 
NO: 2015/3, February 2015, p.6. 
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sanctions783. While some study show that the public censure can detrimentally 
affect the repute of a company and can result in a consequent decline in the value 
of its shares784, Unexpectedly, Armour Group Plc’s share values were not affected 
by this sanction785. 
 
Importantly, reputational sanctions can reduce government expenditure when 
compared to other public enforcement sanctions. However, research in China 
indicates that even when no legal sanctions are enforced, public censure by a 
regulatory authority can disadvantageously affect the stock price of the company 
at fault786. 
 
In addition, it is proposed that directors can be humiliated by judges due to their 
reproach of their conduct even when no breach of duty is established. This is 
supported by Professor Edward Rock who believed that public shaming of a 
director can lead to dismissal, the derision of their peers and reputational damage. 
                                                             
783 See Stephen Pierce, Ben Butler and David Crone, “Takeover Panel censures Bob Morton 
over purchases of Armour Group shares by his sons” August 2015, Lexology and available 
at: http://documents.lexology.com/7049ed53-46f0-4352-a923-326ae2d243a6.pdf . 
784 Howell E. Jackson and Mark J. Roe, "Public and private enforcement of securities laws: 
Resource-based evidence", Journal of Financial Economics, 93.2, 2009, 207. 
785 See London Stock Exchange, Armour Group Plc’s Share Price after 23rd Feberuary 2015, 
available at: http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/prices-and-
markets/stocks/summary/company-summary/GB0000496611GBGBXAIM.html, [Accessed 
August 19, 2015]. 
786 Benjamin L. Liebman and Curtis J. Milhaupt "Reputational sanctions in China's securities 
market" Columbia Law Review, 2008, 929. 
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In some respects however, this could be a significant way of helping to discourage 
such behaviour787. 
 
Company directors are often encouraged to uphold their affairs conscientiously 
so as to avoid poor decisions and corporate failures so as to prevent any negative 
publicity or public shame. This is often prevalent even when a breach of conduct 
would not likely result in formal sanctions. However, it is notable that these social 
factors can diminish if enforcement procedures become relaxed or if breaches of 
duty face negligible punishments. Therefore, the risk of poor conduct can still 
exist and can indeed become more prevalent if no external accountability is 
present. Consequently, appropriate standards of board conduct can be replaced 
with inappropriate standards788. 
 
Saudi law has recognised the reputational sanction. However it is not applied as 
a main penalty but as an ancillary. For example, s.25 of the Anti-Commercial 
Fraud Law 2008 states that ‘A summary of the final judgment of conviction for a 
violation provided for in the previous sections shall be published in two daily 
newspapers at the convicted person's expense’. In terms of the enforcement of 
corporate governance, there is no such a provision that allows any public 
                                                             
787 See Edward B Rock, “Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?” 
UCLA Law Review, Vol. 44, p. 1004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=10192 . 
788 See Renee M. Jones and Michelle Anne Welsh, “Toward a Public Enforcement Model for 
Directors' Duty of Oversight”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2012, Vol. 45, No. 
2, 343. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2050610 . 
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authority to announce its verdict against the person who is convicted for a 
violation of the law. Nevertheless, the CMA always publishes its decisions of 
fining or disqualifying directors who are in breach of the Capital Market Law 
2003.  Hence, it is been arguable whether this publication is considered as an 
illegal defamation789. In order to avoid the uncertainty to the law, it is suggested 
that the legislators should add a provision to the Capital Market Law which grant 




The CA 2006, the Bribery Act 2010 and the Criminal Justice Act 1993 have all 
led to imprisonment of directors within the UK. The Fraud Act 2006 stipulates 
that a director will be prosecuted and punished if found guilty of involvement in 
fraudulent business practice. This can include imprisonment with a maximum 
sentence of ten years790. 
In the UK, it is acknowledged by law that directors can be subject to 
imprisonment if found guilty of violations or misconduct. Specifically, it is stated 
under Section 61 of the UK Criminal Justice Act 1993 that any person found to 
have committed insider trading will incur a prison sentence of up to 6 months 
                                                             
789 See Mohammed Alsuhali, ‘ The people right to sue the CMA on the grounds of the 
defamation’, Alrriyadh Newspaper, 2010, available at: http://www.alriyadh.com/501910. 
790 S.1,12 of the Fraud Act 2006. 
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and/or a financial penalty up to the statutory maximum value upon summary 
conviction. Furthermore, Section 61 states that the director is liable to incur a 
financial penalty and/or prison sentence of up to 7 years upon conviction of an 
indictable offence.  
 
By and large, market abuse is either sharing inside information which is known 
as “insider dealing” or sharing false information which is called “market 
manipulation”. If such activities are exploited, how confident the public are in 
relation to the market will likely decrease. Thus, to address this and to take control 
of market abuse, offenders tend to be penalised by lawmakers through the use of 
deferent types of sanctions, for example, financial sanctions or imprisonment791. 
In Section 118, the FSMA 2000 outlined nine types of behaviours which are by 
definition constitutive of market abuse. Three of these behaviours relate to insider 
trading while six relate to market manipulation. 
 
The Tribunal of Davidson and Tatham v FSA792 overturned the fine totalling 
£750,000 that was imposed on Paul Davidson, also known as “the plumber”, for 
reasons of market abuse. The most significant feature, it is generally believed, of 
Davidson’s prosecution within the United Kingdom, is that the case makes it clear 
                                                             
791 See Dreek French, Stephen Mayson, and Christopher L. Ryan, Company Law. Oxford 
University Press, 2015-2016, pp.362,367. 
792 [2006] FSMT Case 031. 
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that market abuse is a criminal act. Although the Criminal Justice Act 1993 
already looked towards insider dealing as being a criminal offence, it was not 
previously clarified that abuse of the market, which is an offence in accordance 
with the 2000  Financial Services and Markets Act, is an offence of criminal 
proportions also793. However, in the above named case, it was stated by the 
Tribunal that as the case was so serious, civil standards would yield similar or 
equal results to criminal standards794. 
George Osborne, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, made a statement in June of 
2015 remarking that the public is right to question why only a small number of 
individuals have been punished in court when there have been a large number of 
scandals that have cost the country a great deal. He stated that he was in 
agreement with the governor: that anyone who manipulates the markets in a 
fraudulent manner and who commits any financial crime are criminals and must 
be treated as such795. Indeed, certain scholars make the argument that crimes 
committed by ‘white-collar’ people and organisations must face the same serious 
treatment any other crime or criminal would face, and therefore support 
individual directors’ and corporations’ criminal liability796.  
 
                                                             
793 See Julian Connerty, “Courts in Davidson Declare Market Abuse a Criminal Act 
[comments]” International Financial Law Review, Vol. 25 (7), 2006, 8. 
794 Davidson and Tatham v FSA [2006] FSMT Case 031 at 43. 
795 See News Release - Fair and Effective Markets Review Releases Final Report, June 2015, 
available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2015/055.pdf . 
796 See Sally S. Simpson, ‘Making Sense of White-Collar Crime: Theory and Research’ 8 
Ohio St. J. Crim. L., 2010, 481. 
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The Bribery Act 2010 specifies that a director is unable to receive a benefit from 
a third party if the benefit is offered on the basis of them being a director. A 
director is also prohibited from accepting a benefit on the basis of them doing or 
not doing a certain activity797. This indicates that anyone seeking to undertake 
any business activity outside of the UK would need to seek direction regarding 
this. Importantly, in relation to the Bribery Act 2010, directors must be aware of 
their duties and the potential conduct of those permitted to act on their behalf 
when conducting business on an international setting798. 
 
Through review of past precedent, it appears that no directors have been found 
culpable of receiving a bribe under the Bribery Act 2010. However, in the case 
of Smith & Ouzman Ltd, two directors were found guilty of a foreign public 
official’s offence. They were convicted of three counts of dishonestly deciding to 
make payments to public officials for company contracts within Kenya and 
Mauritania799.These payments amounted to £395,074 and were found to oppose 
the Bribery Act 2010. They were liable to a prison sentence for a maximum of 
twelve months800. However, as the payments occurred prior to enactment of the 
                                                             
797 Ss. 1,2,6,7 and 11 of the Bribery Act 2010. 
798 Tahir Ashraf "Directors' duties with a particular focus on the Companies Act 
2006" International Journal of Law and Management 54.2, 2012, 125. 
799 See The Official website of Serious Fraud Office (SFO), “UK printing company and two 
men found guilty in corruption trial”, 2014, available at: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-
room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2014/uk-printing-company-and-two-men-found-
guilty-in-corruption-trial.aspx [Accessed August 26, 2015]. 
800 Ss. 6,11, and 14 Bribery Act 2010. 
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Bribery Act 2010801, both directors were convicted under section 1(1) of the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 for dishonestly agreeing to make payments. 
At the start of 2015, a sales and marketing director and company chairman for a 
SFO were convicted by Southwark Crown Court. The former was imprisoned for 
three years whilst the latter received an eighteen month suspended service, 250 
hours of unpaid work and a three month curfew802. The Director of the SFO, 
David Green stated that this was the first conviction by trial involving bribery of 
foreign officials. He reported that criminal behaviour by organisations can 
negatively affect the business reputation of the UK and can drive dishonest 
governance throughout the world803. Although the court has not yet passed 
sentencing for the SFO, the fact that jury found the organisation guilty is of note. 
This is because, as the offences were committed prior to the Bribery act 2010, the 
jury had to consider the offenders as the “directing mind and will” of the 
company. This doctrine of identification has faced extensive reproach as it is 
considered a difficult threshold to meet and it helped to underpin the development 
of the strict liability corporate offence under the Bribery Act 2010. However, this 
case does indicate that convictions of companies could be achieved prior to the 
                                                             
801 Louise Roberts, “UK company director jailed for bribing public officials in Africa” March 
2015, Lexology and available at: http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=635339c1-
33cc-4545-8fb4-a94a634fae01. 
802 Ibid. 
803 See the Official website of Serious Fraud Office (SFO), “UK printing company and two 





introduction of the Bribery Act 2010804. The Small Business, Enterprise and 
Employment Act 2015 will place increased emphasis on international business 
conduct due to alterations in the director disqualification scheme. 
Disqualification will be accessible for any offences committed outside of Great 
Britain which would normally qualify as an indictable offence within English, 
Welsh and Scottish jurisdiction. This will apply to any offences linked to 
company promotion, formation, management and liquidation. Meanwhile, courts 
will also be able to evaluate the conduct of company directors relating to overseas 
business when reviewing applications for disqualification805. Disqualification 
orders will be discussed further in the following section. 
 
Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, numerous provisions of Companies Law carry 
criminal liability as a consequence of violation. This can result in a prison 
sentence for directors proven to have acted in violation of the law. Under Saudi 
law, imprisonment represents the sole type of criminal punishment for company 
directors, which excludes disqualification and financial penalties (civil 
punishment). Nonviolent crimes committed on the basis of financial gain (i.e. 
fraudulent activities) carry the consequence of criminal punishment for company 
directors working in Saudi Arabia. These consequences apply if a director is 
                                                             
804 See Amy Smart, Omar Qureshi, “Smith and Ouzman Ltd: two sentenced for foreign 





found guilty of acts such as orchestrating the provision of false dividends, abuse 
of funds, and annual budget fraud or mishandling806. 
 
In the past, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was tasked with the duty of 
inspecting any company director thought to be violating any rule of Section 229 
of the CL 1965. The Ministry was also responsible for commencing legal 
proceedings if accusations made against the director were found to be true807. 
Nowadays, these duties are held by the Saudi Commission for Investigation and 
Prosecution, following the release of a Ministers Council decree808. Recently, this 
provision has been formulated under s.215 of the CL 2015. Nevertheless, s.220 
grants the MOCI, or the Capital Markets Authority (in the case of listed 
companies), the power to investigate any director who is found guilty of any 
crime under s.213. This include, failure to publish the financial statements of the 
company, failure to prepare or record minutes, or any deliberate disruption to the 
call for, or convening of, a GM by any director. 
Under Section 229 of Companies Law 1965, a prison sentence of 3-12 months 
and/or a financial penalty of $1,333-5,333 will be incurred by any individual 
found guilty of involvement in the stated crimes, excluding non-compliance to 
Shari'ah law. These punishments are listed with their associated violations in full 
                                                             
806 S. 229 of the CL 1965. For in depth see Mohammed Al-Jeber, “Joint stock company’s 
directors responsibilities in Saudi legal system” Riyadh Commerce, 1992, Vol. 363, the 31st 
year, 100 
807 S.231 of the CL1965. 
808 Ministers Council Decree No: 34 in 2012.  
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under Section 229809; however, since the list is so exhaustive, it is not possible to 
outline every violation in this paper810. The punishments outlined in Section 229 
are to be multiplied if the same crime is committed again by the offending 
director, as outlined in Section 231811. Under the new CL 2015, these sanctions 
have become heavier. The director can be held liable to a financial penalty up to 
$1,333,000 and/or prison sentence of up to 5 years812. Although it may initially 
seem that this reform can increase the deterrence for the directors who would be 
in breach of CL 2015 provisions, it is unclear if this may actually be considered 
as a step forward. To the best of the author’s knowledge, since the introduction 
of the CL 1965, no cases has been reported in accordance to imposition of 
penalties for breaches of CL provisions. This is due to the fact that such 
insubstantial fines prove insufficient in terms of providing adequate capital 
sources for future investigation.  If the heavy sanctions - under the CL 2015- are 
not enforced effectively then they will probably have no real impact on directors’ 
behaviour. 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry reported the case of selected Mohammad 
Al Mojil Group’s board members to The Bureau of Investigation and Public 
Prosecution since the Ministry had no power to enact further control over the 
company. The Ministry was authorised to refer the terms of reference of 
                                                             
809 S. 229 of the CL 1965. 
810 For in depth, see Mansour Alhaydary, Corporate crimes and its penalties, MA Thesis, The 
Higher Institute of Judiciary, Riyadh, 2003. 
811 S. 231 of the CL 1965. 
812 Ss. 211-213 of the CL 2015. 
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companies and actions to the above authority based on the existence of criminal 
conduct813. The Ministry’s rationale for referring the case to the above authority 
was based on two premises: the failure of the company’s board members to 
respond to the Ministry’s written communication; and the company’s apparent 
breaches of the Companies Law, which caused the company’s share value to drop 
and prevented capital market exchange814. 
Imprisonment is also supported by Saudi law, in which a number of regulations 
state that violating directors can incur a prison sentence. The CRSD’s ruling of a 
multiple punishment for insider trading within the Bishah Agriculture 
Development Company was the most noteworthy case of its kind. The director 
received a 3 month prison sentence, CMA bill of $14,050, a $26,666 fine, and a 
5-year ban from employment with registered companies815. This ruling was 
supported by s.57 (C) of Capital Market Law 2003, which stipulates that the 
Committee has the power to penalise individuals who are found guilty of creating 
significant harm to the stock exchange and participated in insider trading 
activities, as per the Authority’s claim. Section 57 (C) denotes that the maximum 
prison sentence for these offences is 5 years816. It should be noted that this was 
the first example of the CRSD enforcing a prison sentence on a director as 
                                                             
813 Ministers Council Decree No: 34 in 2012.  
814 See the official website of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
http://mci.gov.sa/MediaCenter/News/Pages/08-03-15-02.aspx . 
815 Issued Decision by the CRSD, dated 17 August 2009.  
816 S.57 (c) of Capital Market Law 2003. 
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punishment for breaching Capital Market Law817. Although it has been argued 
that this ruling was sufficient as a caution for others’ conduct818, it has also been 
contested that the CRSD should not be authorised to enact such rulings since it 
not strictly a third-party entity819.  
 
This being said, it can be a challenge to achieve a criminal penalty for the offence 
of insider trading. This is because the evidence required to reach an informed 
decision on criminal violation is often extremely detailed and complicated820. 
Furthermore, there are a variety of other prohibited actions that are associated 
with criminal punishments. This is especially true where conduct violates the 
various statutory responsibilities of the director821. However, it is claimed that the 
association between these specific actions and criminal punishment is largely 
theoretical and these violations have not yet ever been criminally punished822. 
Furthermore, imprisonment only affects specific people rather than entire 
companies. This means that imprisonment cannot be used as a supporting 
deterrent of fines823. 
                                                             
817 See Alhayat Newspaper, 19th August 2009, issue 16938. 
818 See Aleqt Newspaper, 19th August 2009, Issue 5791.   
819 See Alhayat Newspaper, 19th August 2009, issue 16938. 
820 See H McVea, “Fashioning a System of Civil Penalties for Insider Dealing: Sections 61 
and 62 of the Financial Services Act 1986”, JBL, 1996, 344. 
821 See John Armour, “Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap 
and Empirical Assessment”. ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 106/2008. April 2008, available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133542 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1133542 . 
822 Ibid. 
823 See Hazell Croall, Understanding white collar crime, Open University Press, 




5.2.3. Directors Disqualification orders and undertakings 
Limited liability can beneficially enhance investment, encourage managerial risk 
taking and can protect shareholders from company creditors. However, some 
disadvantages do exist. Primarily, limited liability can be subject to abuse as 
identified by the Cork Report in 1982824. This Report identified how directors can 
leave behind a ‘trail of unpaid creditors’825 by allowing a company to become 
insolvent before creating a new limited liability company and continuing business 
activity. Consequently, the Report recommended the stipulations provided in the 
CA 1985 and the Insolvency Act 1985 regarding director’s disqualifications. 
These provisions were further solidified in the Company Disqualifications Act 
1986826. 
Criminal and civil sanctions can be taken against directors for any breach of duty. 
For small businesses this can often cause the end of a company. Interestingly, it 
is questionable as to whether section 178 is appropriately titled ‘Civil 
consequence of breach of general duties’. Indeed, this section only confirms the 
previous position maintained under correlating common law legislation. It is 
therefore possible that an opportunity exists for developing the law in this area. 
Irrespective of clear and recent updates to the CA 2006, old principles often need 
                                                             
824 See John Lowry and Alan Dignam. Company law. Oxford University Press, 2014, pp.49-
51. 
825 See Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Cork Report). 
1982, Cmnd 8558, para 1813. 
826 See John Lowry and Alan Dignam. Company law. Oxford University Press, 2014, p.314. 
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to be employed where new circumstances arise. Thus, due to the complex nature 
of the CA 2006 together with other legislation, directors will require qualified 
and experience legal advice to understand the implications of this Act827. 
 
The concept of director duties was largely developed by the CDDA 1986 and past 
precedent prior to the CA 2006. Duties incorporated standards regarding the duty 
of care and skill828. Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v. Maxwell (No. 
2)829concerned a trustee of the Maxwell group pension schemes. A fundamental 
issue was whether the trustee company, which was in liquidation, had breached 
their fiduciary duties by assenting to transfer a number of financial investments 
for consideration to a different company. Importantly, the trustee was the director 
of the recipient company which controlled Robert Maxwell’s private interests. 
The court found that the trustee had breached their duties and on appeal of this 
verdict, Hoffmann L.J stated that Maxwell’s failure to familiarize himself with 
the company’s business was a breach of duty. In previous cases, the duty of a 
director to be actively involved in company management was not so stringent. It 
is evident therefore that legislation in this area is developing and changing in 
response to public attitudes towards corporate governance. This is demonstrated 
in the passing of the CDDA 1986. However, notably, the existence of a duty for 
                                                             
827 Tahir Ashraf "Directors' duties with a particular focus on the Companies Act 
2006" International Journal of Law and Management 54.2, 2012, 125. 
828 The standards of the duty of care and skill has been addressed earlier in this thesis under 
Chapter 3. 
829 [1993] B.C.C. 120. 
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directors to partake in company affairs will depend upon how an organization is 
run and the role which the director is practically able to adopt830.  
 
In the case discussed, the court determined the case by simply referring to the 
defendant’s fiduciary duties. Essentially, the defendant had dispersed of the 
company assets without an initial enquiry and had therefore failed to uphold the 
interests of the company831.If an individual is subject to a disqualification 
decision, they are no longer authorized to acquire or benefit from the assets of a 
company and are not allowed to continue within their role as director. 
Additionally, under Section 1 of the CDDA 1986, the individual is also unable to 
partake in the managerial structure of a company or any decision making832. 
 
The CDDA 1986 stipulates that directors may face disqualification if they are not 
deemed to fulfill their role as a director. Section 6 of this Act obliges the court to 
issue a disqualification order against an individual if (a) the director has been a 
director of a company which has at any time become insolvent and (b) the conduct 
of a director makes them unfit to be concerned in company management. This 
can apply to the director alone or taken in conjunction with their conduct as a 
director of any other company or companies. If a director is deemed unfit, Section 
                                                             
830 [1993] B.C.C. 120. 
831 See Adrian Walters “Directors’ Duties: the impact of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986” Comp. Law. 2000, 21(4), 110. 
832 S.1 of CDDA 1986. 
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1(1) of the CDDA provides that any disqualification should apply for a minimum 
of two years but no longer than fifteen years833. Disqualification orders can only 
be sought by the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
or by the official receiver if the Secretary of State directs it. The latter can occur 
for example in compulsory liquidation of a company across England and 
Wales834. Meanwhile, Section 8 of the CDDA permits the Secretary of State to 
seek a disqualification order following a specified power of investigation.  If the 
investigation confirms that the behavior of an individual makes them unsuitable 
for the management of a business, a disqualification order can be applied. Unlike 
Section 6, Section 8 of the Act does not require company insolvency835. 
 
Section 6 and Section 8 of the CDDA require that the defendant is unfit to be 
concerned in the management of a company. When assessing this, Section 9 of 
this Act requires the court to pay attention to the matters stipulated in Part I of 
Schedule 1. Part I includes misfeasance or breach of both fiduciary and any other 
duties by the director of an organization. This is applicable irrespective of whether 
the business is solvent or not836. Meanwhile, Section 11 of the Act states that an 
offence will be committed if an individual who is subject to a bankruptcy 
                                                             
833 S.6 (4) of CDDA 1986. 
834 S.7 (1) of CDDA 1986. 
835 S.8 of CDDA 1986. 
836 S.1 of Part I of Schedule 1 of CDDA 1986. 
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restrictions order or who is an undischarged bankrupt holds a director role within 
limited companies. 
 
This indicates that foreign individuals will not be prohibited from obtaining 
employment as a director under English law. However, foreign directors of 
overseas businesses who operate in the UK may be subjected to disqualification 
procedures under English legislation. This poses the question as to whether 
foreign directors should be able to move across different states and countries in 
order to benefit from limited liability companies where the risk of poor conduct 
could arise. This has gained recognition by ss. 1181 to 1191 of CA 2006 which 
identifies foreign director disqualification and similar restriction orders. These 
orders serve to hold offending directors criminally or personably liable. 
Admission of any foreign restrictions is compulsory and can be made public837. 
 
The CDDA 1986 provides that if a director disqualification applies, the director 
is no longer able to maintain their job role and is not permitted to participate in 
company promotion, formation or management. If this rule is breached, the 
individual will commit both a criminal and personal liability offence. This can 
apply to not only the individual but also the company for any debts or liabilities 
endured throughout the time period in which the disqualification breach 
                                                             




occurred838. The CDDA 1986 will apply to both natural and legal individuals839. 
However, after October 2016 when the S.87 of the Small Business, Enterprise 
and Employment Act 2015 comes into effect, only natural persons will be able to 
be employed as a company director840. Notably, whilst preventing a corporate 
body from acting as a company director can reduce the extent to which a legal 
director’s disqualification applies, it is unable to prevent it fully. Section 156A 
(4) of the CA 2006 will not affect individuals who are acting as either a director 
or a shadow director, although the individual cannot be validly employed as a 
director841. 
 
“Disqualification undertakings” provide a different and less costly option to 
disqualification orders under English law. The Insolvency Act 2000 contains 
certain regulations which have changed the CDDA 1986. Section 6 of the Act 
provides that the Secretary of State is permitted to accept a disqualification 
undertaking by an individual which prevents the individual from being employed 
within a director role for a specified period of time. This is based upon Sections 
7 and 8 of the CDDA 1986. Disqualification undertakings are primarily issued to 
                                                             
838 S.13-15 of CDDA 1986. 
839 The Insolvency Service, “Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and failed 
companies”, November 2014, P.5. 
840 S.87 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, and the new s.156A (1) 
of CA 2006. 
841 The new s.156A (4) of CA 2006. 
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reduce court time, meaning that they can be issued without the need to obtain a 








2001-02 782 1281 2063 
2002-03 443 1468 1911 
2003-04 432 1278 1710 
2004-05 375 945 1320 
2005-06 267 906 1173 
2006-07 246 954 1200 
2007-08 248 897 1145 
2009-10 255 997 1252 
2010-11 287 1150 1437 
2011-12 231 920 1151 
2012-13 207 824 1031 
2013-14 255 1018 1273 
                                                             




2014-15 210 885 1095 
As can be illustrated from the table843, figures show that in 2004-2005, the number 
of disqualification orders reduced. Out of 1320 disqualification notices received 
by the Register, 945 or seventy-two percent were disqualification undertakings. 
Since this time period, the total number or disqualification orders and 
undertakings have continued to reduce. However, in 2010-2011 an increase to 
1437 occurred, incorporating 1150 undertakings and 287 orders. Finally, in 2014-
2015, a total of 1095 director disqualifications were obtained. Of these, there 
were 210 orders and 885 undertakings. It can be noted that the percentage of 
disqualifications that were undertakings ranges from 70% to 85%. 
 
Importantly, Part 9 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 
reinforces the rules which prevent an individual from being employed as a 
director where poor conduct has taken place. It also introduces new provisions 
for the justification for disqualification and has created an alternative way in 
which creditors can receive financial reimbursement for any losses experienced 
due to creditor transgression. Additionally, it has updated the issues courts must 
consider when reviewing a director disqualification844. 
                                                             
843 For in depth of Disqualifications/undertakings statistics, see Insolvency Service: annual 
reports and accounts, available at: https://goo.gl/q13spV . [Accessed November 19, 2015]. 
Also, see John Lowry and Alan Dignam, Company law, Oxford University Press, 2014, 
p.326, and, Paul Lyndon Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, p.253. 




In Saudi Arabia, the CRSD has authority to disqualify the director or directors of 
listed companies when they have breached the rules, regulations and laws of the 
CMA, under the Saudi legal system. Under Section 59 (A) of Capital Market Law 
2003, it is stated that the CMA Board is permitted to commence legal proceedings 
through the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes so as to request 
the relevant penalty, which is inclusive of prohibiting the individual(s) from being 
employed by firms that have securities on the stock exchange under the following 
conditions: the CMA believes the individual or company to have previous 
participated, currently be participating, or planning to participate in activities that 
represent a breach of Capital Market Law rules, CMA regulations, or stock 
exchange guidelines845. 
 
As previously stated, loyalty represents the key component of a company 
director’s responsibilities. The issue of loyalty is comprised of the avoidance of 
insider trading and conduct that poses a conflict of interest846. The CRSD has 
made the decision to disqualify numerous violating directors who have acted in 
such a manner that violates their code of responsibility, including participation in 
insider trading. One such example is an instance in which the CRSD applied a 
                                                             
845 S.59 (A) of Capital Market Law 2003.  
846 Norwood Beveridge, The Corporate Directors’ Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding 
the Self-Interested Director Transaction, DePaul Law Review, 1991, 41, p.688. 
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multiple penalty to a Saudi Hotels and Resorts board member, which entailed a 
$26,666 fine and a 3-year ban on being employed by registered companies847. 
Furthermore, a chairman of the company was found guilty of power abuse and 
share trading, with a penalty of a $26,666 fine and 3-year band on employment 
with registered companies848. The CRSD decision was approved by the Appeal 
Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts has accepted the CRSD 
judgment849. A number of similar cases in Saudi Arabia have resulted in the 
disqualification of directors, as stated within the financial penalty, in the 
following subsection. 
 
For the directors who receive the punishment of disqualification, this can be a 
harsh consequence. The purpose of this potential penalty is both to punish the 
director for his/her actions as well as ensuring that he/she cannot continue to 
breach the code of duty that should have been upheld as part of the role of 
company director850. It has been suggested that disqualification is one of the most 
effective and logical penalties that can be applied to violating directors, since this 
particular form of punishment manages to sidestep a number of restrictions 
experienced in the case of alternative penalties851. From this perspective, 
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disqualification can be equated to a hefty financial penalty in situations where the 
director is unable to meet the fine requirements, or where the company may take 
actions to protect the individual. Furthermore, this measure is the most probable 
to carry broad and acute preventative impacts. It is likely to be effective in 
deterring other directors from committing criminal acts852.  
 
Conversely, it could be argued that companies can appoint new directors and 
continue to commit offences even in the event of director disqualification853. 
Furthermore, this kind of punishment would not have prevented the director or 
company from engaging with legal professionals or taking other measures. This 
being said, the disqualification measure still manages to wield a particularly 
severe impact, somewhat due to the caution involved in enforcing a punishment 
so harsh854. 
 
In Saudi Arabia, only the CRSD has the authority to disqualify directors while 
the court in UK originally has the power to do so.  Additionally, due to the fact 
that the disqualification order can be costly and a waste of time, the UK law has 
introduce the “undertakings” order which can be achieved by the Secretary of 
State rather than obtaining the court orders. In Saudi, the CRSD is 
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administratively managed by the CMA which means that any disqualification 
does not lie with the court. While leaving the power to the court may increase the 
independence to the procedure, the administrative approach serves to save money 
and time. Law-makers in Saudi Arabia can benefit from this dual approaches due 
to an increased level of autonomy and flexibility. 
5.2.4. Winding up in public interest 
The report compiled by the Cork Committee855 described the overall notion 
behind public interest liquidation (PIL), which is that it allows winding-up to be 
triggered by the state when doing this is in the public’s general interest. One 
potential trigger for this would be a firm that has prejudiced a great many 
consumer creditors’ interests. It only applies if the creditors do not possess a 
significant amount of debt which would warrant costs of court proceedings856. 
Under S. 124A of the Insolvency Act 1986, the Secretary of State for Business 
Energy and Industrial Strategy has authorisation to petition a company’s ‘winding 
up’ in the public interest. The key public interest was identified in the Secretary 
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills v Top Choice Wholesale Ltd857. In this 
case, the court held that a S.124A petition can be presented alongside a winding-
up petition presented by a creditor858. This somewhat excessive judgement must 
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however be considered in relation to information acquired through other 
investigations. Additionally, S.124A2 reports that if a company is already being 
wound up through court proceedings, a winding-up petition cannot also be used. 
Meanwhile, Re Lubin, Rosen and Associates Ltd859 indicates that this does not 
apply if the action of winding-up is voluntary860. 
 
In Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills v PAG Management 
Services Ltd861, the Secretary of State presented a petition for the winding-up of 
the PAG Company which had been asked to oversee and coordinate a business 
rates migration scheme in 2011. The winding-up was based upon public interest 
grounds under section 124A of the Insolvency Act 1986. Mr. Justice Norris 
deemed it appropriate to wind-up the company in the public interest, not due to 
the integrally intolerable promotion of migration schemes but due the operating 
systems employed. This included for example, artificial leases with no 
commercial reality and the misuse of insolvency law.  
 
In regards to the degree to which PIL may deter criminal behaviour and how much 
it is able to control practices of trading or maintain higher business standards, it 
was noted that the procedure of PIL does not have a significant public profile. As 
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such, there is a need to raise the directors’ awareness of the reasons may wind up 
the company in public interest862. The company’s winding-up in the public 
interest is not available under Saudi law. 
 
5.2.5. Financial sanctions 
Financial penalties can be issued by public enforcers if directors are found 
culpable of breaching their duties in law. For example, directors must reveal the 
nature and level of any direct or indirect interest in any proposed or existing 
business arrangements or dealings. Importantly, disclosure must be full and clear 
and must be made before the company enters into any business agreement. This 
does not incorporate financial dealings which are unlikely to lead to a conflict in 
interest863. If a director does not manage to comply with this declaration of interest 
they will be deemed to have committed a legal infringement. Under this section, 
this can result in conviction on indictment or a fine. If a summary conviction 
applies, a fine no greater than the statutory maximum may be issued864. 
 
In Saudi Arabia, under Section 229 of Companies Law 1965, a financial penalty 
of $1,333-5,333 will be incurred by any individual found guilty of involvement 
in crimes under CL 1965. Under the new CL 2015, the fine has become extremely 
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heavier. The director can be held liable to incur a financial penalty up to 
$1,333,000865. It may initially seem that this reform can increase the deterrence 
for the directors who would be in breach of CL 2015 provisions. However, as 
discussed earlier, if this fine is not enforced effectively then they will probably 
have no real impact on directors’ behaviour. 
Furthermore, directors found guilty of breaching Exchange regulations, Capital 
Market Law implementing regulations, or the provisions of Capital Market Law 
are subject to the imposition of a financial penalty by the CMA Board. The CMA 
Board (or the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes) can enforce 
financial penalties of between $2,666 and $26,666. Additionally, every individual 
breach carries an individual penalty, which means that directors can be fined 
multiple times866. One memorable example of the conflict of interest issue is the 
case of the Saudi Chemical Company and the actions taken by its board members 
and board chairman. The individuals involved in the case attempted to permit 
15% of the company’s shares to be bought by a subsidiary of the company. 
Although the board chairman possessed a conflict of interest in this decision, the 
company failed to report this to its general assembly. Furthermore, the company 
neglected to report that the decision was linked to its subsidiary. This information 
was not shared on the Saudi Chemical Company’s website or on the stock 
exchange. As a result, each board member of the company was issued with a 
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866 S.59 (B) of Capital Market Law 2003. 
292 
 
penalty of $13,333 by the CMA Board. The board director was also issued with 
the same penalty by the Authority867. 
 
In addition to fines, individuals who have participated in the past, are currently 
participating, or are planning to participate in breaches of the given Law, the 
Authority’s regulations or the Exchange’s rules are liable for compensating any 
individual who has incurred harm as a result of the individuals’ misconduct. 
Alternatively, the offending individual must provide a sum to the Authority as a 
result of committing the breaching act868. Furthermore, it is provided that any 
individual whose actions have resulted in significant harm to the stock exchange, 
and who has been involved in insider trading, has the option of securing 
resolution through the Authority rather than commencing with proceedings, 
under Section 64 of Capital Market Law. In this case, the individual must provide 
the Authority with up to three times the profit or losses gained by the individual 
through the breaching act(s). This agreement is made without hindering the 
compensation rights of those harmed due to the breach of conduct, regulation or 
law869. In one example of insider trading, a director of Saudi Telecom was proven 
to have abused his role of authority. The consequence of this activity, as ruled by 
the ACRSD, was that the director was fined $26,666, required to pay almost $2 
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million to the CMA, and incurred a 3-year ban on employment with registered 
companies870. 
 
It is argued that directors will not be sufficiently deterred from malpractice if they 
see the financial punishment as minimal871. In broad terms, a dependence on 
financial sanctions carries various issues. For instance, in order for financial 
sanctions to be effective in preventing the misconduct of company directors, 
financial penalties would have to be set at an extremely high value. This is 
because directors would logically weigh up the cost of the financial penalty 
against the probability of being discovered and charged872. If the cost of financial 
penalty is low, this could lead directors to believe that it is worth taking the risk. 
This poses a potential political issue. Specifically, smaller firms may be more 
likely to comply through fear of paying large fines that they cannot afford, whilst 
large firms may still be corrupt due to being able to afford the fines873. Among 
the main proposed advantages of the move towards civil punishment was the 
notion that less evidence is required for civil punishment to be approved, which 
implies that a higher number of guilty directors could be sanctioned under civil 
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law than under criminal law874. Certain scholars claim that those very infrequent 
cases where criminal sanctions have been imposed, the consequences of these 
impositions have barely been relative to the amount of inflicted harm, or the 
amount of profits that were made875. 
 
This being said, it is contested that raising financial punishments is a logical 
reaction to the seemingly never-ending stream of legal and regulatory breaches 
and misconducts876. France’s leading bank (BNPP) is also a leading global bank. 
Banks and financial institutions are disallowed from engagement in specific 
financial activities with specific nations, bodies and individuals under the 
American legal system. BNPP was found guilty of legal violations due to its 
involvement with Cuba, Iran and Sudan. Consequently, the bank was liable for 
financial punishment under American law. The punishment entailed a probation 
window of five years as well as extremely high fine of $8,833,600,000 USD.  It 
could be argued that such extreme financial punishments are unfair to directors 
who fear court proceedings877. On the other hand, it is more likely that directors 
will commit crimes and violate rules, or at least believe that it is reasonable to do 
                                                             
874 Michael Filby, “The enforcement of insider dealing under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000”, Comp. Law. 2003, 24(11), 334. 
875 For in depth see Andrew Keay and Michelle Welsh, "Enforcing breaches of directors’ 
duties by a public body and antipodean experiences", Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 
2015, Vol. 15, No. 2, 255. 
876 See Patrick Hardouin, “The BNP Paribas "tour de fraud": extortion, war and justice” 




so, if no sanctions exist. For this reason, it makes logical sense that since directors 
still commit criminal acts, fines will continue to rise until directors are deterred. 
Indeed, financial penalties are essential and should be appropriate to the level of 
misconduct or criminal activity. However, fines must be set in such a way that 
does not lead to devastating outcomes. In the case of BNPP and Cuba, Iran and 
Sudan, over $190 billion USD was secured during the decade spanning 2002 to 
2012. The fine represents 4.5-5% of BNPP’s total revenue, at fewer than 6 months 
in a decade. This reflects a significant expense for the company878. 
 
There is no doubt that the punishment incurred by BNPP is absolutely harsh and 
far from a minor loss for the company. This being said, the punishment has no 
detrimental impact on financial markets. Instead, the punishment helps to resolve 
the problem of the company’s lack of adherence to the relevant laws and 
regulations. Consequently, it is reasonable to suggest that banks are less likely to 
behave hastily in terms of the violation of rules, especially the rules imposed by 
the United States879.  Financial sanctions beneficially help to both deter 
misconduct by directors whilst providing a large resource to public authorities. 
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Upon identification of any transgressions, this can lead to financial penalties 
making it easier for the agency to impose any actions880. 
 
5.3. Difficulties of Public enforcement actions 
5.3.1. Company Law is Private Law 
It is questionable whether a public authority should be restricted in instigating an 
enforcement action solely when it is in the public interest. Arguably, company 
law is wholly private law, yet, if this is the case, then there should be little public 
regulation as a result. Consequently, it could be argued that if companies are 
considered to be private entities, then any legal enforcement and legal solutions 
should also be kept private881. 
In some respects, as public representatives and the government have authority 
over companies’ rights and operations, the public do perhaps have an interest. In 
other words, companies are allowed to act as a legal person due to government 
concession882. Thus, it appears that only a public authority is able to monitor and 
oversee the duties of directors. Additionally, in the UK, public authority 
intervention into private law is permissible. The UK has a capitalist society and 
there is an evident public interest in ensuring responsible risk taking by 
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organizations. An example of public policy choice concerns that of limited 
liability which was developed in 1885 by the UK Parliament. As public policy 
choice arouses public interest, limited liability must consequently be reviewed by 
the state. Under S. 447 of the CA 1985, any violation of any financial concessions 
may therefore result in an informal inquiry883. 
 
Critique of public intervention concerns the development of regulations which 
stipulate what company directors are able to do and in doing so limit the ability 
of directors when undertaking company affairs. However, this does not mean that 
public intervention causes increased prohibition on directors and there is no desire 
to impose further duties upon them. Instead, the focus has been placed on the 
growing enforcement which can be directed towards directors. A study by Keay 
found that in the UK little public involvement occurs in company law but in 
Australia increased involvement does exist which has led to disapproval of public 
enforcement884. 
 
In an Australian case, Ailakis v Olivero885, the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Australia made several points regarding directors’ duties. It considered these 
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duties to stem from law, equity and statute and found that statute determines the 
range and required standards of a director’s duties. Statute can therefore be used 
to impose these duties yet it is notable that these duties do not always have to 
have a public nature. This applies for example to the duty to attend court in 
response to a subpoena or the duty to care for a child. Instead, the duties of a 
director are considered to relate to the company and can therefore be enforced by 
the company. In similarity, Foss v Harbottle886 held that any remedy must enforce 
company rights not the rights of those who owe duties to the company such as the 
directors. Thus, the duties of a director to the company in which they are 
employed are not considered to be duties of a public nature887. 
 
Moore believes that the framework for corporate governance legislation in the 
United Kingdom, in spite of displaying certain noticeably contractarian 
characteristics, is largely regulatory by nature. Corporate law can be located 
within private English law but can also be located in the realm of public law. 
However, the analysis suggests that it is not appropriate to locate the law of 
corporate governance in private law but in public law. Thus, it ought to be 
understood to be an outcome-imposing or regulatory element of law, rather than 
the traditional portrayal as an outcome-facilitating or contractual element. As 
such, legislation for corporate governance ought to be understood as a substitute 
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for democratically agreed divisions of power regarding corporate decision 
making in place of alternate allocations that tend to result from decentralised 
contractual determination888. 
5.3.2. Soft law vs hard law 
Best practice in corporate governance is enforced differently around the world. 
Some countries rely upon regulations and legislation whilst others invoke the 
comply-or-explain approach. Thus, when developing legal reforms, regulators 
and lawmakers must identify the type of reform required. This subsection 
therefore focusses upon whether soft laws have any efficacy when developing 
improved corporate governance. 
 
Responsive theory was developed by Ayres and Braithwaite and proposes that 
people, organisations and industry require responsive regulations. This is because 
different sectors will require different types of regulations. The foundation of 
responsive theory is that individual actions are encouraged by a variety of 
different factors. Therefore, a regulatory authority requires a wide range of 
potential enforcement actions so as to effectively respond to this889. Business 
individuals who are incentivised by a degree of social responsibility could be 
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regulated by a system based upon self-regulation. If businesses are wholly 
influenced by financial reasons then a system based upon penalties could be 
appropriate890. Meanwhile, driving factors will alter and differ over time891. 
Consequently, it appears impossible for a regulatory agency to recognise and 
react to every infringement of the law. Thus, it is critical that agencies are able to 
promote compliance with the law on a voluntary basis. Responsive regulation 
ultimately seeks to ‘stimulate maximum levels of regulatory compliance’892. This 
is more likely to be obtained when agencies are able to demonstrate an 
‘enforcement pyramid’ which details a range of different enforcement methods 
which increase in severity and are proportionate to the level of misdemeanour893. 
As the definition of fraud is difficult to fully clarify regulations often fail to 
regulate it. One example is that of fraud. Fraud is not deemed to be a criminal 
offence but is instead a manner in which otherwise legal activity is carried out. 
The most distinctive part of whether fraudulent behaviour is compliant or non-
compliant with the law is whether or not the activity has been carried out 
dishonestly894. 
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The “comply and explain” regulation has been identified within both the UK and 
the Saudi Corporate Governance Code. It is therefore challenging to evaluate 
whether or not this principle is working in the correct way. When companies fail 
to comply or have transgressed away from the code without explanation, there is 
often little publicity of this895. This correlates with the findings of a study 
conducted by Seidl, Sanderson and Roberts in 2009. This research examined 129 
of the biggest listed companies in the UK and found that companies invariably 
do not fully utilise the flexibility offered by the comply-or-explain principle. It 
found that over fifty percent of British companies declare deviations away from 
the code with the most common being the requirement for autonomous non-
executive directors forming the majority of the board896. 
 
Importantly, the large percentage of company transgressions, do not indicate the 
failure of the regulation. The comply-or-explain principle is designed to promote 
flexibility which enables companies to stray from certain code requirements if 
they are inappropriate for their own specific situation. Therefore, deviation does 
not always indicate a lack of compliance but it can show that the system is 
working adequately due to the element of flexibility used. A good method of 
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assessing if the regulatory system is functioning adequately is to evaluate both 
compliance statements and the nature of any explanations for any deviations. This 
has reflected how a substantial number of UK companies are not currently 
proffering complete and accurate explanations for transgressing away from the 
code. Interestingly, twenty-five percent of justifications provided did not include 
any specific reasons or provide explanations without incorporating any 
alternative practice897. The remainder were deemed to be unreasonable and 
illogical with one company believing that the provision does not promote best 
practice898. The authors of the study concluded that for the comply-or-explain 
principle to be successful it is reliant upon the company and investor acting 
honestly, applying the code to the best of their ability and being willing to engage 
into open communications regarding any deviations from the code899. 
 
In the “Review of the Effectiveness of the Combined Code” the FRC reported 
that numerous respondents, including primary investors and service providers, 
considered that companies’ corporate governance statements offered extremely 
limited information. Criticism was also targeted at the detail of the explanations 
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provided when companies failed to adhere to the Code900. One respondent 
commented that there appeared to be a substantial lack of integrity in the 
explanations provided and that companies adopt poor practice by communicating 
with shareholders before declaring a substantial infringement of the Code’s 
principles901. Meanwhile, another respondent declared that explanations of 
deviations away from the Code have become inadequate and somewhat 
homogenous902. Thus, it is evident that a desired level of voluntary compliance is 
not being realised. Importantly, the FRC and other regulatory bodies are not 
responsible for assessing company responses to the Code. Organisations 
themselves evaluate if their responses are adequate. Meanwhile, the markets and 
shareholders must consider whether or not the response is suitable and if not, must 
take action to compel the companies to increase their compliance with the Code. 
Essentially, if compliance is truly desired then companies should seek to respond 
in an effective manner. Therefore, comply-or-explain seeks to embolden 
shareholders so that they can determine if non-adherence is acceptable based 
upon the situation of the company903. 
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Under the German Corporate Governance Code, Andres and Theissen explored 
the nature of companies which adhere to the requirements of the code. They found 
that managers can opt out of transparency provisions if the company structure and 
regulatory incentives enable them to do so. This loophole in the compulsory 
disclosure regulation illustrates how it can benefit small shareholders and brings 
into doubt the efficacy of the comply-or-explain principle904. However, the 
viewpoint of the FRC respondents show that there is a belief in a more flexible 
based comply-or-explain principle rather than a more regulated system905. 
 
The ex-Chairman of FRC, Baroness Hogg, reported that whilst reservations exist 
regarding the Code, it does serve to encourage company compliance even if 
companies are somewhat unwilling to change. The Code has helped to promote 
innovation such as the creation of board evaluation and due to its flexibility has 
helped to develop inspiring language to encourage change and diversity906. In 
May 2015, the new chairman Sir Bischoff, stated that most companies do achieve 
the standards required. Indeed, in 2014, ninety-four percent adhered to nearly all 
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of the UK Corporate Governance Code provisions, apart from two which have 
not been stipulated907. However, more work is required to oversee company 
reporting and explanations regarding non-adherence. Meanwhile, Keay 
suggested that it is difficult to ascertain if the comply-or-explain principle is an 
effective system. This is because when a company fails to adhere to the code or 
has transgressed away from the code, publicity is somewhat rare908. Further to 
this, Cadbury commented that corporate governance requires both statutory and 
self-regulation but equilibrium must be sought between the two and they must 
apply to specific and appropriate governance issues909. 
 
Recently, the UK has adopted the viewpoint that overall, corporate governance 
should be self-regulatory rather than overly regulated. A proposition by the 
European Commission Green Paper has been faced with dissent from the 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills910 which advocated that securities 
regulators, stock exchanges and other authorities should be given the permission 
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to investigate comply-or-explain corporate governance statements and 
information. This would enable regulatory bodies to identify if these statements 
are accurate and to ensure that any accounts are fully detailed and 
comprehensive911. Particularly after the introduction of CL 2015, Saudi Arabian 
legislators seem in favour of mandatory rather than voluntary regulations. For 
example, ss.81 (1) and 95 of CL 2015 introduces provisions that prevent the 
combination of the post of chairperson with executive positions (including that 
of CEO) and compulsory cumulative voting. These provisions were included 
under Saudi CGC 2006, Articles 6-b and 12-d, which applies only to firms listed 
on the Saudi Arabian Stock Exchange and serves only as guidance, not law. 
5.3.3. The cost  
Due to the Global Financial Crisis and the negative publicity surrounding 
directors, it is apparent that the public could support an increase in work for public 
authorities within the UK despite them being overladen with work already912. 
However, unlike public enforcement, private enforcement is unable to fully 
provide a self-sufficient system of securities regulation. This is because the 
financial costs of private solutions such as insider trading prevent effective 
private enforcement. Within public enforcement, if a misdemeanor is recognized, 
it is easier for an agency to initiate enforcement due to a higher level of resources 
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which enable regulatory investigations. This incorporates substantial financial 
penalties913. Despite this, it is evident that the UK government is not expected to 
expend public finances on issues which should only involve company members 
or creditors914. 
Arguably, if a regulator is able to redeem expenses from a director during legal 
proceedings, this will still affect public finances as it requires public enforcement 
actions915. This is of importance as the government currently seeks to reduce its 
expenditure within different sectors such as the civil service. For example, the 
government has recently cut its budget for the Serious Fraud Office from £52 
million in 2008/9 to £31 million in 2014/15916. 
In similarity to the UK, Saudi Arabia is also due to reduce its spending on the 
civil service and to not increase expenditure on the public mechanisms of 
directors’ duties. The latter is due to the fact that directors’ duties should be the 
responsibility of company members. However, national spending and the 
National Budget have been reduced due to a reduction in oil prices from $110 to 
                                                             
913 Howell E. Jackson and Mark J. Roe, "Public and private enforcement of securities laws: 
Resource-based evidence", Journal of Financial Economics, 93.2, 2009, 207. 
914 Paul Lyndon Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, p.668. 
915 Andrew Keay “The Public Enforcement of Directors' Duties” (January 16, 2013). 





$45. This fiscal deficit has been projected at SR 145 billion, equating to 
approximately £25 billion917.  
5.3.4. Political Pressure 
The ability to successfully enforce legislation and regulations relies upon political 
commitment918. However, this can impede enforcement of directors’ duties if 
there is an unwillingness politically to publicly penalise any misdemeanours. 
However, this does not apply to private enforcement actions. In other words, 
unlike private claimants, public enforcement agencies are somewhat centralised 
so therefore invite political control. Although political control can help ensure 
public enforcement is coordinated, there is a risk of bribery amongst public 
enforcer bodies919. Additionally, some research indicates that a company’s 
performance can be bettered if they have a political connection, such as the 
adoption of formal political roles. This means that if a director is employed 
politically, their motivation and the repercussions of their political involvement 
will be analysed. Companies with political links can often benefit from biased 
government policies and tenders causing a subsequent increase in profits and 
                                                             
917 See “Ministry's of Finance statment about the national budget for 2015”available 
at:https://www.mof.gov.sa/English/DownloadsCenter/Budget/Ministry's%20of%20Finance%
20statment%20about%20the%20national%20budget%20for%202015.pdf [Accessed August 
23, 2015]. 
918 See Ira M. Millstein, Shri G. N. Bajpai, Erik Berglöf and Stijn Claessens, Corporate 
Governance and Enforcement” in Enforcement and Corporate Governance, Three Views 
Global Corporate Governance Forum, Focus 3, 2005 at 59 and accessible at : 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/6ab71c8048a7e7b3accfef6060ad5911/Focus_ENFCorp
Go%20v3.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (Accessed, August 23 2015). 
919 Jonathan R. Hay and Andrei Shleifer. "Private enforcement of public laws: A theory of 
legal reform." American Economic Review, 1998, 398. 
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increased share prices920. It is only feasible to minimise sanctions against a 
company or its directors if the political role of the director can benefit them in 
other ways. 
Due to the existence of close relationships between government and business, 
reform of enforcement in the interests of minority shareholders appears somewhat 
unlikely921. Several agencies deal with corruption in UK such as Serious Fraud 
Office and National Crime Agency. In August 2015, as a part of the UK Anti-
Corruption Plan, the International Corruption Unit was created within the NCA. 
The ICU is tackling corruption, serious bribery and money laundering around the 
world922. Parlour has experience working as a UK representative on EU projects 
involving corruption legislation. Based upon Hong Kong as an example, he has 
proposed that corruption must be overcome politically and that development of 
an Independent Commission Against Corruption is the key to achieving success. 
It is questionable as to whether this would be politically approved within the UK 
and the EU but it appears to be a strong solution923. Despite this, lack of political 
desire to enforce the law is not always linked to corruption. Indeed, the UK 
                                                             
920 See Philip, Lawton, Yung, Boyce, 'Corporate political connection as a determinant 
of corporate governance in Hong Kong' Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 2012, 63, 449. 
921 See Ira M. Millstein, Shri G. N. Bajpai, Erik Berglöf and Stijn Claessens, Corporate 
Governance and Enforcement” in Enforcement and Corporate Governance, Three Views 
Global Corporate Governance Forum, Focus 3, 2005 at 59 and accessible at : 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/6ab71c8048a7e7b3accfef6060ad5911/Focus_ENFCorp
Go%20v3.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [Accessed, August 23 2015]. 
922 See the Official website of National Crime Agency (NCA), “International Corruption Unit 
(ICU)”, 2015, available at:  http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-
do/economic-crime/international-corruption-unit-icu. 




Government’s unwillingness to take initiate proceedings against directors is due 
to its resistance to expend public finances on issues which should be the 
responsibility of the company members924. 
Whilst the Saudi Government has reduced expenditure on public enforcement, 
political pressure is prevalent. Some legislation prohibits politics from 
influencing company management925 but the state has placed investment into 
many large companies. The Government is a significant shareholder as a result 
and has also adopted a managerial position with somewhat unobstructed powers. 
Most companies in which the Government has invested have substantial finance, 
are well managed and resourced and are some of the most lucrative corporates on 
the stock market926. Therefore, this indicates that despite political influence, 
company power is not exploited.  
 
In 2011, the National Anti-Corruption Commission was introduced with a direct 
link to the King. The role of the Commission will be to oversee all government 
sectors together with the execution of public affairs and orders. It will also be 
accountable for regulating any illegal practice within administration and 
                                                             
924 Paul Lyndon Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, p.668. 
925 For Example: s.6 Ministers’ Council Law 1994 prohibits the ministers from combining the 
position of company director and being minister at the same time. 
926 See Fahad M. Al-Majed, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate 
Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: a Comparative and Analytical Study from a 
Legal Perspective, Hard copy, Unpublished PhD thesis in Manchester University, 2008, p.48. 
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finance927. The Commission is aimed at helping to improve practice within a 
country although its effect so far is too early to evaluate. 
5.4 Summary 
 
In contrast to Chapter 4, which outlined private enforcement, Chapter 5 evaluated 
public enforcement activities. This chapter was an attempt to answer the second 
half of the research question regarding the effectiveness of public enforcement 
actions for directorial duties provided by UK legislation, and to what extent Saudi 
law can benefit from a consideration of them. This chapter was divided into three 
main sections to address the discussed aims. Firstly, public enforcers and their 
functions were discussed, and this part of the chapter outlined the public decision-
making bodies which possess the authority to penalise directors who have 
violated their responsibilities in the UK and Saudi Arabia. The second part 
focused on the possible measures that can be applied by the state official bodies 
– in the UK and Saudi Arabian contexts – to a director who has violated his/her 
legal duties. The final section emphasised the obstacles to public enforcement, 
which involved providing a detailed examination of the efficacy of directorial 
duties with respect to public enforcement. Ultimately, this helped the author to 
critically examine the current level of public enforcement of directorial duties in 
Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia, the author found that public enforcement actions 
are more efficacious and efficient compared to private actions and enforcement, 
                                                             




and this may be an indication of Saudi legislators’ desire to encourage a greater 


















CHAPTER 6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1. Introduction  
Clearly, the duties that directors owe to their company are a key component of 
corporate governance. Law-makers have introduced these duties in an attempt to 
create a fair and balanced relationship between shareholders and directors. This 
balance is needed to regulate tensions between ownership and control of 
companies. Nonetheless, if directors’ duties are not enforced effectively then they 
will have no real impact on corporate management. This is true regardless of the 
legal system that these duties are supposed to operate within. 
 
The key objective of this thesis is to analyse and assess those measures available 
to shareholders that are able to protect them as regards enforcing directors’ duties. 
It is vital to seek out an appropriate comparative legal research method as legal 
systems worldwide are changing rapidly. These sorts of approaches enable 
researchers to assess current legal concepts on a national and global basis. In 
recent years, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has taken great strides towards 
creating an effective legal structure for its judiciary, economy, corporations and 
capital market. The newly enacted Company Law 2015 substantially reformed 
and modernised company law in the country, bringing it closer in line with 
international standards and developments in corporate governance. However, as 
this thesis shows, the new Saudi Arabian law has not made any significant inroads 
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in regards to enforcing the duties of directors. More specifically, the only change 
to have been introduced is that the new law has increased certain types of public 
action outcomes such as fines and imprisonment. In terms of private enforcement, 
minority shareholders’ right to wind up the company has been annulled by the 
new law928. While the new law was expected to provide a derivate claim scheme 
for the jurisdiction, the law made no changes regarding this sort of claim. 
Therefore, minority shareholders may only rely on unfairly prejudiced conduct to 
sue directors. As this thesis concludes, this may be an indication of Saudi 
legislators’ desire to encourage more public enforcement actions than private 
ones929.  
 
As a result, the new legislation requires further amendment. Fresh developments 
and demands can be used to create recommendations for amendments for the CL 
2015. Of particular concern is the need to improve corporate governance 
structures and the enforcement of directors’ duties as well as the need to 
consolidate the protection of shareholders through more efficient enforcement 
actions. This thesis seeks to make a contribution by examining the experience that 
more developed nations have had in terms of the enforcement of directors’ duties. 
 
                                                             
928 See Ch 4, para 4.4. 
929 See Ch 6, paras 6.2.4., 6.2.6. 
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As a developing country, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia looks to other nations to 
improve its corporate governance practices. This is done in the hope of benefiting 
from other countries’ more advanced political, financial and legal institutions and 
avoiding any shortcomings identified in existing legal systems. This research 
examines and compares the law on enforcement of directors’ duties in the UK 
and in Saudi Arabia. This thesis will conclude by presenting a summary of the 
principal research findings, offering recommendations and suggestions for future 
studies in this area. In so doing, it is hoped that this thesis as a whole has 
contributed to knowledge in this area. 
6.2. Summary of findings 
Corporate behaviour has traditionally been seen as one of the main and central 
elements of efficacious corporate action and behaviour. According to the IOSC, 
in order to sustain the market's financial stability and future growth, a company's 
board of directors must display independence, integrity and accountability. Also, 
board members should be suitably qualified and clear about their collective remit 
and responsibility930.  Indeed, many significant corporate scandals have been 
attributed to the misconduct of individual directors. The thinking behind the 
enforcement of limiting responsibilities concerning the power and position of 
directors managing firms presents a chance for shirking behaviour or self-dealing. 
                                                             
930 The Growth and Emerging Markets Committee of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSC), Report on Corporate Governance, October 2016, available 




As a result, a thorough and clear series of rules and regulations has been thought 
of as necessary in order to retain positive corporate action with regard to director 
behaviour931.  
The Saudi CL 2015, when trying to optimise corporate governance behaviour 
within the nation, published a list of directors’ duties. Nevertheless, proficient 
corporate management also depends upon enforcement, not merely of 
regulations, edicts but also voluntary guidelines. This is because a director’s 
motivation to abide by regulations is impacted by the means by which such 
regulations are manifested and enforced. Therefore, efficacious enforcement and 
comprehensive rules determine the efficiency of a system of regulation. A 
comparison of the law concerning the enforcement of directors’ responsibilities 
shall be provided herein. Laws of this nature within Saudi Arabia and the UK 
have been critically assessed within this thesis.  
The UK, as a result of its long-lived experience in this sector, is thought of as 
among the more advanced of all corporate law jurisdictions. Indeed, this is 
especially true with regard to the means by which it sorts out and the enforcement 
of directional duties. When endeavouring to try and assess the remit of law in 
Saudi Arabia, this study has assessed several UK law sources. Actions which may 
be utilised by minority shareholders when trying to bring about an enforcement 
of directors’ duties are extensively covered in a number of UK cases and in 
                                                             
931 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
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legislation, such as the CA 2006. There are some crucial elements, even following 
the passing of the Saudi Companies Law in 2015 that are still unaddressed. As a 
result, UK legislation needs to be considered in depth as it may potentially 
contribute to prospective CL 2015 development.  
Furthermore, from the very foundation of Saudi Arabia as a nation, the Shari’ah 
has been the official legal code. Therefore, this thesis believes that it is significant 
that the analysis is expanded in order to demonstrate a viewpoint stemming from 
Shari’ah law concerning the issue at hand. Moreover, the duties and 
responsibilities of directors with regard to the principles and rights afforded by 
Shari’ah law are, according to Islamic academics, able to provide several 
suggestions. These suggestions include increased efficacy when dealing with 
misconduct by directors. Therefore, this assessment will not investigate Shari’ah 
as a legal system only for followers of Islam. Rather, it will be considered in the 
context of governmental actions. In other words, the review will focus on 
Shari’ah law as a system providing recommendations to legislators worldwide, 
irrespective of national religions. These recommendations may be used to 
improve the effectiveness of regulations, and in particular of certain aspects of 
commercial law932. Subsequently, this will alter and enforce corporate 
governance. Due to the fact that these issues remain unexamined, this process 
                                                             
932 See Ch 3, para 3.1. 
318 
 
will provide new original contributions to academic understanding. Of all the 
findings, those listed below were ascertained by the following means.  
6.2.1. Shari’ah law 
 
This thesis has illuminated the question concerning Shari’ah, namely, whether 
the system of law may be imposed, with validity, upon or within modern societal 
systems. Many critiques of Shari’ah law stem from misunderstandings, it has 
been found. The concept of Shari’ah as an inflexible doctrine is founded on the 
incorrect conception that Shari’ah law is merely to be found in the accounts of 
the Qur‘an and Sunnah. Though these documents comprise Shari’ah’s main and 
primary sources, the legal code is not pre-made for use by humans in a passive 
and uncompromising manner. Rather, it should be founded on the primary 
sources and sacred texts, which are acknowledged as its main sources933. As 
demonstrated by this study, laws from alternative legal systems are sometimes 
taken and transplanted as part of Shari’ah law, assuming they do not contradict 
its main values. For example, in Saudi Arabia the Commercial Court Law 1931, 
the Commercial Register Law 1956 and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Law 1980 have been transplanted from other legal systems such as those in 
France, which were not against the Shari’ah law principles934. 
                                                             




Second, this thesis has shown that the idea of a number of directors’ duties have, 
for some time, been acknowledged by academics of Shari’ah law. Several 
secondary and primary sources have been scrutinised and assessed when trying 
to ascertain if Shari’ah has indeed incorporated certain elements within directors’ 
duties. Furthermore, fiduciary duties have been proven as having their origins in 
Shari’ah law935. Also, it has been proven that duty to act within powers, duty not 
to accept profits from the third parties, duty to avoid conflicts of interest and other 
duties have their roots in Shari’ah law. Such an acknowledgement has shown and 
demonstrated by instances and provisions deliberated over by Islamic scholars, 
who improved them for use by contemporary companies. In one instance, which 
has been demonstrated above, Shari’ah law has devised processes and regulations 
concerning violations of due diligence. These were developed to be analogous to 
corporate law’s duty of care standards.  
This concept demonstrates a recognition in Islamic thinking of fiduciary 
relationships and the principles therein. Furthermore, the adoption by the UK of 
the idea of trust was imported from Arabic states in the thirteenth century after 
witnessing the operation of the Waqf institution according to Shari’ah law and its 
use in the Middle East936. Subsequently, the argument has been made that UK 
common law has developed the idea of a fiduciary relationship. Responsibilities 
                                                             
935 See Ch 3, para 3.1.2.1. 
936 See Ch 3, para 3.1.2.1. 
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within this relationship include due attention and fidelity. Conversely, this aspect 
of law remains under-assessed in Islamic scholarship937.  
6.2.2. Directors’ liability 
 
Among the more fascinating findings are those concerned with directors’ liability. 
With regard to the accountability of directors when contrasting UK and Saudi 
law, three prominent aspects are notable. First, law in Saudi Arabia is less flexible 
with regard to the limits placed on the abilities and freedoms of directors. Indeed, 
legally, under section 72 of the CL 2015, directors are not allowed to concern or 
involve themselves with a rival company. In the event taking place, the company 
is able to apply for reimbursement via income, profit or compensation from the 
salary of the director in question. Theoretically, this is a disincentive for any 
director that may be intending to concern themselves with a rival company, and 
reinforces the law by making repercussions more enforceable.  
Also, the application of limits on the appointment of corporate directors are 
already applied938. A number of issues came to the fore several decades ago 
because of legal persons being appointed to joint stock company directorial 
boards. Consequently, a series of limits and rules were applied for such an 
instance, while a further instance of such an example is an aspect of Saudi CL 
                                                             
937 See Ch 3, para 3.4.1. 
938 The UK Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, s.87 prohibits a corporate 
body to be employed as a director, but this section is still not in force. 
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2015, which states that CEO and Chairperson positions may not be combined into 
a single role, something that remains non-bonding in UK law. 
Additionally, the second aspect concerns the stance of Saudi Arabian law with 
regard to relief from liability. In Australia and the United States of America, the 
business judgement rule (BJR) is enshrined in law. The BJR sets a benchmark 
used by the courts when investigating the behaviour of company board members 
to decide whether or not they can be held liable for decisions that have damaged 
the company. A claimant wishing to bring a case against a director or directors 
and their motives must challenge the presumption of the BJR that they have made 
decisions in the best interests of the company. In order to rebut the BJR, the 
claimant is required to prove alleged fraudulent activity, conflict of interest or 
some other illegal action939. In Saudi Arabia, there is no doctrine or case law, 
leaving company board directors with no such avenue for protection from liability 
when conduct is called into question940. 
Also, in Saudi Arabia, directors do not have as many chances to avoid or relieve 
themselves from responsibilities and accountabilities compared to their peers in 
the UK. Indeed, a company in Saudi Arabia is not permitted to ratify its director’s 
inappropriate behaviour or actions; this is not the case in UK law. Nevertheless, 
                                                             
939 See Ch 3, para 3.3.3.2. 
940 See Amgad Husein and Anas Akel, “Saudi Arabia: Officers and Directors Liability under 





ratification is permitted in Shari’ah, and some argue that Saudi law may 
potentially be reshaped so that ratification comes in the form of prior consent to 
the director, thus making it both permittable and lawful. An additional alleviation 
of liability is in the form of the availability of the liability insurance of directors; 
as expounded upon above941, the pressure is removed from directors to some 
degree as they are not accountable to pay expensive litigation costs, something 
that can also be time-consuming. Directors’ liability insurance is not dealt with 
in CL 2015, though it has been claimed to be crucial for legislators in Saudi 
Arabia to find a substitute for directors’ insurance that does adhere to Shari’ah 
law. This is to stop the possibility of harmful liability arising. 
Additionally, directorial liability was seen to increase from negligent 
performance or default, and this may be relieved according to UK law according 
to the CA 2006 section 1157. This iterates, in elementary terms, that directors 
merely have to act in an honest and rational way942. Nevertheless, there is no 
provision in Saudi CL 2015 providing for such a judicial pardon. Thus, there is a 
wider array and degree of liability in the UK when compared with and contrasted 
to the UK, and the reason as to why the Saudi law assumed its stand is due to the 
requirement to guarantee correct company administration and the protection of 
investor rights, as well as the rights of stakeholders and shareholders. Herein, 
                                                             
941 See Ch 3, paras 3.1.2.3., 3.3.4. 
942 Although such a judicial pardon is available in UK under CA 2006 s.1157, it is rarely used 
successfully. See Ch 3, para 3.3.4. 
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Saudi Arabian law is seen to be far less flexible, indeed it allows a relatively 
restricted relief concerning the liability for directors. In the case of a director 
breaching their obligations however, the law is unable to present or facilitate 
efficacious reactive actions to reprimand them. Indeed, it is not strong enough to 
be able to prevent shareholders from launching legal actions in order to reprimand 
those directors who transgressed their responsibilities.  
Thirdly, a number of directors’ duties have yet to be incorporated or dealt with 
by Saudi Arabian Law. Prior to CL 2015, a number of academics have attributed 
this shortcoming to the fact that we dealing with a 50-year-old law and in the UK 
many of the new forms of directorial liability (such as wrongful trading) have 
only emerged in the past 30 years. Since 1965, significant alterations to the 
financial, corporate and business world have been experienced943. However, these 
limitations remain, even after more recent laws have been introduced, and one 
instance of this is the fiduciary responsibilities which are not mentioned within 
the CL 2015. Some propound the argument that Shari’ah law does include and 
acknowledge fiduciary responsibilities is traceable in the nation and that it does 
have an effect on and is applied in the courts there. Explanation and codification 
is needed regarding these responsibilities however, or integrity may be damaged 
by a series of fragmented regulations and principles. UK law should be used by 
                                                             
943 Fahad M. Al-Majed, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance 
of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: a Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal 




Saudi Arabian lawmakers when trying to improve Saudi law, especially section 
174 of the CA 2006, something that delineates directors’ responsibility including 
the duty of care while concurrently imposing directorial standards that must be 
adhered to by all directors. 
In Saudi Arabian law, there is no mention of the person that directors owe their 
duties to, nor which person’s concerns need to be considered when directors 
manage their respective companies. In UK law, however, section 170 of the CA 
2006 states that companies are owed duties by directors, and that the director is 
bound by duty to promote the success of their company to benefit all its members, 
especially with regard to longevity and shareholders’ interests as per s.172 of the 
CA 2006.  
A further instance is that UK directors are able to utilise their personal scrutiny 
and judgement. Assuming that that the power to make decisions was approved of 
through a concord by the company in question and in accordance with the 
constitution of that company, the director of a company needs to assess the 
various situations on an independent basis. Nevertheless, if the director should as 
part of a company board also make a decision by judging situations independently 
remains unclear and unstipulated in Saudi law. Additionally, a nominee director 
within the UK legal system is not indebted to the nominator as they have been 
nominated by them. This is due to the fact that the director’s role is to undertake 
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independent judgements944. No legislation exists in the UK that concerns nominee 
directors. As a result of this fact, the CA 2006 does not tackle the problem, and 
furthermore there is no provision within the Saudi CL 2015 that necessitates 
independent directorial decisions.  
Consequently, in Saudi law, the laws for directors’ duties need to more stringent. 
It was recommended that shareholders be able and permitted to ratify the director 
through the general meetings as they see fit. In the UK, this provision is 
acknowledged, and similarly it is clearly permitted in Shari’ah law. Indeed, it is 
seen from the text stipulating the duties of directors in Saudi law that director’s 
substantive principles are mirrored, though certain aspects are clearly ignored or 
neglected. What is required henceforth is for directors under Saudi law to have a 
broader way of covering director actions and behaviour.  
6.2.3. The concept of “shadow” directors 
 
An additional important discovery is geared toward the significance of 
determining the person who actually is the director of a given company. UK and 
Saudi law differ on this issue. In the case of the latter, the definition of the term 
is very significant and is based on the main issue and query as to which individual 
is owed the responsibility. Indeed, no law actually stipulates the precise definition 
of a director. One of the repercussions of the absence of such a definition is that, 
within Saudi law, there is no official recognition of the role of shadow director. 
                                                             
944 See Ch 3, para 3.3.1. 
326 
 
The individual that is able to influence the board to a considerable extent is not 
deemed to be a director. Such individuals may be able to incur notable profits or 
inflict losses on the firm though nevertheless not be accountable by law. As a 
result of this, the identification of such an individual as part of the company is 
needed so their titular position can be used, as a named director, for consequential 
action by shareholders. 
If a firm is subject to wrongdoing by a certain individual who holds no formal 
position on the board, theoretically speaking, this person is then able to prevent 
any liability on their part and thus fines, imprisonment and disqualification 
rulings are not applicable to them on the basis of breached duties. This due to the 
fact that Saudi law a formal approach in this issue and the concept of shadow 
directors is not recognised. Additionally, directors who have been disqualified 
from acting as directors are able to informally influence company’s affairs945. 
Thus legal enforcement mechanisms are spurious, and the efficaciousness of 
disqualification penalties are doubtful. 
This thesis therefore sets out a series of suggested amendments to the CL 2015. 
The thesis aims to ensure that all responsibilities of directors shall also be 
applicable to shadow directors and de facto directors too. As a result of this, such 
individuals will assume greater liability for misconduct or bad decisions. 
                                                             
945 Since this person is not considered as a director, he/she may not be accountable for 
breaching directors’ duties. He/she may be held accountable only on the grounds of the civil 
liability based on contract or tort. 
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Consequently, several enforcement procedures and mechanisms are attainable in 
the case of such a breach.  
6.2.4. The private and public enforcement of directors’ duties 
 
Among the discoveries made herein one concerns the assessment of whether 
enforcement actions may be utilised against defaulting directors. This may be 
done in the case of a private party’s action or the action of a state official. There 
are two varieties of enforcement; public enforcement and private enforcement. 
This thesis endeavours to assess the various Saudi private and public enforcement 
actions and contrast them with those of the UK.  
Particularly after the Saudi CL 2015 had been introduced, among the more 
disappointing elements of the Saudi system is the limited range of choices for 
minority shareholders. While in the UK there are a number of private enforcement 
actions that can be taken by shareholders against that of a company director, there 
are very few in Saudi law. Initially, with regard to the derivative claim as covered 
under the UK CA 2006, it was concluded that such actions are unrecognised under 
Saudi law. Such an action, it is argued, is alluded to in the wording of section 80 
of the CL 2015, the implantation derivative action, as it exists in other nations, is 
not and has not been in the past the aim of the Saudi legislators. 
Once, minority shareholders held the right to seek the winding up of the company. 
This is no longer the case and the option is not available any more under the new 
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Saudi CL 2015946. By and large, winding up has a notable and important impact 
on the stakeholders of a company and the company itself. In the case of a court 
deciding that winding up is not appropriate due to the alternates available, a 
number of situations nevertheless do arise wherein it remains the sole available 
option. As a result of this, this thesis criticised the Saudi CL 2015 as it stopped 
minority shareholders from seeking this order947. 
Another possible action for minority shareholders to take against a company they 
are not satisfied with is the exit solution. Saudi law allows this solution even in 
private companies. This is an advanced US remedy948. However, no direct 
enforcement action against directors is taken and directors are not held 
responsible for their illegitimate actions as a result of the minority shareholders 
selling their shares. Though a number of shareholders are presented with the 
chance to escape their company, the company itself and their colleagues and other 
shareholders are then subject to losses and negative repercussions. Regardless, so 
that the destabilisation of a firm does not occur once minority shareholders have 
been afforded the rights to sell-off their share, a number of caveats may be 
enforced while ensuring this minority is still able to exercise their afforded rights.  
                                                             
946 See Ch 4, para 4.4. 
947 See Ch 4, paras 4.4., 4.5.2. 
948 See s.262 of Delaware General Corporation Law, s.13,14 of the Model Business 
Corporation Act. For in depth comment see Raluca Papadima, Mihaela Gherghe and Radu 
Valeanu "Shareholder Exit Signs on American and European Highways: Under 
Construction." U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 18, 2016, 1059. 
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Minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia, can only commence unfair prejudice 
actions against directors in the case of private enforcement actions. Indeed, the 
claim of unfairly prejudicial conduct was seen as preferable to UK minority 
shareholders. Within this assertion, the rights of both Saudi and UK minority 
shareholders are similar, the UK law permits the courts the ability to judge and 
exercise powers under the assumption of the litigation being justified and well-
grounded. The UK’s section 996(2)(c) of the CA 2006 could benefit the Saudi 
SA 2015 as UK law permits the court to permit the petitioning body or individual 
to take action against directors in the name of the company based on an unfair 
prejudice claim as decided by the court949.  
Assuming there are a number of comparatively small levels of private 
enforcement in the way of directors’ duties, the public enforcement of duties 
needs to be taken into account. This study has demonstrated that Saudi Arabia, as 
a developing nation is almost equivalent in the way of instructions compared to 
established UK institutions. This is especially true with regard to the process of 
disciplining and holding accountable managerial staff. Additionally, a number of 
enforcement mechanisms may be forced on companies by the central 
government. In the case of Saudi Arabia. The MOCI and the CMA are the main 
                                                             
949 It is submitted that the relief under Section 996(2)(c) has, in reality, been ordered only 
infrequently and it is suggested that, under this provision, action such as this has never been 
permitted by the courts. However, as the legal environment in Saudi Arabia is very different, 
this does not preclude the possibility of such action being ordered. See John Lowry and Alan 
Dignam, Company law, Oxford University Press, 2014, p.211. 
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public agencies enforcing directors’ duties under Saudi law. These institutions 
are responsible for dealing with and assessing directors that have transgressed 
and who have violated the SCL 2015. While CMA being placed in charge of 
directors of publically-listed companies, other companies’ directors are 
monitored by MOCI. 
Among the most disappointing of all findings seen within this thesis is that, to the 
understanding of the author, since the introduction of CL 1965, no single case has 
been recorded in accordance to imposition of penalties for breaches of CL 
provisions. Despite the fact that the institution is able to take action against certain 
actions, there have been no recorded repercussions imposed by it. Under Saudi 
CL 1965, the highest level of financial penalty can be seen to be equivalent to 
$5,333. It is believed that the MOCI will experience no benefit if it decides to 
take such action and initiate these proceedings against wrongdoers. This is due to 
the fact that such insubstantial financial penalties prove insufficient when 
bringing about adequate capital sources for future investigation.  
Such sanctions, in accordance with the contemporary CL 2015, are far more 
severe. Indeed, the director may be accountable for fines of up to $1,333,000, as 
well as potential incarceration and a prison sentence of 5 years. It is argued that 
in the case of more severe financial penalties, and the successful implementation 
of such penalties, then MOCI will be able to initiate their penalties with greater 
effectiveness. Despite for the fact that it may, at the start, seem as if deterrence 
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did increase concerning those directors breaching the provisions situated in CL 
2015, it is not the case that this is certainly a positive development. Under CL 
2015, heavier sections may be inadequately enforced, and, if so, they may have 
meagre or inadequate repercussions concerning directors’ action950.  
Concerning the CMA, this thesis has shown that a number of initiatives were 
commended and launched by the CMA. A number of sanctions have been 
imposed by the CMA-managed CRSD. As a result of this, the autonomy of the 
CRSD remains questionable. Thus punishments like imprisonment and 
disqualification are imposed and are deemed as acceptable as a result. A number 
of commentators951 critique the fact that the committee is not given the correct 
level of autonomy by which it would be able to impose the sections it makes, and 
this is true of the CRSD. Thus, not every imposition is necessarily to be imposed 
by court rulings. In the UK, courts alone have the authority to disqualify a 
director, though the “Undertakings order” may be brought about by the Secretary 
of State, and they do not require court order. Indeed, while leaving this power 
with the courts may increase the independence of the process, the administrative 
approach serves to save money and time. Saudi Arabian legal officials may learn 
                                                             
950 See Ch 5, para 5.5.2. 
951 For Example see Faleh Al Kahtani, Current practices of Saudi corporate governance: A 
case for reform, PhD thesis, Brunel University, 2013, pp.108,109, available at 
http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/7382/3/FulltextThesis.pdf [Accessed March 27, 
2016]. Two articles were published as a result of this thesis, see Faleh Al Kahtani, “Current 
Disclosure and Transparency Practices in Saudi Corporate Governance”, Arab Law 
Quarterly, 28(2), 2014, 176. Also see Faleh Al Kahtani, “Current Practices of Saudi 
Shareholders’ Rights: A Case for Reform”, Arab Law Quarterly, 27 (3), 2013, 231. 
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from the UK and the way that it deals with higher flexibility and autonomy 
levels952.  
Additionally, in Saudi Arabia, the law generally permits selected public agencies 
to publish their rulings regarding the fining of individuals. If such publication was 
not supported by appropriate legal provisions, publication might be seen as illegal 
defamation. The CMA often publishes its decisions regarding the disqualification 
or fining of those directors found to have breached the 2003 Capital Market Law. 
Publication of this information is not facilitated or supported by any grant or 
ruling, and this thesis recommends that there be a provision added to the Capital 
Market Law that enables the CMA the means and authority to publish the 
penalties it has imposed on disqualified or fined individuals953.  
 
 
6.2.5. Obstacles in the way of enforcement actions 
 
This thesis discovered that in Saudi Arabia, though the law fails to present 
sufficient enforcement mechanisms, a number of lesser challenges could stymie 
those already in place. This shortcoming may be a result of several causes.  
The thesis argued that enforcement costs of such aforementioned details may 
present a difficulty for both the private party and the state. One of the most notable 
                                                             
952 See Ch 5, para 5.2.3. 
953 See Ch 5, para 5.2.1. 
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differentiating factors of private law enforcement and public law enforcement is 
that public law enforcement assumes payment is received regardless of the action 
in question. In the case of private enforcement, only when litigation achieves its 
goal are the parties concerned paid. Private claimants need to provide the capital 
needed to fund the litigation. Though this results in easier coordination of public 
enforcement, this is because this process is able to operate a securities regulation 
system, one that is self-sufficient as it can be applied to notable financial 
penalties. As a result of this, the argument that cost modifications have greater 
repercussions on private investment can be maintained. 
This thesis endeavours to find solutions to the minority shareholders cost issue. 
In the UK, the losing side needs to pay for the total capital spend on litigation for 
the wining party as well. Conversely, in the US, each party needs to pay for their 
own legal team, and this is true of all legal suits954. As a result, in the case of an 
unsuccessful legal action then the shareholders do not need to reimburse the legal 
costs of the party who is successful. Thus the US has a more appropriate solution 
to protecting the rights of minority shareholders with regard to such cases. 
Additionally, minority shareholders are not aware of their rights to initiate actions 
against directors955. Indeed, under Saudi Arabian law, minority shareholders are 
                                                             
954 See Ch 4, para 4.5.1. 
955 For example see Fahad M. Al-Majed, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the 
Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: a Comparative and Analytical 
Study from a Legal Perspective, Hard copy, Unpublished PhD thesis in Manchester 
University, 2008, p.242. 
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able to influence the organisational processes, although this is uncommon. For 
example, they are entitled to call for a General Meeting (GM), where they may 
ask questions of all board members and auditors. Thus, they hold the right to gain 
access to information held on record by a company that they can utilise it to 
extrapolate evidences against directors in the case of a litigation law suit. 
Minority shareholders in the country are unaware of this however, according to a 
number of studies, and thus do not take action as a result956. 
A further obstacle that has been expounded upon herein is the means by which 
political agenda may present a notable challenge to directors’ duties and their 
enforcement. As a result of the fact that, in order to efficaciously and successfully 
bring about litigation enforcement and impose regulations, political commitment 
is needed. Consequently, enforcing breaches of director’s duties may be harder, 
assuming a political resistance to draw attention to or highlight any related 
transgressions. Biased governments have been known to assist companies in the 
past with whom they have shared some connection, and their policies generally 
result in higher profits and thus can increase the cost of shares. The minimisation 
of sanctions against a company and the directors of a company is only viable 
when alternative benefits can be obtained. Due to the existence of familial ties 
between government and companies, reform of enforcement in the interests of 
minority shareholders appears somewhat unlikely. Political corruption is able to 
                                                             
956 See Ch 4, para 4.5.3. 
335 
 
stymie both private mechanisms and public mechanisms with regard to legal 
enforcement. As a result, corruption, it is proposed, needs to be transcended by 
political action. The establishment of an autonomous institution to combat 
corruption may attain this end. The corruption is tackled in UK by several 
agencies such as Serious Fraud Office and National Crime Agency.  In Saudi 
Arabia, it was shown that the newly established National Anti-Corruption 
Commission is aimed at helping to improve practice within a country although 
its effect so far is too early to evaluate957.  
Absence of political intent to enact and enforce law is not perennially connected 
to corrupt practices, though it also may arise from unwillingness to allocate public 
funds, as previously expounded upon, concerning problems, companies and their 
members. As a result of this, in Saudi Arabia, as well as in the UK, governments 
hope to reduce their public expenditure across several sectors for a number of 
different reasons. This is also true for those agencies responsible for public 
enforcement duties and charges.  
This thesis argued that GCC adoption in Saudi Arabia has made no effective 
contribution to the enforcement of directors’ duties. Herein, the many issues and 
problems concerning the enforcement of director’s duties with regard to the GCC, 
and not Companies Law, has been assessed. It must be stated that the code itself 
is merely a guide, and that the application of such regulations generally apply to 
                                                             
957 See Ch 5, para 5.3.4. 
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listed companies alone. Provisions from voluntary bodies may also promote 
innovative practice, and one such example of this is the founding of the board of 
evaluation. Nevertheless, the board remains reliant on honest behaviour from 
directors and their use of the code to their optimal ability and capacity. 
Consequently, legislators in Saudi Arabia are not keen to enact such propositions 
via a voluntary code with regard to company directors. Indeed, a number of 
voluntary provisions were made mandatory via revisions made by the CL 2015. 
Lastly, with regard to corporate governance demands, according to Cadbury958, 
both equilibrium as well as self-regulation are sought after. Nevertheless, 
equilibrium needs to be sought-out in a mutual endeavour before being applied 




6.2.6. Closing remarks 
 
Lastly, the objective of this study was to look into the effectiveness of Saudi 
enforcement actions against directors compared to those of the UK. A critical 
assessment of legal sources on each nation has facilitated this process.  
                                                             
958 See Adrian Cadbury. Corporate governance and chairmanship: A personal view. Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p.28. 
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The duties in Saudi Arabia, as can be perceived by a thorough reading of duties 
of directors and the provision thereof, are mirrored. However, for certain aspects 
and elements this is not the case.  
In terms of enforcing breached duties, if a director is in breach of duty in Saudi 
Arabia then there is no effective legal course by which private actions can be 
initiated to punish the wrongdoers. For instance, minority shareholders are 
prevented from initiating any legal action against directors on the company’s 
behalf. In Saudi Arabia, the author found that public enforcement actions are not 
only sufficient but more efficacious compared to private actions and enforcement. 
Indeed, they are able to protect minority shareholders, unlike the private 
enforcement actions, and can provide the necessary capital required by the action 
itself. Furthermore, as has been submitted, efficacious public enforcement assists 
private enforcement too. 
Evidently, each enforcement system outlined here has drawbacks, as previously 
described. Nevertheless, it is also clear that single systems may not be sufficient 
on their own. As such, it is submitted that the use of appropriate multiple methods 
could improve corporate governance, so long as it does not unreasonably affect 
actions of the board959. 
A number of recommendations are presented herein in order to try and increase 
the scope of law. This thesis has presented a number of changes to existing Saudi 
                                                             
959 Andrew Keay, Board Accountability in Corporate Governance, Routledge, 2015, p.241. 
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Law and argues that the legal system in Saudi Arabia would benefit as a result. 
However, it has also shown that merely transposing UK law onto Saudi Arabia 
cannot be seen as a change to Saudi structural accountability of directors. Indeed, 
lawmakers in Saudi Arabia shall not burden directors with a new list of rules. 
Instead, they are more likely to clarify director duties. Though this brings with it 
a series of notable repercussions, with regard to changing existing implications 
and provisions, this aim may be easily attained. The new amendments of Saudi 
CL 2015 are suggested by a number of enforcement actions. Regardless, this 
thesis thinks that in the case of UK enforcement mechanism being transposed to 
the Saudi legal system, they would become entrenched and mould to extant Saudi 
culture.  
6.3. Recommendations 
Recommendations are presented here in an effort to contribute to legal reform in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in order to improve the situation for the 
enforcement of directors’ duties. It is recommended that Saudi Arabian political 
and legal actors develop a better understanding of their power in relation to 
enhancing existing enforcement mechanisms for the duties of directors. In 
particular, this research suggestions include: 
1- It was submitted that the definition of ‘director’ is vitally important and centres 
on the key concern of the question of by whom the duties of directors are owed960. 
                                                             
960 See Ch 2, para 2.1. 
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Nevertheless, in Saudi Arabia, no piece of legislation currently provides an 
explicit definition of the term. As a clear definition of ‘director’ may prevent legal 
uncertainty, law-makers should amend the Saudi CL 2015. Also, the Saudi CL 
2015 should specify a minimum age requirement for directors. 
 
2- Neither ‘shadow’ nor ‘de facto’ directors are recognised in Saudi Arabian law.  
If Saudi Arabian law-makers were to recognise these two forms of director, this 
would make firms and those who act as directors more accountable for their 
conduct. It is thus recommended that new laws be introduced to ensure that the 
perpetrators of bad corporate conduct be held responsible for their actions. In 
addition, despite the important role played by nominee directors in representing 
key shareholders, groups of shareholders or, typically, a holding company, 
neither UK nor Saudi Arabian legislation provide legal provisions for nominee 
directors. It is suggested that both jurisdictions should address the issues related 
to nominee directors. 
 
3- Since the fiduciary duties of directors are not well-clarified in Saudi Arabian 
legislation, Saudi Arabian legislators should clarify these duties under SCL 2015. 
In other words, Shari’ah law has recognised fiduciary duties and this 
acknowledgement exerts its influence in the country and is applied by the courts. 
Nevertheless, this recognition is gained through scattered rules and principles, 
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which can create legal uncertainty. Given that other directors’ duties are typically 
codified in the Companies Law 2015, it is suggested that directors’ fiduciary 
duties should be codified too. This will offer greater clarification of Saudi 
Arabia’s legal position in relation to fiduciary duties. In doing so they can benefit 
from s.174 of the UK CA 2006 which offers an explanation of the various 
fiduciary responsibilities of directors, for example, the duty of care, and imposes 
standards that directors must meet.  
4- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 does not address the issue of whose interests 
need to be considered when running a company.  However, the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Code 2006 does strongly indicate that the rights of both shareholders 
and stakeholders need to be safeguarded. However, the Code’s applicability 
extends to listed companies only, thus, Saudi Arabian policy-makers should 
reflect on this issue when amending the SCL 2015. 
 
5- In Saudi Arabia, legislation is silent on directors’ liability insurance. It has 
been suggested that since insurance is vital for both individuals and businesses. 
Although the insurance companies within the country that offer different types of 
insurance contracts such as health and vehicle insurance, but directors’ liability 
insurance has not been recognised961. Saudi Arabian legislators must identify a 
                                                             
961 See Ch 3, paras 3.1.2.3., 3.3.4. 
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substitute for directors’ insurance that adheres to Shari’ah law in order to prevent 
potentially crippling liability. 
 
6- The Saudi Arabian legal position on whether to grant minority shareholders 
the right to initiate a derivative claim is ambiguous and uncertain. In order to 
remove this uncertainty, s.80 of SCL 2015 should be amended.  Thus, it is 
suggested that derivative claims must be included in Saudi Arabia’s CL 2015. 
Nonetheless, when considering the introduction of this claim, there is a need to 
balance the prevention of unreasonable claims by minority shareholders, which 
can damage a company, with the guarantee that the claim is available to minority 
shareholders. These claims are vital as they can create equilibrium between 
shareholders and directors and protect shareholders’ rights. Unreasonable claims 
can be managed by imposing limitations on derivative claims.  
 
7- In terms of unfairly prejudicial conduct claims, SCL 2015 can benefit from 
adoption of s.996(2)(c) of the UK CA 2006. This provision allows the court to 
grant permission to the petitioner(s) to bring an action in the name of the company 
and on the basis of the court’s directions as to whether the unfair prejudice claim 
is well-founded. 
 
8- Before the introduction of the Saudi CL 2015, it was suggested that the 
minority shareholders’ right to seek to wind up the company must only apply in 
certain circumstances, i.e. when a winding up is the only choice. However, while 
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this right is no longer granted to minority shareholders under the new Saudi CL 
2015, it is suggested that it should be granted in certain conditions. 
 
9- In Saudi Arabia, the Capital Market Authority often publicly publishes its 
decisions concerning the sanctions and penalties imposed on directors. This can 
offer greater transparency as shareholders and other stakeholders will be aware 
of any sanctions that have been imposed on directors. However, no legal 
provision allows the CMA to publish this information and it is arguable whether 
publication constitutes illegal defamation. Hence, in order to avoid legal 
uncertainty, it is suggested that legislators add a provision to the Capital Market 
Law that grants the CMA the power to publish details of the penalties levied 
against wrongdoers. 
 
10- As has been previously discussed, the Saudi Arabian Committee for the 
Resolution of Securities Dispute has the power to impose different sanctions on 
discreet directors. These can include, imprisonment, fines and disqualification. 
Considering the administration of the CRSD is managed by the CMA, the 
former’s independence is questionable. It is thus suggested that the CRSD should 
not be authorised to enact such rulings. Also, the UK courts originally had the 
sole power to disqualify directors, but the newly introduced ‘undertakings; order 
can be enacted by the Secretary of State without the need for a court order. In 
fact, while leaving this power with the courts may increase the independence of 
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the process, the administrative approach serves to save money and time. Law-
makers in Saudi Arabia can benefit from the UK approach’s higher level of 
autonomy and flexibility. 
 
6.4. Contribution and suggestions for further research 
As has been shown above, the accountability of directors has been thought of as 
a central element to efficacious corporate action and behaviour. Nevertheless, if 
such duties are not enforced in the correct manner then they shall have no or 
negligible impact on the behaviour of directors. As a result of this, this thesis 
intends to assess Saudi Arabian directors’ duties compared to those of the UK. 
More exactingly, the effectiveness of the enforcement of directors’ duties on their 
actions was assessed herein.  
According to the findings of this thesis, studies under Saudi Arabian law have not 
considered the duties of its company directors in great detail. More significantly, 
the problem as to how director duties can be enforced was not assessed or 
invested, even before the introduction of the new CL 2015. With the 
commencement in May 2016 of the Companies Law, introduced in November 
2015, reforms occurred to a number of kinds of enforcement mechanisms which 
may be enacted when directors beach their duties. Thus, the gaps that exist in 
extant literature can be explained by this, and the need for further research in the 
sector can be justified. This thesis is, according to the author’s best understanding, 
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the first study that assessed in a critical manner the enforcement of director duties 
in Saudi Arabia in the light of the CL 2015. Through the provision of important 
results and findings, this study has made a significant contribution to knowledge. 
Through assessing and benefiting from the UK -and other nations’- legal, 
financial and political institutions, this thesis has been able to highlight the lawful 
limitations in Saudi Arabia regarding enforcement of directors’ duties. 
Furthermore, the element of Islam and the Islamic viewpoint has been significant 
in trying to determine the opinions and perspectives of efficacious corporate 
action. Such contrasts try to bridge the gaps in existing literature to try and 
promote and argue for legal reform in Saudi Arabia. This, it is hoped, will make 
the current situation regarding the enforcement of director’s duties in the nation 
more efficient and efficacious. Thus, the corporate context will be more closely 
scrutinized and thus safer. Additionally, the thesis endeavoured to broaden the 
understanding of the topic in hand and that of judges, directors, practitioners and 
lawyers. 
Consequently, additional and prospective research concerning a number of legal 
topics is required. Furthermore, extant literature needs to be assessed in order to 
fully deal with the problem at hand. Therein, a number of important issues 
concerning Saudi law and the governance of corporate institutions in the nation 
itself demand additional and more in-depth assessment. As a result of the 
restrictions arising from this thesis, the author has had to restrict themselves to 
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enforcement actions concerning directors of solvent companies. Furthermore, 
only the safeguarding of shareholder rights has been assessed herein. Therefore, 
this thesis has not concerned itself with the duties of directors regarding creditors 
in a situation of company solvency or insolvency in Saudi Arabia, nor contrasted 
them with US and UK jurisdictions. New insolvency laws are anticipated shortly 
in Saudi Arabia, hence the significate of this thesis.  
Additionally, the aspect of this subject that demands the most research is the 
enforcement of directors’ duties within family firms. Thus, a contrast of UK and 
Saudi family companies is needed in prospective research. So that the analyses 
can be widened, the research study should incorporate extant enforcement 
challenges as well as recommend a number of solutions.  
Furthermore, the thesis has looked into the duties of directors as a single aspect 
of corporate governance. Research into the nature and the structure of corporate 
governance as a whole is needed. Indeed, the gap is there because there is a need 
for more and further studies in this area concerning Saudi legal, political and 
socio-economic viewpoints and corporate governance. This study shall assess 
such subjects in a theoretical and practical manner. 
Lastly, it is essential to highlight the methodology of legal transplant as a central 
technique for mending the gaps identified in Saudi Arabian corporate governance 
regulations. Therefore, evaluation of texts on transplants is required by future 
examinations. The examination must assess the current methods within Saudi 
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Arabia for transferring corporate laws from foreign jurisdictions. This 
examination will try to explore the primary elements that must be highlighted 
during the process of transplanting recently developed regulations to ensure 
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